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After the proclamation of the Kingdom of Italy, which took place in Torino in 1861, a new and 
fundamental impulse was given to the realization of an organic program of rail transport. The 
strongest industrial groups of that time invest substantial capital, making also use of foreign 
fundings (especially French fundings), on this new activity and they founded about twenty 
concessionaires.  
Soon it emerged the need to reduce the number of concessionaires and the law n.2248 of 
20/03/1865 assigned the management of the whole railway network to four companies: “Società 
per le Ferrovie dell’Alta Italia”, “Società per le Strade Ferrate Romane”, “Società Italiana per 
le Strade Ferrate Meridionali” and “Società Vittorio Emanuele”.  
In the 1885, the Italian State enacted a law which reorganized the general organization of the 
railways and renewed the concessions to the major companies; furthermore, the railway lines 
were disposed in longitudinal sense along the peninsula: the first line, on the Adriatic side, was 
given to the “Società Italiana per le Strade Ferrate Meridionali” and the second line, on the 
Tyrennian side, was given to the “Società Italiana per le Strade Ferrate del Mediterraneo”. 
These companies operated under concession as provided by the law n. 2248 of 1865. 
After the constitution, between the 1905 and the 1907, of “Ferrovie dello Stato”, a lot of 
concessions remained to the private companies according to the pre-existing legal institute of 
concession which provided that the concession from the State has to last at least for a period 
deemed appropriate to remunerate the invested capital. 
In the second postwar period, the concessions to the private companies were regulated by the 
“Regio Decreto n. 1447 of 09/05/1912” and they represented a fifth of the whole national 
railway network of which the State was bare owner till the expiration of the concessions.  
During the years, the institute of the railway concession was renewed and today it is regulated 
by the articles 200 and 201 od the “Decreto Legislativo n. 50 of 18/04/2016”. 
 
In my thesis, I evaluated if currently the State finds optimal to give the concession of the new 
railway line Napoli-Bari to a Private Company. 
First, I highlighted the importance of the realization of this line which is considered a 
fundamental impulse to the economic development of the South of Italy by allowing the 
improvement of the links of the South with the North of Italy and the Europe as well as the 
improvement of the links between the Tyrrhenian and the Adriatic Sea. 
Indeed, I proceeded to describe the characteristics socio-economic, infrastructural and 
geographical of the areas interested by the project; furthermore, I examined the actual railway 
	 III	
link with its deficiencies and I also examined the future railway link with the improvements 
made. 
Successively, elaborating the data provided by RFI1, I performed the financial and economic 
analysis and the socio-economic analysis of the railway project: the first has the purpose to 
evaluate the economic convenience to realize the project while the second has the purpose to 
evaluate the socio-economic impact of the project on the areas subject to the intervention. 
In the last part of my thesis, first I described a theoretical model that allows to evaluate if the 
interest of the State to give the concession to the Private Company matches with the interest of 
the Private Company to invest; after, I applied this model, using the data of the socio-economic 
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Within the initiative for the development of South Italy, the transport networks renewal between 
the Regione Campania and the Regione Puglia, finalized to an adequate response to the growing 
needs of travellers and freight mobility, constitutes a fundamental element for the socio-
economic integration in Italy and in Europe. The project will allow the strengthening and 
speeding of the Napoli-Bari line and its integration with the main corridors of North Italy and 
Europe. The connections improvement of the Regione Puglia and provinces more interior of 
the Regione Campania to the national transportation system and in particular the Apennine line 
(of which the AV / AC Milan-Rome-Naples is an integral part) is the first step of a wide 
integration process. 
The connection strengthening between the Tyrrhenian and Adriatic Sea will create a triangle 
(Rome, Naples and Bari) which will be one of the largest metropolitan systems in Europe. 
 
The project was made and will be realized by RFI2. RFI is a company 100% owned by “Ferrovie 
dello Stato Italiane” which is the holding of the group; the last is totally owned by the Italian 
Economic and Finance Ministery. 
This company has about 83.000 railwaymen, more than 9.000 trains and it manages a network 
of about 16.600 Km on which about 600.000.000 travellers and 50.000.000 tons of goods are 
transported annually. 










The Napoli-Bari line will achieve the following benefits: 
• the railway integration improvement with intermodal transport and logistics facilities; 
• the improvement of rail transport competitiveness through the increase of performance levels, 
comparable with road transport, and a significant reduction in travel time; 
• the South-East railway network integration improvement with the high capacity railway 
system; 
• the railway integration improvement with freight pole of Marcianise; 
• the elimination of the constraints which characterize the existing infrastructure; 




These benefits will take place in form of: 
• the connections speeding to and from the Adriatic line with positive effects on long-distance 
services;  
• the railway offer increase;  
• the rail freight transport recovery; 
• the creation of direct connections with Naples,  
• the regional services improvement between Puglia and Campania; 
• the improvement with the high-capacity line towards the north and south, through the Naples-
Afragola Station; 
• environmental and social benefits which will allow the rebalancing of the modal distribution 
through the quality improvement of the public transport service contributing to the reduction of 
congestion, pollution and accident rates. 
 
This intervention is part of the following national and regional programs and plans that regulate 
the transport systems development of the territory covered by this study: 
• Piano Generale del Trasporto e della Logistica 
• Programma Operativo Nazionale (PON) – Trasporti 2000–2006  
• Piano Regionale dei Trasporti Regione Campania 
• Programma Operativo Regionale (POR) Campania 
• Piano Regionale dei Trasporti della Regione Puglia.  
The Rome-Napoli-Bari line renewal fits, functionally and structurally, the key projects for the 
development of the South and its economic and social integration within the European 
Community, through the integration improvement of the railway towards South-East, extending 
in that direction the High Speed/High Capacity connections. The intervention will permit a 
substantial enhancement of the SNIT3 rail network through the increase of the passengers and 
goods traffic according to economic development and modal shift objectives. Moreover, the 
interventions enable the enhancement and modernization of the cross connection lines through 






3	National Scheme for Infrastructures and Transports.	
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2 DESCRIPTION OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL AREA OF 
INTERVENTION 
 
2.1 Regione Campania 
 
Picture 3  
 
 
The Regione Campania is the second most populated region of Italy and the first in population 
density. Naples, the third Italian city, has over a million inhabitants. The other provinces are 
Salerno, Caserta, Benevento and Avellino. The region is crossed by transport networks of the 
following types: 
• rail lines with a total length of 1606 km (considering the number of tracks); 
• highways with a total length of 442 km; 
• Regional and Provincial roads for a total length of about 9,680 km 
  
In addition there are the following transport terminals: 
• Naples Capodichino airport (which in 2004 developed a sum of about 51.410 commercial 
aircraft movements); 
• the freight pole Maddaloni-Marcianise which developed in 2006 a volume of freight traffic of 
about 1402 thousand tons. 







Table 1  
Harbours Tons  TEU4 Travelers 
Napoli 20.996.552 438.280 7.593.733 
Salerno 12.943.969 359.328 687.268 
   Total  Total  Total 
  33.940.521 797.608 8.281.001 
 
The main information (2015) of the provinces are reported in the table 2: 
 
Table 2 
  Inhabitants Surface Population density 
Provinces  Sq Km Inhabitants/ Sq km 
Caserta 924.414 2.651,35 348,6578535 
Benevento 280.707 2.080,44 134,9267463 
Napoli 3.113.898 1.178,93 2641,29168 
Avellino  425.325 2.806,07 151,5731967 
Salerno 1.106.506 4.954,16 223,3488624 
  Total Total Average population density 
































Puglia is crossed by land transport networks of the following types: 
• rail lines with a total lenght of 1218 km (considering the number of tracks); 
• highways with a total length of 313 km; 
• Regional and Provincial roads for a total length of about 11,210 km 
 
In addition, in the region there is the localisation of the following major transport terminals: 
• Bari Palese Airport (which in 2004 developed about 21.440 commercial aircraft movements) 
• freight poles of Bari Scalo Ferruccio, Brindisi and Apricena which developed in 2006 a 
volume of freight traffic, respectively, of 1.592.000, 680.000 and 735.000 tons. 
• the ports of Brindisi, Bari and Taranto which in 2015 developed the following data:  
 
Table 3 
Harbours Tons  TEU Travelers 
Bari 5.070.224 60.009 1.491.786 
Bridisi 11.774.738 329 625.714 
Taranto 22.565.243 148.519kj 358 
   Total  Total  Total 





The main information of the provinces are reported in the table 4: 
 
Table 4  
  Inhabitans Surface Population density 
Provinces  Sq Km Inhabitants/ Sq km 
Foggia 630.851 7.007,54 90,02460207 
Bari 1.263.820 3.862,88 327,1704014 
Taranto  586.061 2.467,35 237,526496 
Brindisi 398.661 1.861,12 214,2048874 
Lecce 804.239 2.799,07 287,3236468 
Barletta-Andria-
Trani 
393.534 1.542,95 255,0529829 
  Total Total Average population density 
























3. CURRENT RAIL LINK DESCRIPTION 
 
 
3.1 Technical description 
 
Currently, the rail link between Napoli and Bari is not continuous in fact it presents a 
discontinuity (so-called "break of cargo") in Caserta station and a reverse gear gear (reversal of 
the train running direction) in the Foggia station. 
Proceeding from West to East, the first railway route that runs that direction is that from Naples 
to Caserta, via Cancello: this line is double-track. From Caserta, after rail change, it continues 
Eastward covering the current Caserta-Foggia route which is single-track for almost its entire 
length of about 163 km. The sections between Vitulano and Apice, for an extension of about 
21 km, and between Foggia Centrale and the Cervaro station, for an extension of about 7 km,  
have already been doubled in recent times (1980s). 
In the Foggia station occurs, always using the same rail, a reverse to allow the entry of the train 
on the Pescara-Bari line which is double track. 
 





The Naples-Bari line plays an important role in long and short distance passenger transport 
service and in the freight transport service. Currently, the railway infrastructure between 
Caserta and Foggia is mainly used by passengers with a flow of about 1,3 million passengers a 
year. It can be compared, for these values, to similar Transapennine routes (Orte-Falconara, 
Roma-Pescara, Pontremolese).  
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The average travel times of the existing services are the following: 
Table 5 
Line Travel time 
Napoli-Bari 3h 35 min 
Roma-bari 4h 37 min 
 
The freight transport service along the Caserta-Foggia route is quite low: around 0.6 million 
tons/year. 
The regional services are mainly developed between Naples/Caserta and Benevento while the 
services supply is marginal towards Foggia and the Puglia side. 
The traffic volume is highly significant on the Caserta-Cancello route because along the last 
route there is the addition of the Rome/Naples and Foggia lines towards the Tyrrhenian South 
line. 
The traffic volume is also significative in the Cancello-Napoli route which is exclusively 
dedicated to local transport thanks to the construction of the railway Villa Literno-Naples-
Caserta and the High Speed/High Capacity Rome-Naples.  
	
3.3 Mobility  
 
This section describes the project mobility area which is divided into 16 traffic docks reported 
in the table 6. The analysis was carried out starting with the elaboration of the matrix 



















The total daily demand is about of 93.000 shifts: 30.500 trips for study, 42.500 for work and 
20.000 for other reasons.  
The transport modes are different: those for study take place for the 38% by private transport 
(car or motorcycle) and 62% by public transport (bus or rail) while those for work take place 
for the 90% by private transport and 10% by public transport. 
Regarding the public transport mode: the shifts for study reasons are performed for the 15% by 
rail and for the remaining 85% by road while for business reasons the 35% prefer the use of the 
rail and the remaining 65% prefer the road. 
In summary the public rail transport attracts about 5.000 shifts: 2.600 for study purposes (about 
9% of the total), 1.350 for work purposes (about 3% of the total) and the remaining 1050 for 
other purposes. 
This data highlights an inadequate competitiveness of public transport by rail compared to other 
transport modes available for both trips made for study and business purposes.  
Students tend to reward the widespread coverage of the territory offered by road public 
transport than by rail. 
The work passengers reward the private transport rather than the public rail and road for various 
reasons: first because private transport guarantees lower travel times, especially if we consider 
travel times currently offered by the rail service on the Telese-Benevento-Caserta-Napoli; 
second, the lack of adequate parking areas limits the ability to use the car to access the rail 
system and therefore penalizes transport demand linked to the park and ride, moreover, the 
current rail service is characterized by a low rides frequency especially during the afternoon 
time slots; this penalizes the re-entry shifts; finally, the current lack of integration between iron 
and rubber penalizes the choice of the railway.  
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4 FUTURE RAIL LINK DESCRIPTION 
 
 
This section describes the intermediate future routes proceeding from Naples to Bari. 
 





The planning solution develops at South of the town of Acerra and involves the building of a 
service station for the connection of the Acerra industrial area and interchange with the 
Circumvesuviana line and it allows the addition of a stop in proximity of the pediatric pole. 
This line is the first route of Napoli-Bari and it allows, through the new Napoli Afragola Station, 
the integration of the historical line with the High Speed/High Capacity railway. 
The project layout, from the Afragola station towards Napoli Centrale, presents a total length 
of 5,3 km and runs for about 1,8 km on a single infrastructure corridor together with the existing 
High Speed/High Capacity railway, made by TAV6 S.p.A, continuing parallel to the the last 
railway until the junction with the historical line at Casoria at Km 241+740. At Km 2+600 the 
realization of the stop Casalnuovo is expected, thereby allowing the interchange with the 
Circumvesuviana line. The variant line at North of the High Speed/High Capacity station, with 
an overall length of approximately 10,2 km, runs for 2 km in Afragola territory, crossing the 





expected. It runs then in the municipality of Acerra, at the South of the city center, for about 
8,2 Km integrating with the historical line at Km 229+568. The realization of the new Acerra 
station is expected to be realized at this location, where the rail link Pomigliano engages and 
allows its interchange with the Circumvesuviana line and the shutdown at the pediatric pole. 
 
The variant total length is equal to 15,5 km, the project speed  is 130 km/h (except for some 
points where the urbanization of the territory has led to a reduction to 100 Km/h) with diverting 
60 km/h. 
 






The are four solutions examined for this route: 
 
• the first provides a new railway infrastructure in the Valle Caudina corridor; 
• the second provides a new infrastructure that runs in a corridor at North of Valle Caudina; 
• the third provides a new infrastructure whose path is a combination of the paths of the two 
previous solutions, 
• the fourth solution involves the modernization of the historical line between Caserta and 
Benevento through Telese-Cerreto.  
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• Solution 1 - Valle Caudina corridor 
The track in solution 1 develops in Valle Caudina, an area which is characterized by a 
significant urbanization. 
The intervention involves the construction of a new single electrified rail line with an overall 
length equal to about 38 km with a project speed of 200 km/h and a maximum longitudinal 
slope of 20%. The solution of the first line has a capacity of approximately 43 pairs of 
trains/day. The connection to the Caserta-Cancello existing line is a double rail both towards 
Rome both towards Naples. From Km 0+000 to Km 4+500 there is a double-track line that 
allows the removal of the first section of the Benevento-Cancello route, in order to eliminate 
the insertion of this line in that of Cancello. The regional traffic is routed on the two rail variant. 
From Km 4+500 to Benevento, the single rail line continues on an independent site from the 
existing line and includes a dock station at Km 19+130 named Cervinara-Montesarchio. 
The high longitudinal gradients and the difficulties to realize a direct connection with 
Maddaloni-Marcianise freight pole make the new line inadequate to freight traffic which 
therefore remains routed on the existing line Benevento-Caserta. 
With the aim to improve the link with Maddaloni-Marcianise, a freight road will be created 
between the freight pole and Caserta-Aversa route. This makes it possible to insert freight trains 
coming from Benevento towards Maddaloni-Marcianise with no U-turn in Caserta. 
 
• Solution 2 - Corridor at the north of Valle Caudina 
This route runs entirely at North of the Benevento-Cancello existing line, it provides a double-
track electrified line which has a length of 40 km, project speed of 200 km/h and maximum 
longitudinal gradient of 12%. It has a capacity of approximately 130 pairs of trains/day. 
The insertion towards Caserta-Cancello line is a double rail both towards Rome both towards 
Naples. 
This line is destined for long distance passenger and freight traffic; it provides a stop at Km 
24+800 named Airola-Montesarchio. 
The connection to the Maddaloni-Marcianise pole is made with a pair of rails that connect 
directly to the pole rails allowing the improvement of the functionality of Caserta plant and the 





• Solution 3 - Combination of the previous two solutions 
The third solution, until Km 20+000, retraces the route of solution 2 and then going through the 
territorial area between the towns of Aiola and Montesarchio, then returning to the route of the 
Solution 1 until Benevento. This route, even if it increases the line length of about 5-6 km 
compared to previous solutions, allows a considerable reduction in the number of tunnels. 
This solution provides the realization of a single electrified rail line with 200 km/h project speed 
and a maximum 16% of the longitudinal slope with a daily capacity of about 34 pairs of 
trains/day. 
Specifically, it involves the construction of a double rail until Km 6+200; from here the rail 
branches off creating two single rails, one for the new project connection and the other will link 
to the historical line Caserta-Benevento before Frasso-Telesina station. It thus provides the 
dismission of the historical line section between Valle di Maddaloni and Caserta and the routing 
of regional traffic on the new stretch of double rail. This allows to the regional traffic on the 
Napoli-Benevento to use the new line with a significant reduction in travel time. 
Even in this solution it is expected the station of Aiola-Montesarchio at Km 22+900. 
Freight traffic continues to circulate on the existing line but, taking advantage of the above-
described variation, it can be routed directly to Maddaloni-Marcianise without affecting the 
system of Caserta and the historical line section between Caserta and Maddaloni. 
 
• Solution 4 - Speeding up and doubling of Benevento-Caserta historical line 
This solution provides the doubling and the speeding up of the existing line to a project speed 
of 160 km/h and an increase in daily capacity up to about 110 pairs of trains/day. The insertion 
to Caserta-Cancello line is similar to that described in the solution 3 with the removal of a 
historical line section between Valle di Maddaloni and Caserta. Moreover, even in this 
hypothesis the direct connection for freight traffic with Maddaloni-Marcianise, through the 
creation of a double rail, is mantained. The stations of Valle di Maddaloni, Frasso Dugenta, 
Amorosi, Telese, Solopaca and S. Lorenzo Maggiore are maintained, with the necessary 
modifications, while the plants of Maddaloni Superiore and Ponte Casalduni are 




The characteristics of the four solutions are summarised in the table 7: 
 
Table 7 









Solution 1 38+260 14+850 39 200km/h 20 Cervinara-
Montesarchio 
Solution 2 40+968 23+000 56 200km/h 12 Airola-
Montesarchio 
Solution 3 45+643 17+240 38 200km/h 16 Airola-
Montesarchio 
Solution 4 45+724 13+157 29 180km/h 12 Existent 
stations 
 
The four solutions for the Cancello-Benevento line described above, submitted to the studies 
made by RFI, have been restricted to solution 3 and 4 so excluding solutions 1 and 2. 
The reasons for this choice are: 
• constructive and functional criticalities: 
¨ for solution 1 the biggest problems are related to the excavation of the tunnel named 1A 
(between Km 6+500 to Km 14+500 because the last involves highly fractured carbonate 
formations with poor mechanical properties and there are also high hydraulic loads, 
reaching the limits of technical feasibility, concentrated just in correspondence with the 
fault zones. 
¨ for solution 2 the criticality issues are mainly in the final stretch towards Benevento, 
linked essentially to the realization of the long tunnel characterized by highly 
heterogeneous formations (an alternation of rock types) which could lead to instability 
of the face and the cavity especially in concomitance of probable water seepages. 
• travel time because both solution 1 that 2 do not ensure a time reduction while solution 3 
and 4 allow a time reduction (D) according to the table 8: 
Table 8 
Line Current Solution 1-2 Solution 3 Solution 4 
Napoli-Benevento 1h 50 min 1h 50 min 1h 20 min 1h 10 min 
        D        D                       D 
       0    -30 min     -40 min 
 
So further in the analysis we analyse only solutions 3 and 4. 
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4.3 Benevento/Apice-Orsara di Puglia route 
 
 Picture 8 
 
 
The Benevento/Apice-Orsara di Puglia route represents the "Apennine pass" of the line and the 
most challenging line for the doubling. 
Three possible infrastructure corridors have been identified: 
• corridor A, which develops at the North of Montecalvo Irpino; 
• corridor B, which develops at the North of Ariano Irpino and laps, underground, the town 
of Montecalvo Irpino; 
• corridor C, which develops at the South of Ariano Irpino and provides the passage in the 
Grottaminarda territory. 
The three solutions (corridors), submitted to the studies made by RFI, have been restricted to 
solution B and C. 
The reason for the exclusion of solution A is due to building problems mainly caused by the 
nature of the crossed geological formations and disseminated superficial landslides which 
would require important stabilization interventions to the tunnels entrances; moreover, the 
clays multicolour can be probable gas pockets. 
Corridor A is also critical from an environmental point of view since it crosses archaeological 
areas (proximity to ancient Via Traiana). 
 
From these studies the two achievable solutions are the so-called "Direct solution" which falls 
in the corridor B and the "South Solution" which falls in the corridor C. 
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4.4 Orsara di Puglia-Cervaro di Foggia 
 
This line is already completed and provides a double rail. 
The main features of the route are reported in the table 9: 
 
Table 9 
Project speed 200 km/h 
Total km 33 
Number of bridges 3 
Total km of bridges 1 
Number of tunnels 6 
Total km of tunnels 5,372 
Number of stations  2 
 





The reverse abolition is provided in Foggia station obtaining a time recovery and the 
decongestion of the same station. 
The route inserts at Km 5+660 of the Caserta-Foggia historical line and it develops at the South-








The main features of the line are reported in the table 10: 
 
Table 10  
Project speed 100 km/h 
Total km 4,285 
Number of bridges 2 
Total km of bridges 0.783 


























4.6 Possible combinations of lines 
 
From the analysis made in chapter 4.2 and 4.3, it emerges that in the Cancello-Benevento line 
there are two solutions (3 and 4) while in the Benevento/Apice-Orsara di Puglia there are also 
two ones (Direct and South solutions); from the combinations of these rise four solutions: 
 




This solution presents the following characteristics: 
 
Table 11  
Napoli-Bari (A scenario) 
Total lenght 293 km 
Travel time 2h 18 min 















This solution presents the following characteristics: 
 
Table 12  
Napoli-Bari (B scenario) 
Total lenght 278 km 
Travel time 2h 12 min 













This solution presents the following characteristics: 
Table 13  
Napoli-Bari (C scenario) 
Total lenght 270km 
Travel time 2h 10 min 






















This solution presents the following characteristics: 
Table 14  
Napoli-Bari (D scenario) 
Total lenght 285 km 
Travel time 2h 15 min 

















5. FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
 
The financial and economic analysis is a very important step in a project feasibility study; in 
fact it allows to estimate the convenience, from the investor point of view, to realize or not the 
project depending on the revenues and the costs flows and on the salvage value of the 
investment; these three items, discounted at a rate, compose the financial and economic net 
present value. 
 
In the analysis development I have proceeded, using the data of RFI, to the recalculation of the 
previous items taking into account the past values of annual inflation7 from 2006, the year of 
the analysis made by RFI, to 2016 and the forecast of annual inflation, from 2016 to 2060, 
which is considered stable around 2%8; while for the discount rate I have used the rate of similar 
railway project which is 4% according to the EU Cohesion Policy 2014-2020 9. 
 
Further analysis information are included in the following list: 
• the time horizon goes from 2016 to 2060 (last year of the RFI concession); thus the present 
values (PVs) are computed at 2016;  
• the four plan solutions, previously described, have been considered; 
• the numbers are expressed in millions of Euros unless otherwise noted; 













7	The inflation rates (source www.inflation.eu) are reported in the appendix (5) 
8 Source OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) 
 
9 The European Cohesion policy is the main investment policy of the European Union; it supports: job creation 
and growth, investment in people, business support, research and innovation strengthening, environmental 






The project costs include: realization costs, maintenance costs and operating costs. 
I have corrected these values, estimated by RFI in 2006, for the inflation rates occurred between 
2006 and 2016 and for the estimated inflation rate between 2016 and 2060. 
 
5.1.1 Realization costs  
 
The realization costs (RC) include the costs for the building of the lines Napoli-Cancello, 
Cancello-Benevento, Benevento/Apice-Orsara di Puglia and the Foggia rail link. 




A B C D 
4.512,00 € 4.106,00 € 3.869,00 € 4.275,00 € 
 
According to the RFI time-program, the line should be realized from 2016 to 2023 (8 years); 
thus I have assumed the costs are distributed over 8 years.10 











                Table 16 
PV RC 
A B C D 
4.473,58 € 4.071,03 € 3.836,05 € 4.238,60 € 
 
																																																						




5.1.2 Maintenance costs  
 
The maintenance costs (MC) are divided in ordinary and extraordinary costs. 
 
According to the RFI time-program, the ordinary maintenance costs (OMC)11 become effective 
from 2020 until 2060.  























Considering the RFI time-program, the extraordinary maintenance costs (EMC) become 
effective from 2020 until 2060.  

















Extraordinary maintenance costs 
  A B C D 
10 years 0,80 € 1,10 € 1,04 € 0,74 € 
20 years 2,18 € 4,19 € 4,43 € 2,42 € 
25 years 0,71 € 0,68 € 0,65 € 0,68 € 
30 years 1,36 € 1,87 € 1,78 € 1,26 € 
40 years 2,56 € 4,91 € 5,19 € 2,84 € 
 





				D,.ℎ	. = 10, 20, 25, 30, 40 
 
obtaining: 
               
Table 19 
  PV EMC 
  A B C D 
10 years 0,54 € 0,74 € 0,70 € 0,50 € 
20 years 1,00 € 1,91 € 2,02 € 1,11 € 
25 years 0,26 € 0,25 € 0,24 € 0,25 € 
30 years 0,42 € 0,58 € 0,55 € 0,39 € 
40 years 0,53 € 0,70 € 0,74 € 0,40 € 
  Total Total Total Total 
  2,35 € 3,58 € 3,64 € 2,27 € 
 
 
The PV of maintenance costs is derived by the formula: 
 






           Table 20 
PV MC 
A B C D 
33,76 € 42,84 € 40,28 € 31,06 € 
 
 
5.1.3 Operating costs  
 
The operating costs (OC) are divided into: freight transport service and passenger transport  
service costs. 
 
The freight transport service operating costs (FTSOC) 12 are taken into account from 2024, 
activation year of the freight transport services, to 2060. 











          Table 21 
PV  FTSOC 
A B C D 
852,56 € 852,56 € 852,56 € 852,56 € 
 
The passenger transport service operating costs (PTSOC)13 are taken into account from 2020, 
activation year of the short distance passenger service, to 2060. 









12 The values are reported in the appendix (5.1.3 A). 
 







          Table 22 
PV PTSOC 
A B C D 
2.530,95 € 2.530,95 € 2.530,95 € 2.530,95 € 
 
 
The PV of the operating costs is given by: 
 




          Table 23 
PV OC 
A B C D 
3383,51€ 3383,51€ 3383,51€ 3383,51€ 
 
 
5.1.4 PV Total costs 
 
The PV of the total costs is computed through the formula: 
 




            Table 24 
PV TOTAL COSTS 
A B C D 









5.2 Revenues projections 
 
As RFI made available only the data regarding traffic flows, I have proceeded to the revenues 
estimation. 
In this estimation, I have used the ticket prices available on www.trenitalia.it by considering a 
price update linked to the foreseen annual inflation rate of 2% as well as by considering a traffic 
volume (passenger or freight transport) update of an annual value of 1,5% for the first 20 years. 
The revenues can be divided in:  
• short distance passenger transport service revenues; 
• long distance passenger transport service revenues; 
• freight transport service revenues. 
 
5.2.1 Short distance passenger transport service revenues 
 
The short distance passenger transport service regards the Napoli-Caserta-Cancello-Benevento-
Bovino-Foggia route. 
I have conjectured only the weekly traffic, so 5 days/week (252 days/year), because such traffic 
is relevant for the presence of workers and students.  
The activation year of the short distance passenger transport service will be 2020. 
The PV of the short distance passenger transport service revenues (SDPTSR)14 is computed 









          
            Table 25 
PV SDPTSR 
A B C D 
767,62 € 424,74 € 751,38 € 408,50 € 
																																																						
14 The short distance passenger transport service revenues, for each solution (considering the different routes), are 




5.2.2 Long distance passenger transport service revenues 
 
The long distance passenger transport service regards the routes: AV (Roma-Bari; Milano-
Bari), ES (Napoli-Bari) and IC (Roma-Bari; Napoli-Bari).  
I have conjectured traffic 7 days/week (365 days/year).  
The activation year of the long distance passenger transport service will be 2024. 
The PV of the long distance passenger transport service revenues (LDPTSR)15, which is equal 










           Table 26 
PV LDPTSR 
A B C D 
10.588,26 € 10.588,26 € 10.588,26 € 10.588,26 € 
 
 
5.2.3 Freight transport service revenues 
 
The freight traffic regards the route Napoli-Bari. 
I have conjectured relevant only the weekly traffic, so 5 days/week (252 days/year), because 
such traffic is linked to the working days. 
The activation year of the freight transport service will be 2024. 
The PV of the freight transport service revenues (FTSR)16, which is equal for the four solutions, 
is computed through the formula: 
 
																																																						
15 The long distance passenger transport service revenues, for different routes, are reported in the appendix  
(5.2.2 A). 
 














          Table 27 
PV FTSR 
A B C D 
2.302,40 € 2.302,40 € 2.302,40 € 2.302,40 € 
 
 
5.2.4 PV Total revenues 
 
The PV of the total revenues is computed through the formula: 
 
!"	RKR$`	aB"BbcBS = !"	Sd!RSa + !"	`d!RSa + !"	QRSa 
 
obtaining: 
   
          Table 28 
PV TOTAL REVENUES 
A B C D 
















5.3 Investment Salvage Value  
 
The salvage value is the value which the infrastructure will have at the end of the concession 
period; it is computed in terms of the perpetuity of flows from 2024 to 2060.  
The value for each solution is reported in table 29. 
             
            Table 29 
Salvage value in 2060 
A B C D 
8001,18 € 7.601,93 € 7.361,19 € 7.760,29 € 
 











            Table 30 
PV SALVAGE VALUE  
A B C D 















5.4 Financial and economic NPV 
 
The financial and economic (FE) NPV is an indicator which allows to verify the financial and 
economic convenience for the investor to realize the infrastructure. 
It is computed through the formula: 
 




          Table 31 
FE NPV 
A B C D 
7.192,02 € 7.171,57 € 7.692,86 € 7.027,67 € 
 
The financial and economic NPV results positive and extremely high for each plan solution, 
thus it is convenient, from the investor point of view, to start the realization of the infrastructure 




















6. SOCIO-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
 
The socio-economic analysis takes into account the values of the financial and economic 
analysis as well as the values coming from the evaluation of the socio-environmental impact 
on the areas where the infrastructure will be realized. 
This analysis indicates if a project, sustainable from the financial and economic point of view, 
can be also sustainable from the socio-economic one.  
In the socio-economic analysis there is the distinction among internal benefits and costs and 
external ones. Substantially there is a comparison between benefits and costs, directly or 
indirectly associated with the investment, with benefits and costs, external to the financial 
statements, which are relevant for the entire collectivity.  
The internal costs are analysed in paragraph 6.1; the internal benefits are analysed in paragraph 
6.2; the external benefits are analysed in paragraph 6.4 while, according to RFI reports, the 
external costs are not present. 
 
While in the financial and economic analysis the monetary values are subjected to the inflation 
and to a nominal discount rate, in the social and economic analysis the values refer generally to 
benefits and costs constant over time and to a real discount rate; the last one is 5% according to 
the EU Cohesion Policy 2014-2020. 
This analysis is divided in two parts: in the first one I have converted, through the use of 
conversion factors17, the financial and economic values into socio-economic ones while in the 
second part I have added, to the previous values, the monetary quantifications of the socio-
environmental impact. 
 
Further analysis information are included in the following list: 
• the time horizon goes from 2016 to 2060 (last year of the RFI concession); thus the present 
values (PVs) are computed at 2016;  
• the four plan solutions, previously described, have been considered; 
• the numbers are expressed in millions of Euros unless otherwise noted; 




17 The conversion factors are reported in the appendix (6A). They allow to purify the financial items from 




6.1 Internal costs 
 
In this paragraph, I employed the same analysis made in paragraph 5.1 but I have considered 
the absence of inflation, a real discount rate of 5% and the conversion factors for the different 
items of costs. 
 
6.1.1 Realization costs 
 
The realization costs (RC) of paragraph 5.1.1, are converted through the conversion factor 
0,8706, thereby obtaining the following results: 
 
              Table 32 
Total realization costs 
A B C D 
3.928,15 € 3.574,68 € 3.368,35 € 3.721,82 € 
 
 
Considering the RFI time-program, the line should be realized from 2016 to 2023, so 8 years; 
thus I have assumed that the costs are equally distributed over 8 years.18 











                      Table 33 
NPV RC 
A B C D 








6.1.2 Maintenance costs 
 
The maintenance costs (MC) are divided in ordinary and extraordinary costs. 
  
The items of paragraph 5.1.2 are converted through the conversion factor 1,0182. 
According to the RFI time-program, the ordinary maintenance costs (OMC)19 become effective 
from 2020 until 2060.  























Considering the RFI time-program, the extraordinary maintenance costs (EMC) become 
effective from 2020 until 2060.  




















 Extraordinary maintenance costs 
 A B C D 
10 y 0,80 € 1,10 € 1,04 € 0,74 € 
20 y 2,18 € 4,19 € 4,43 € 2,42€ 
25 y 0,71 € 0,68 € 0,65 € 0,68€ 
30y 1,36 € 1,87 € 1,78 € 1,26 € 
40y 2,56 € 4,91 € 5,19 € 2,84€ 
 









                 Table 36 
 PV EMC 
 A B C D 
10 years 0,63 € 0,86 € 0,82 € 0,58 € 
20 years 0,67 € 1,28 € 1,35 € 0,74 € 
25 years 0,16 € 0,16 € 0,15 € 0,16 € 
30 years 0,24 € 0,33 € 0,31 € 0,22 € 
40 years 0,25 € 0,48 € 0,51 € 0,28 € 
 Total Total Total Total 
 1,60 € 2,56 € 2,59 € 1,63 € 
 
 
The PV of maintenance costs is given by the formula: 
 






                Table 37 
PV MC 
A B C D 
19,85 € 25,37 € 23,88 € 18,36 € 
 
 
6.1.3 Operating costs 
 
The operating costs (OC) are divided in freight transport service and passenger transport service 
costs. 
 
The items of paragraph 5.1.3 are converted, in the socio-economic analysis, through the 
discount factor 0,7144. 
The freight transport service operating costs (FTSOC)20 are taken into account from 2024, 
activation year of the freight transport services, to 2060. 











          Table 38 
PV FTSOC 
A B C D 
401,76 € 401,76 € 401,76 € 401,76 € 
 
 
The passenger transport service operating costs (PTSOC)21 are taken into account from 2020, 
activation year of the short distance passenger service, until 2060. 
The PV is computed through the formula: 
																																																						
20 The values are reported in the appendix (6.1.3 A). 
 














          Table 39 
PV PTSOC 
A B C D 
1.439,81€ 1.439,81€ 1.439,81€ 1.439,81€ 
 
 
The PV of the operating costs is given by: 
 




          Table 40 
PV OC 
A B C D 
1.841,57 € 1.841,57 € 1.841,57 € 1.841,57 € 
 
 
6.1.4 PV Internal costs 
 
The PV of the internal costs is computed through the formula: 
 




          Table 41 
PV INTERNAL COSTS 
A B C D 





6.2 Internal benefits 
 
As RFI made available only the data regarding traffic flows, I have proceeded to the internal 
benefits estimation. The internal benefits are the project revenues. 
In this estimation, like in chapter 5.2, I have used the ticket prices available on  www.trenitalia.it 
by considering the absence of inflation as well as by considering a traffic volume (passenger or 
freight transport) update of an annual value of 1,5% for the first 20 years. 
The revenues are converted through the conversion factor 1. 
The revenues can be divided in:  
• short distance passenger transport service revenues; 
• long distance passenger transport service revenues; 
• freight transport service revenues. 
 
6.2.1 Short distance passenger transport service revenues 
 
The short distance passenger transport service regards the Napoli-Caserta-Cancello-Benevento-
Bovino-Foggia route. 
I have conjectured only the weekly traffic, so 5 days/week (252 days/year), because such traffic 
is relevant for the presence of workers and students.  
The activation year of the short distance passenger transport service will be 2020. 
The PV of the short distance passenger transport service revenues (SDPTSR)22 is computed 









                     
            Table 42          
PV SDPTSR 
A B C D 
455,15 € 251,84 € 445,52 € 252,06 € 
 
																																																						
22 The short distance passenger transport service revenues, for each solution (considering the different routes), are 




6.2.2 Long distance passenger transport service revenues 
 
The long distance passenger transport service regards the routes: AV (Roma-Bari, Milano-
Bari), ES (Napoli-Bari), IC (Roma-Bari, Napoli-Bari).  
I have conjectured traffic 7 days/week (365 days/year).  
The activation year of the long distance passenger transport service will be 2024. 
The PV of the long distance passenger transport service revenues (LDPTSR)23, which is equal 











          Table 43 
PV LDPTSR 
A B C D 
6.267,74 € 6.267,74 € 6.267,74 € 6.267,74 € 
 
 
6.2.3 Freight transport service revenues 
 
The freight traffic relates to the route Napoli-Bari. 
I have conjectured relevant only the weekly traffic, so 5 days/week (252 days/year), because 
such traffic is linked to the working days. 
The activation year of the freight transport service will be 2024. 
 
The PV of the freight transport service revenues (FTSR)24, which is equal for the four solution, 
is computed through the formula: 
 
																																																						
23 The long distance passenger transport service revenues, for each route, are reported in the appendix (6.2.2 A). 
 














          Table 44 
PV FTSR 
A B C D 





6.2.4 PV Internal benefits 
 
The PV of internal benefits is computed through the formula: 
 
!"	kbRBab$`	lBbBQkRS = !"	Sd!RSa + !"	`d!RSa + !"	QRSa 
 
obtaining: 
   
          Table 45 
PV INTERNAL BENEFITS 
A B C D 






6.3 Investment salvage value  
The investment salvage value, mentioned in paragraph 5.3, is converted through the conversion 
factor 0,8706; thereby obtaining: 
 
                  Table 46 
Salvage value in 2060 
A B C D 
6.965,83 € 6.545,69 € 6.293,70 € 6.713,84 € 
 











      Table 47 
PV SALVAGE VALUE  
A B C D 


















6.4 External benefits 
 
The external benefits are the benefits due to the socio-environmental positive impact. 
The main project impact is the switch from the road mobility to the rail mobility with different 
external benefits that are analysed in the following chapters. 
 
6.4.1 Environmental impacts 
From the lower car use and the higher train use, it derives reduction of pollutant emissions and 
greenhouse gases according to the following RFI estimates (the numbers are tons/year). 
 
Table 48 
 Pollution emissions + greenhouse gases reduction 
 A B C D 
bKm -332 -285 -269 -314 
PM -37 -32 -30 -35 
COVNM -33 -29 -28 -32 
SKn 69 65 62 66 
JKn -96.401 -80.350 -75.536 -90.417 
 
The only increment is SKn due the the major demand of electric energy caused by major railway 
traffic. 
The estimates have been taken into account from 2024 to 2060. 
The monetary quantification, made by RFI, is the following: 
 
                   Table 49 
Pollution reduction/year 
A B C D 
7,90 € 6,60 € 6,30 € 7,40 € 
 
 













                       Table 50 
PV PR 
A B C D 
93,82 € 78,38 € 74,82 € 87,89 € 
 
 
6.4.2 Social impacts 
 
As a function of pollutant emissions, RFI has determined the annual impact of these substances 
on the exposed population in terms of the overall reduction in life expectancy expressed in 
YOLL (years of life lost). 
According to train and road accidents, RFI has determined the annual impact on the number of 
lives and injuries generated by the implementation of new infrastructure. 
 
          Table 51 
Life expectation 
A B C D 
61 YOLL/year 52 YOLL/year 49 YOLL/year 57 YOLL/year 
Accidents reduction 
A B C D 
Injured dead Injured dead Injured dead Injured dead 
-96 -3 -82 -2 -78 -2 -91 -3 
 
 
The estimates have been taken into account from 2024 to 2060. 
The monetary quantification, made by RFI, is the following: 
 
            Table 52 
Accidents reduction + life expectation 
A B C D 
22,20 € 19,00 € 17,90 € 20,90 € 
 
 














            Table 53 
PV SR+LE 
A B C D 
263,66 € 225,65 € 212,59 € 248,22 € 
 
 
6.4.3 Ceasing costs due to the switch from road mobility to rail mobility 
 
The annual ceasing costs, estimated by RFI, include ceasing costs freight traffic (CCFT) and 
ceasing costs passenger traffic (CCPT)25. 
The first relates to the vehicular traveller portion which will abandon the use of the vehicle on 
the road in favour of the new rail transport system; for the evaluation of these costs RFI has 
taken as a reference the data published by ACI26 and in the Conto Nazionale dei trasporti and 
it has computed the average production cost on kilometric base. 
The second relates to the vehicular freight transport portion who will abandon the use of the 
vehicle on the road in favour of the new rail transport system; for the evaluation of these costs 
RFI has taken as a reference the data published by ACI and in the “Conto Nazionale dei 
trasporti” and the data “CSST/Albo trasportatori”; on the basis of these data RFI has computed 
the average production cost on kilometric base. 
The estimates have been taken into account respectively from 2024 to 2060 and from 2020 to 
2060. 










25 These values are reported in the appendix (6.4.3 A). 
 












          Table 54 
PV CCFT 
A B C D 




          Table 55 
PV  CCPT 
A B C D 
2.808,11 € 2.808,11 € 2.808,11 € 2.808,11 € 
 
 
6.4.4 Time savings 
 
Among the benefits resulting from the railway investment program there are also the time 
savings which derive from the reduction of travel times. 
The corresponding monetary benefits refer to the concept of willingness of the consumer to 
pay, or to the value recognized by the individual for the use of a specific service/product. In the 
absence of a market price, the time saved value was estimated by RFI27 through the use of 
indirect measurement techniques related to the so-called "cost saving approach". This approach 
requires that the value of one hour of work of each individual is attributed to the gross hourly 
average earnings. 
RFI has taken as reference the statistics of the Bank of Italy considering: 
• the amount of compensations of employees paid equal to 630,44 billions of Euros; 
• the total dependent employment recorded equal to 17,945 millions of standard units; 
• the average number of annual hours worked per employee equal to 1,659. 
By dividing the total employment wages for the corresponding total number of hours worked 
the result is an average working time value of about 21,18 €. 
																																																						





The time savings estimates have been taken into account from 2020 to 2060. 











          Table 56 
PV TS 
A B C D 
550,02 € 550,02 € 550,02 € 550,02 € 
 
 
6.4.5 PV External benefits  
 
The PV of external benefits is computed through the formula: 
 




          Table 57 
PV EXTERNAL BENEFITS 
A B C D 




6.5 Socio-economic NPV  
 
The socio-economic (SE) NPV is given by the formula: 
 
SKJkK − BJKbKIkJ	b!"
= !"	kbRBab$`	lBbBQkRS − !"	kbRBab$`	JKSRS





SE NPV  
A B C D 
8.794,85€ 8.783,32 € 9.107,44€ 8.717,46€ 
 
 
As we can see from the numbers the NPV is positive and extremely high for each solution. 
The project presents positive FE and SE NPV i.e. respectively it is convenient to realize it both 
from the economic point of view both from the social point of view; this is valid for each 
solution. 
Recent studies have excluded the solution C and D for different reasons: water crossing, 
landslide risk, landscape and archaeological, material disposal. 
Between solutions A and B, the first has a slightly higher NPV and serve more population: so 
I share the RFI choice to realize the solution A. 














7 CONCESSION PRICE MODEL 
 
This chapter describes the model used to establish the concession price in the hypothesis that 
the railway line Napoli-Bari is assigned in concession to a Private Company. 
This model refers to the paper published by the economists Scandizzo and Ventura28 with some 
adaptions for the case at hand.  
The broad diffusion of concession contracts in recent years is due to the tight budget constraints 
and the economic situations faced by governments. These factors have pushed and continue to 
push governments to outsource services through concessions. 
	
7.1 Model description 
 
The model can be used to: 
• introduce a theoretical scheme which allows the concession design ex-ante evaluation; 
• identify the key variables which have to be monitored before, during and after the 
concession tender procedure; 
• identify the bargaining relations between the Principal, i.e. the State, and the 
Concessionaire, i.e. the Private. 
 
In the model the following assumptions are made: 
• the uncertainty, surrounding the decisions, is dynamic and can only be solved with the 
passage of time; 
• the investment is irreversible; 
• the investment can only be realized by the private investor but not by the principal who 
faces the decision to give the resource to the private under a concession contract or to 
renounce to its development. 
 
The concession contract is structured in the following way:  
• the concessionaire pays an amount of money (the concession price) to the principal  
• the concessionaire takes charge of all maintenance and operating costs and a portion of 
investments costs and it benefits from the revenues generated by the investment; 
																																																						




• the concessionaire obligates itself to give back the resource at the concession period 
expiration. 
It is assumed that the resource development yields to a cash flow,	>, described by a geometric 
Brownian motion process according to the following stochastic equation: 
 
Equation	1	
=>2 = a>2=. + s>2=- 
 
with a and s respectively the drift and the standard deviation parameters. 
 
The cash flow y is given by the difference between the revenues and the operating and 
maintenance costs. 
The contract value for the State can be determined according the following equation: 
 
Equation	2	
" > = sup B [+Årt( +År ÇÅt
¥
t@É
>Ç=1 + +År ÇÅt !Ñ=1
t@É
t





with r the discount rate, T is the concession expiration date, t is the stochastic time of entry 
(which is the initial year of the concession), !Ñ is the minimum acceptable concession price, c 
is the flow of external benefits and costs generated by the investment29 and IÜ is the portion of 
the investment costs sustained by the State. 
The value for the State is equal to the cash flow that it will enjoy after the end of the concession 
period to infinity (like a perpetual bond) plus the concession price, paid by the Private during 
the concession period, plus the flow of external benefits and costs generated from the initial 
year of the concession to infinity minus the portion of investment costs sustained by the State. 
The contract value can also be seen as an option held by State, so by applying contingent claim 
analysis30 to equation 2 the results are the following state dependent solutions depending on 
whether the value of the stochastic variable > is above or below the threshold >á: 
 
																																																						
29 In the line Napoli-Bari only external benefits were estimated by RFI. 
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= B +Årt  and the opportunity cost of delaying the construction project given by 
ê = â − ë > 0 . 
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The exercise boundary depends on the risk adjustment åç
åçÅî
, the flow of external benefits and 
costs ä, the concession price !Ñ and the portion of the investment costs sustained by the State 
kÑ and the various discount factors. 
The option held by the State, reported in equation 2, will be exercised only if > ≥ >á; 
























The equation 2D shows that the minimum concession price, acceptable by the State, should be 
at least equal to the flow of the external benefits and costs minus the cash flow, adjusted for the 
risk, that the State will recover after the concession expiration plus the portion of investment 
costs sustained by the State. 
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On the other contract side, the same analysis is made for the concessionaire, i.e. the Private. 
 
The contract value for the Private can be determined according the following equation: 
 
Equation	3	
"ù > = 1&N B [+Årt +År ÇÅt
É
t





Where Iü is the portion of the investment costs sustained by the Private and !û is the maximum 
concession price affordable by the Private. 
The contract value can be seen as an option held by the Private; so, by applying contingent 
claim analysis to equation 3, the results are given by the following state dependent solutions: 
 
Equation	3A	
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The option held by the Private, reported in equation 3, will be exercised only if > ≥ >ù;so, 

























For a given time span a deal can be reached only if !û ≥ !Ñ, so if the maximum affordable 
price by the Private is greater than the minimum acceptable price by the Principal; i.e. by using 



































+ kù + kÑ] 
 
Where	> is the minimum cash flow above which both parties find optimal to sign the contract. 
So the cash flow should at least cover the sum, adjusted for risk, of the flow of external benefits 
and costs and of the investment costs given by the sum of the Private’s and the State portions 
(kù + kÑ). 
 
The State objective function can be specified as the extended NPV (¢á) from the concession 
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Where the first addend (equation 2A) is the expected NPV of the State and the second addend 
(equation 2B) is the value of the option to wait; specifically, the first addend is the gain of the 
State if the contract is stipulated while the second addend is the gain of the State under the no-
agreement condition. 
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1 − +ÅàÉ .	
 
The State extended NPV is minimized when the concession price, which must be positive, 





















Similarly, for the Private, the objective function can be specified as the extended NPV (¢ù) 
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Where the first addend (equation 3A) is the expected NPV and the second addend (equation 
3B) is the value of the option to wait; specifically, the first addend is the Private’s gain if the 
contract is stipulated while the second addend is the Private’s gain under the no-agreement 
condition. 















1 − +ÅàÉ .	
 
The Private’s extended NPV is minimized when the concession price, which must be positive, 


















Now it is possible to analyse the equilibrium solutions. 
 
If the two parties, the State and the Private, want to reach a cooperative solution in order to 
optimize the concession price paid, they can join their ENPVs (given by equation 5 and 6) and 




!¶∗ = '*Mö∗?'C(¢á + ¢ù) 
 
where !¶∗ represents the equilibrium price if the cooperative solution is reached. 
By taking the derivative of equation 7 wrt !∗ using equations 5, 6, 2C, 3C the following 
equation is obtained: 
 
Equation 8 
!¶∗ = ä −
â+ÅàÉ
1 − +ÅàÉ
(kù + kÑ) 
 
The equilibrium price which maximizes the parties’ ENPVs is independent on cash flow and 
uncertainty; the equilibrium price is equal to the difference between the flow of external 
benefits and costs and the total investment costs given by the sum of the State and the Private’s 
investment costs portions. 
 
If instead the State and the Private reject the cooperative solution, their payoffs are defined by 
equations 2D and 3D according to: 
 





















− kù] − !∗ 
 
In the first equation any value above !∗Ñ  yields a surplus to the State equal to ¢á ! = !∗ −
!∗Ñ , while in the second equation any value below !∗û  yields a surplus to the Private equal 
to	 ¢ù ! = !∗û − !
∗. 
By using the previous payoffs, it is possible to compute the Nash equilibrium31 by maximizing 
the product of the players’ net payoff according to: 
 
!ß∗ = '*Mömax [¢á ! ]® ∗ [¢ù ! ]îÅ®  
 
which developed yields to: 
 
Equation	9	




















!ß∗ = D!∗Ñ + (1 − D)!∗û 
 
with 0 ≤ D ≤ 1. 
The Nash equilibrium is the weighted average of the limiting acceptable price for the two 
parties; the weights represent the parties’ bargaining power. 
The Nash equilibrium represents the best price that either part could choose, given their 








31 (Nash,1951; Harsanyi; 1967 and 1968). 
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7.2 Model application to the Napoli-Bari railway line 
 
In this paragraph, the Scandizzo and Ventura’s model32 was applied to the Napoli-Bari railway 
investment project. 
 
In the application, I have considered different hypotheses of investment costs distribution 
between the State and the Private Company, in order to study how the optimal moment to sign 
the contract  and indeed the decision to invest change according to these hypotheses. 
 
First, I have applied the model by using, as inputs, the data of the socio-economic analysis and 
I have called it “the basic model”.  
After I have made the comparative static analysis and precisely: 
 
• I have selected some inputs i.e. the discount rate, the cash flows volatility and the 
investment costs; 
• I have taken each input one by one and I modified its value ceteris paribus in order to analyse 
how the outputs of the model change according to different values of each single input. 
 
For the basic model the results are reported through tables and plots. 
For the comparative static analysis only the plots are reported while the tables are reported in 
the appendix. 
 
In the tables and in the plots, the values are written in black colour if it is optimal to invest 
immediately, i.e. at the current date33, otherwise the contract values are written in red colour if 
it is optimal to wait. 
 





32 Sharing risk through concession contracts, European journal of operational reasearch(2010). 
33 The starting date is 2016 (see chapter 5).	
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7.2.1 Basic model 
 
The inputs, used for the application of the model, are reported in the table 59: 
 
Table 59 
© ™ ´ ¨ T ≠	ÆØ∞ ± I ≤≥ ≤¥ 




• ë and µ are the drift and the standard deviation of equation (1) thus representing the growth 
rate and the standard deviation of the cash flows;  
• â is the discount rate; 
• ê is “the opportunity cost of delaying the construction of the project"34 and it is computed 
as ê = â − ë;  
• T is the duration of the concession; 
• >	'^M  is the average cash flow computed using the forecast of the time series of the 
concession period; 
• ä is the flow of external costs generated by the investment (it is expressed as a negative 
number because the case study under analysis presents only external benefits);  
• I is the investment cost;  











34 Expression used by Scandizzo and Ventura in the paper Sharing risk through concession contracts, European 
journal of operational reasearch(2010). 
35 Expression used by Scandizzo and Ventura in the paper Sharing risk through concession contracts, European 




Three cases are considered for each hypothesis of investment costs distribution: 
 
• the first case, called by me “the general case”, is that in which the concession price is not 
fixed through an agreement between parties but it is fixed, in an arbitrary way, within the 
range of the admissible prices, determined by the theoretical model; the lower bound of this 
range is the minimum acceptable price by the State to give the concession while the upper 
bound is the maximum price at which the Private Company is ready to invest; 
• the second case regards the cooperative equilibrium in which the concession price is 
determined between the parties in order to maximize the sum of their payoffs; 
• the third case regards the Nash equilibrium in which the concession prices are computed as 
a weighted average of the limiting acceptable prices by the two parties and the weights 
represent the parties’ bargaining power. 
 























• Hypothesis 1: investment costs sustained entirely by the Private Company 
 
First case (“general case”) 
 
The results for the general case are reported in the table 60: 
 
Table 60 
P 0,00 € 50,00 € 100,00 € 150,00 € 200,00 € 250,00 € 276,03 € 
≠∂ 0,00 € 0,00 € 0,00 € 0,00 € 0,00 € 0,00 € 0,00 € 
∑ ≠  10.517,78 € 11.319,87 € 12.121,97 € 12.924,06 € 13.726,16 € 14.528,25 € 14.945,82 € 
≠∏ 246,13 € 296,39 € 346,64 € 396,90 € 447,16 € 497,42 € 523,58 € 
∑∏ ≠  6.441,44 € 5.639,35 € 4.837,25 € 4.035,16 € 3.233,06 € 2.430,97 € 2.013,39 € 
V 
project 




• the first row shows the range of possible concession prices (P); the first price (0,00 €) is the 
minimum price at which the State is ready to give the concession (this value is computed 
through equation 2D) while the last one (276,03 €) is the maximum price at which the 
Private Company is ready to invest (this value is computed through equation 3D); these two 
values constitute, respectively, the lower and the upper bound of the concession prices range 
while intermediate values are examples of possible concession prices that the parties can 
choose; 
• the second row shows the range of possible minimum cash flows ≠∂ at which the State is 
ready to the give the concession (these values are computed through the equation 2C). 
• the third row shows the range of possible contract values for the State ∑ ≠  (these values 
are computed equation 2); 
• the fourth row shows the range of possible minimum cash flows values ≠∏  at which the 
Private Company is ready to invest (these values come from the application of 3C); 
• the fifth row shows the range of possible contract values for the Private Company ∑∏ ≠  
(these values come from the application of equation 3); 
• the last row shows the range of possible values of the project π	∫ªºΩæø¿	which result from 




It is important to analyse the cash flows percentage variations with the aim to identify if the 
Private Company will find profitable to invest at the current date36. 
To have an idea if it is worth for the Private Company to start the project at the current date, we 
compute the percentage change in the cash flow required to make optimal investment. This is 







Where ¬ù is the Private Company cash flow and ¬√ƒ≈ is the average cash flow of the project. 
 
When the percentage variation is negative, the Private Company invest at the current date 
because the average cash flow of the project is higher than the minimum cash flow for which 
the Private Company would invest. 
Viceversa when the percentage variation is positive, the Private Company does not invest at the 
current date because the average cash flow of the project is lower than the minimum cash flow 
for which the Private Company would invest. 
 




























The cash flows percentage variations are negative because the minimum cash flows for which 
the Private Company accepts to invest are lower than the average cash flow of the project; this 
implies that the Private Company is ready to invest at the current date.  
For example when the concession price is 0€, the Private Company minimum cash flow is 52,99 
times lower than the average cash flow of the project and so on… 
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It is also important to analyse, from an alternative point of view, the parties’ contract values 
with the aim to identify if the State and the Private Company sign the concession contract at 
the current date. 
The parties’ contract values and their variations according to the different concession prices are 





For each level of concession price in the range [0€;276,03€] the State and the Private Company 
are ready to sign the contract and thus to invest. When the concession price increases, we have 
that: 
• the State finds even more convenient to give the concession because its contract value " >  
increases; 
• the Private Company finds less convenient to enter into the contract and  to invest because 
his contract value "ù >  decreases. 
 
Second case (the cooperative equilibrium) 
 
The cooperative price (obtained through equation 8) is  !« = 0 thus the results are the same of 
the first column of table 60 and of the plot 1-2 when ! = 0 and precisely we have that: the State 



































Third case (Nash equilibrium) 
 
For the Nash equilibrium the results are reported in the table 61: 
 
Table 61 
w S w P »∗… ≠∂ ∑ ≠  ≠∏ ∑∏ ≠  V project 
1 0 0,00 € 0,00 € 10.517,78 € 246,13 € 6.441,44 € 16.959,22 € 
0,9 0,1 0,00 € 0,00 € 10.517,78 € 246,13 € 6.441,44 € 16.959,22 € 
0,8 0,2 0,00 € 0,00 € 10.517,78 € 246,13 € 6.441,44 € 16.959,22 € 
0,7 0,3 0,00 € 0,00 € 10.517,78 € 246,13 € 6.441,44 € 16.959,22 € 
0,6 0,4 0,00 € 0,00 € 10.517,78 € 246,13 € 6.441,44 € 16.959,22 € 
0,5 0,5 0,00 € 0,00 € 10.517,78 € 246,13 € 6.441,44 € 16.959,22 € 
0,4 0,6 0,00 € 0,00 € 10.517,78 € 246,13 € 6.441,44 € 16.959,22 € 
0,3 0,7 93,33 € 0,00 € 12.014,90 € 339,94 € 4.944,32 € 16.959,22 € 
0,2 0,8 1.538,23 € 0,00 € 35.193,91 € 1.792,28 € 12,19 € 35.206,10 € 
0,1 0,9 2.983,13 € 0,00 € 58.372,92 € 3.244,63 € 12.477,08 € 70.850,00 € 




• the first and the second column show the State (w S) and the Private Company’s (w P) 
bargaining power; 
• the third column shows the Nash equilibrium prices »∗… (computed according equation 10); 
• the fourth column shows the minimum cash flows ≠∂ (computed according equation 2C) at 
which the State is ready to give the concession;  
• the fifth column shows the contract values for the State ∑ ≠  (computed according equation 
2); 
• the sixth column shows the minimum cash flows ≠∏  (computed according equation 3C) at 
which the Private Company is ready to invest; 
• the seventh column shows the contract values for the Private Company ∑∏ ≠  (computed 
according equation 3); 












When the concession price is lower than 1538,23€, the Private Company is ready to invest at 
the current date because the minimum cash flows for which the Private Company accepts to 
invest are lower than the average cash flow of the project (for this reason the cash flows 
percentage variations are negative). For example when the concession price is 0€, the cash flow 
of the project is 52,99 times higher than the minimum cash flow for which the Private Company 
accepts to invest. 
 
When the concession price is higher or equal to 1538,23€, the Private Company does not invest 
at the current date because the minimum cash flows for which the Private Company accepts to 
invest are higher than the average cash flow of the project (for this reason the cash flows 
percentage variations are positive). For example when the concession price is 1538,23€, the 
minimum cash flow for which the Private Company accepts to invest is 242,32 times higher 



























The parties’ contract values and their variation according to the different concession prices and 






When !∗ß = 0,00€ the Nash equilibrium does not exist and the model collapses to the case of 
the cooperative equilibrium. 
From !∗ß = 0,00	€ to !∗ß = 93,33€ both the State both the Private Company find optimal to 
enter in the contract and thus to invest at the current date; instead from !∗ß = 1.538,23	€ to 
!∗ß = 4.428,04	€ only the State finds optimal to enter in the contract while the Private 
Company finds optimal to wait since its expected NPV is negative but his option to wait is 
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• Hypothesis 2: investment costs sustained for the 75% by the Private Company and 
for 25% by the State 
 
First case (“general case”) 
 
For the general case the results are reported in the table 62: 
 
Table 62 
P 0,00 € 100,00 € 200,00 € 300,00 € 337,35 € 
≠∂ 0,00 € 0,00 € 0,00 € 0,00 € 0,00 € 
∑ ≠  9.535,74 € 11.139,93 € 12.744,12 € 14.348,31 € 14.947,48 € 
≠∏ 184,60 € 285,11 € 385,63 € 486,14 € 523,68 € 
∑∏ ≠  7.423,48 € 5.819,29 € 4.215,10 € 2.610,91 € 2.011,74 € 
V project 16.959,22 € 16.959,22 € 16.959,22 € 16.959,22 € 16.959,22 € 
 





The cash flows percentage variations are negative because the minimum cash flows for which 
the Private Company accepts to invest are lower than the average cash flow of the project; this 























The parties’ contract values and their variation according to the different concession prices are 





The maximum price (337,35 €) at which the Private Company accepts to invest has increased 
wrt the hypothesis 1 (276,03 €) and it will continue to increase as the distribution of investment 
costs reach the hypothesis of the investment costs entirely sustained by the State because this 
is due to the fact that the Private Company sustains less investment costs and so it is available 
to spend more money for the concession price.  
For each level of concession price in the range [0€;337,35€] the State and the Private Company 
are ready to sign the contract and thus to invest. When the concession price increases, we have 
that: 
• the State finds even more convenient to give the concession because its contract value " >  
increases; 
• the Private Company finds less convenient to enter into the contract and  to invest because 
his contract value "ù >  decreases. 
 
Second case (the cooperative equilibrium) 
 
The cooperative price (obtained through equation 8) is  !« = 0 thus the results are the same of 
the first column of table 62 and of the plot 5-6 when ! = 0 and precisely we have that: the State 




























Third case (Nash equilibrium) 
 
For the Nash equilibrium the results are reported in the table 63: 
 
Table 63 
w S w P »∗… ≠∂ ∑ ≠  ≠∏ ∑∏ ≠  V project 
1 0 0,00 € 0,00 € 9.535,74 € 184,60 € 7.423,48 € 
	
16.959,22 € 
0,9 0,1 0,00 € 0,00 € 9.535,74 € 184,60 € 7.423,48 € 16.959,22 € 
0,8 0,2 0,00 € 0,00 € 9.535,74 € 184,60 € 7.423,48 € 16.959,22 € 
0,7 0,3 0,00 € 0,00 € 9.535,74 € 184,60 € 7.423,48 € 16.959,22 € 
0,6 0,4 0,00 € 0,00 € 9.535,74 € 184,60 € 7.423,48 € 16.959,22 € 
0,5 0,5 0,00 € 0,00 € 9.535,74 € 184,60 € 7.423,48 € 16.959,22 € 
0,4 0,6 0,00 € 0,00 € 9.535,74 € 184,60 € 7.423,48 € 16.959,22 € 
0,3 0,7 93,33 € 0,00 € 11.032,86 € 278,40 € 5926,36 € 16.959,22 € 
0,2 0,8 1.538,23 € 0,00 € 34.211,87 € 1.730,75 € 14,09 € 34.225,96 € 
0,1 0,9 2.983,13 € 0,00 € 57.390,88 € 3.183,09 € 12.240,46 € 69.631,34 € 
0 1 4.428,04 € 0,00 € 80.569,89 € 4.635,44 € 17.825,40 € 98.395,29 € 
 





When the concession price is lower than 1538,23€, the Private Company is ready to invest at 
the current date because the minimum cash flows for which the Private Company accepts to 






















invest are lower than the average cash flow of the project (for this reason the cash flows 
percentage variations are negative).  
When the concession price is higher or equal to 1538,23€, the Private Company does not invest 
at the current date because the minimum cash flows for which the Private Company accepts to 
invest are higher than the average cash flow of the project (for this reason the cash flows 
percentage variations are positive).  
 
The parties’ contract values and their variation according to the different concession prices and 





When !∗ß = 0,00€ the Nash equilibrium does not exist and the model collapses to the case of 
the cooperative equilibrium. 
From !∗ß = 0,00	€ to !∗ß = 93,33€ both the State both the Private Company find optimal to 


































































!∗ß = 4.428,04	€ only the State finds optimal to enter in the contract while the Private 
Company finds optimal to wait since its  expected NPV is negative but his option to wait is 




• Hypothesis 3: investment costs sustained for the 50% by the Private Company and 
for 50% by the State 
 
First case (“general case”) 
 
For the general case the results are reported in the table 64: 
 
Table 64 
P 0,00 € 100,00 € 200,00 € 300,00 € 398,46 € 
≠∂ 0,00 € 0,00 € 0,00 € 0,00 € 0,00 € 
∑ ≠  8.553,70 € 10.157,89 € 11.762,08 € 13.366,27 € 14.945,76 € 
≠∏ 123,06 € 223,58 € 324,09 € 424,61 € 523,58 € 
∑∏ ≠  8.405,52 € 6.801,33 € 5.197,14 € 3.592,95 € 2.013,46 € 
V project 16.959,22 € 16.959,22 € 16.959,22 € 16.959,22 € 16.959,22 € 
 





The cash flows percentage variations are negative because the minimum cash flows for which 
the Private Company accepts to invest are lower than the average cash flow of the project; this 



















The parties’ contract values and their variation according to the different concession prices are 





For each level of concession price in the range [0€;398,46€] the State and the Private Company 
are ready to sign the contract and thus to invest. When the concession price increases, we have 
that: 
• the State finds even more convenient to give the concession because its contract value " >  
increases; 
• the Private Company finds less convenient to enter into the contract and  to invest because 
his contract value "ù >  decreases. 
 
Second case (the cooperative equilibrium) 
 
The cooperative price (obtained through equation 8) is  !« = 0 thus the results are the same of 
the first column of table 64 and of the plot 9-10 when ! = 0 and precisely we have that: the 



























Third case (Nash equilibrium) 
 
For the Nash equilibrium the results are reported in the table 65: 
 
Table 65 
w S w P »∗… ≠∂ ∑ ≠  ≠∏ ∑∏ ≠  V project 
1 0 0,00 € 0,00 € 8.553,70 € 123,06 € 8.405,52 € 16.959,22 € 
0,9 0,1 0,00 € 0,00 € 8.553,70 € 123,06 € 8.405,52 € 16.959,22 € 
0,8 0,2 0,00 € 0,00 € 8.553,70 € 123,06 € 8.405,52 € 16.959,22 € 
0,7 0,3 0,00 € 0,00 € 8.553,70 € 123,06 € 8.405,52 € 16.959,22 € 
0,6 0,4 0,00 € 0,00 € 8.553,70 € 123,06 € 8.405,52 € 16.959,22 € 
0,5 0,5 0,00 € 0,00 € 8.553,70 € 123,06 € 8.405,52 € 16.959,22 € 
0,4 0,6 0,00 € 0,00 € 8.553,70 € 123,06 € 8.405,52 € 16.959,22 € 
0,3 0,7 93,33 € 0,00 € 10.050,82 € 216,87 € 6.908,39 € 16.959,22 € 
0,2 0,8 1.538,23 € 0,00 € 33.229,83 € 1.669,22 € 16,37 € 33.246,21 € 
0,1 0,9 2.983,13 € 0,00 € 56.408,84 € 3.121,56 € 12.003,84 € 68.412,69 € 
0 1 4.428,04 € 0,00 € 79.587,85 € 4.573,91 € 17.588,78 € 97.176,63 € 
 





When the concession price is lower than 1538,23€, the Private Company is ready to invest at 






























invest are lower than the average cash flow of the project (for this reason the cash flows 
percentage variations are negative).  
When the concession price is higher or equal to 1538,23€, the Private Company does not invest 
at the current date because the minimum cash flows for which the Private Company accepts to 
invest are higher than the average cash flow of the project (for this reason the cash flows 
percentage variations are positive).  
 
The parties’ contract values and their variation according to the different concession prices and 












































































When !∗ß = 0,00€ the Nash equilibrium does not exist and the model collapses to the case of 
the cooperative equilibrium. 
From !∗ß = 0,00	€ to !∗ß = 93,33€ both the State both the Private Company find optimal to 
enter in the contract and thus to invest at the current date; instead from !∗ß = 1.538,23	€ to 
!∗ß = 4.428,04	€ only the State finds optimal to enter in the contract while the Private 
Company finds optimal to wait since its expected NPV is negative but his option to wait is 
positive (the option to wait is in written red colour in the plots and in the tables). 
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• Hypothesis 4: investment costs sustained for the 25% by the Private Company and 
for 75% by the State 
 
First case (“general case”) 
 
For the general case the results are reported in the table 66: 
 
Table 66 
P 0,00 € 100,00 € 200,00 € 300,00 € 400,00 € 459,68 € 
≠∂ 0,00 € 0,00 € 0,00 € 0,00 € 0,00 € 0,00 € 
∑ ≠  7.571,66 € 9.175,85 € 10.780,04 € 12.384,24 € 13.988,43 € 14.945,81 € 
≠∏ 61,53 € 162,05 € 262,56 € 363,08 € 463,59 € 523,58 € 
∑∏ ≠  9.387,56 € 7.783,36 € 6.179,17 € 4.574,98 € 2.970,79 € 2.013,41 € 
V 
project 
16.959,22 € 16.959,22 € 16.959,22 € 16.959,22 € 16.959,22 € 16.959,22€ 
 





The cash flows percentage variations are negative because the minimum cash flows for which 
the Private Company accepts to invest are lower than the average cash flow of the project; this 




















The parties’ contract values and their variation according to the different concession prices are 





For each level of concession price in the range [0€;459,68€] the State and the Private Company 
are ready to sign the contract and thus to invest. When the concession price increases, we have 
that: 
• the State finds even more convenient to give the concession because its contract value " >  
increases; 
• the Private Company finds less convenient to enter into the contract and to invest because 
his contract value "ù >  decreases. 
 
Second case (the cooperative equilibrium) 
 
The cooperative price (obtained through equation 8) is  !« = 0 thus the results are the same of 
the first column of table 66 and of the plot 13-14 when ! = 0 and precisely we have that: the 




































Third case (Nash equilibrium) 
 
For the Nash equilibrium the results are reported in the table 67: 
 
Table 67 
w S w P »∗… ≠∂ ∑ ≠  ≠∏ ∑∏ ≠  V project 
1 0 0,00 € 0,00 € 7.571,66 € 61,53 € 9.387,56 € 16.959,22 € 
0,9 0,1 0,00 € 0,00 € 7.571,66 € 61,53 € 9.387,56 € 16.959,22 € 
0,8 0,2 0,00 € 0,00 € 7.571,66 € 61,53 € 9.387,56 € 16.959,22 € 
0,7 0,3 0,00 € 0,00 € 7.571,66 € 61,53 € 9.387,56 € 16.959,22 € 
0,6 0,4 0,00 € 0,00 € 7.571,66 € 61,53 € 9.387,56 € 16.959,22 € 
0,5 0,5 0,00 € 0,00 € 7.571,66 € 61,53 € 9.387,56 € 16.959,22 € 
0,4 0,6 0,00 € 0,00 € 7.571,66 € 61,53 € 9.387,56 € 16.959,22 € 
0,3 0,7 93,33 € 0,00 € 9.068,79 € 155,34 € 7.890,43 € 16.959,22 € 
0,2 0,8 1.538,23 € 0,00 € 32.247,80 € 1.607,68 € 19,14 € 32.266,93 € 
0,1 0,9 2.983,13 € 0,00 € 55.426,81 € 3.060,03 € 11.767,22 € 67.194,03 € 
0 1 4.428,04 € 0,00 € 78.605,82 € 4.512,37 € 17.352,16 € 95.957,98 € 
 




When the concession price is lower than 1538,23€, the Private Company is ready to invest at 
the current date because the minimum cash flows for which the Private Company accepts to 
invest are lower than the average cash flow of the project (for this reason the cash flows 
percentage variations are negative).  
When the concession price is higher or equal to 1538,23€, the Private Company does not invest 
at the current date because the minimum cash flows for which the Private Company accepts to 
invest are higher than the average cash flow of the project (for this reason the cash flows 
percentage variations are positive).  
















The parties’ contract values and their variation according to the different concession prices and 






When !∗ß = 0,00€ the Nash equilibrium does not exist and the model collapses to the case of 
the cooperative equilibrium. 
From !∗ß = 0,00	€ to !∗ß = 93,33€ both the State both the Private Company find optimal to 
enter in the contract and thus to invest at the current date; instead from !∗ß = 1.538,23	€ to 
!∗ß = 4.428,04	€ only the State finds optimal to enter in the contract while the Private 
Company finds optimal to wait since its expected NPV is negative but his option to wait is 








































































• Hypothesis 5: investment costs sustained entirely by the State 
 
First case (“general case”) 
 
For the general case the results are reported in the table 68: 
 
Table 68 
P 0,00 € 100,00 € 200,00 € 300,00 € 400,00 € 500,00 € 520,00 € 
≠∂ 0,00 € 0,00 € 0,00 € 0,00 € 0,00 € 0,00 € 0,00 € 
∑ ≠  6.589,63 € 8.193,82 € 9.798,01 € 11.402,20 € 13.006,39 € 14.610,58 € 14.931,42 € 
≠∏ 0,00 € 100,52 € 201,03 € 301,55 € 402,06 € 502,58 € 522,68 € 
∑∏ ≠  10.369,59 € 8.765,40 € 7.161,21 € 5.557,02 € 3.952,83 € 2.348,64 € 2.027,80 € 
V 
project 
16.959,22 € 16.959,22 € 16.959,22 € 16.959,22 € 16.959,22 € 16.959,22 € 16.959,22 € 
 





The cash flows percentage variations are negative because the minimum cash flows for which 
the Private Company accepts to invest are lower than the average cash flow of the project; this 





















The parties’ contract values and their variation according to the different concession prices are 





For each level of concession price in the range [0€;520,00€] the State and the Private Company 
are ready to sign the contract and thus to invest. When the concession price increases, we have 
that: 
• the State finds even more convenient to give the concession because its contract value " >  
increases; 
• the Private Company finds less convenient to enter into the contract and to invest because 
his contract value "ù >  decreases. 
 
Second case (the cooperative equilibrium) 
 
The cooperative price (obtained through equation 8) is  !« = 0 thus the results are the same of 
the first column of table 68 and of the plot 17-18 when ! = 0 and precisely we have that: the 






































Third case (Nash equilibrium) 
 
For the case of the Nash equilibrium the results are reported in the table 69: 
 
Table 69 
w S w P »∗… ≠∂ ∑ ≠  ≠∏ ∑∏ ≠  V project 
1 0 0,00 € 0,00 € 6.589,63 € 0,00 € 10.369,59 € 16.959,22 € 
0,9 0,1 0,00 € 0,00 € 6.589,63 € 0,00 € 10.369,59 € 16.959,22 € 
0,8 0,2 0,00 € 0,00 € 6.589,63 € 0,00 € 10.369,59 € 16.959,22 € 
0,7 0,3 0,00 € 0,00 € 6.589,63 € 0,00 € 10.369,59 € 16.959,22 € 
0,6 0,4 0,00 € 0,00 € 6.589,63 € 0,00 € 10.369,59 € 16.959,22 € 
0,5 0,5 0,00 € 0,00 € 6.589,63 € 0,00 € 10.369,59 € 16.959,22 € 
0,4 0,6 0,00 € 0,00 € 6.589,63 € 0,00 € 10.369,59 € 16.959,22 € 
0,3 0,7 93,33 € 0,00 € 8.086,75 € 93,81 € 8.872,47 € 16.959,22 € 
0,2 0,8 1.538,23 € 0,00 € 31.265,76 € 1.546,15 € 110,22 € 31.375,98 € 
0,1 0,9 2.983,13 € 0,00 € 54.444,77 € 2.998,50 € 34.709,61 € 89.154,38 € 
0 1 4.428,04 € 0,00 € 77.623,78 € 4.450,84 € 40.294,55 € 117.918,33 € 
 





When the concession price is lower than 1538,23€, the Private Company is ready to invest at 
the current date because the minimum cash flows for which the Private Company accepts to 
invest are lower than the average cash flow of the project (for this reason the cash flows 
























When the concession price is higher or equal to 1538,23€, the Private Company does not invest 
at the current date because the minimum cash flows for which the Private Company accepts to 
invest are higher than the average cash flow of the project (for this reason the cash flows 
percentage variations are positive).  
 
The parties’ contract values and their variation according to the different concession prices and 






When !∗ß = 0,00€ the Nash equilibrium does not exist and the model collapses to the case of 



































































From !∗ß = 0,00	€ to !∗ß = 93,33€ both the State both the Private Company find optimal to 
enter in the contract and thus to invest at the current date; instead from !∗ß = 1.538,23	€ to 
!∗ß = 4.428,04	€ only the State finds optimal to enter in the contract while the Private 
Company finds optimal to wait since its expected NPV is negative but his option to wait is 
positive (the option to wait is in written red colour in the plots and in the tables). 
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7.2.2 Comparative Static Analysis 
 
In this paragraph, I have done the comparative static analysis and precisely: 
 
• I have selected some inputs i.e. the discount rate, the cash flows volatility and the 
investment costs; 
• I have taken each input one by one and I modified its value ceteris paribus in order to analyse 
how the outputs of the model change according to the variation of the single input. 
 
I have assumed two scenarios for each input: 
 
• for the discount rate, which in the basic model is â = 5%, I have assumed a variation of 
25% by obtaining â = 4% and	â = 6%; 
• for the standard deviation of the cash flows, which in the basic model is µ = 1%, I have 
assumed µ = 10% and µ = 20%  37 ; 
• for the investment costs, which in the basic model are k = 3928,15	€, I have assumed an 
increase of 100% and 200% by obtaining k = 7856,3	€ and k = 11784,45	€  38. 
 









37The reason for this choice is explained in the paragraph 7.2.2.2 
 
38 The reason for this choice is explained in the paragraph 7.2.2.3 
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7.2.2.1 Discount rate variation 
 
The first input on which the comparative statics analysis is made is the discount rate: while the 
discount rate in the basic model is equal to 5%, I have conjectured a lower discount rate equal 
to 4% (example 1) and a higher discount rate equal to 6% (example 2). 
 
The inputs for the example 1 become: 
 
Table 70 
© ™ ´ ¨ T ≠	ÆØ∞ ± I ≤≥ ≤¥ 
0,95% 1,00% 4,00% 3,05% 40 523,5 € -397,96 € 3928,15 € 4,14 -193,16 
 
while for the example 2 the inputs become: 
 
Table 71 
© ™ ´ ¨ T ≠	ÆØ∞ ± I ≤≥ ≤¥ 
0,95% 1,00% 6,00% 5,05% 40 523,5 € -397,96 € 3928,15 € 6,15 -195,16 
 
Indeed, I have proceeded as follows: 
 
• as in the basic model, I have reported the plots under the different hypotheses of investment 
costs distribution; 
• after the plots of each example, I have done a general comment to understand how the 




§ Example 1 (´ = œ%) 
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• Hypothesis 2: investment costs sustained for the 75% by the Private Company and 
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• Hypothesis 3: investment costs sustained for the 50% by the Private Company and 
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• Hypothesis 4: investment costs sustained for the 25% by the Private Company and 
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§ Results example 1 (´ = œ%) 
 
First case (“general case”) 
 
The main results in all hypotheses of investment costs distribution are: 
 
• the increase of the upper bound of the concession price range i.e. the increase of the 
maximum concession price payable by the Private Company, this is due to the application 
of a lower discount rate; 
• the parties’ contract values, " ¬ 	'%=	"ù(¬), are higher than in the general case of the basic 
model reflecting a lower discount rate; 
• the State and the Private Company find optimal to enter in the contract and to invest at the 
current date for each concession price in the range; this propensity increases for the State 
and decreases for the Private Company when the concession price increases. 
 
Second case (cooperative equilibrium) 
 
The cooperative price coincides with the lower bound of the concession prices range in the 
general case for each hypothesis of investment costs distribution. 
 
Third case (Nash equilibrium) 
 
The main results in all hypotheses of costs distribution are: 
 
• the increase of the Nash equilibrium concession prices different from 0 wrt the basic model; 
• when !∗ß = 0,00€ the Nash equilibrium does not exist and the model collapses to the case 
of the cooperative equilibrium. 
• the contract values for both parties, " ¬ 	'%=	"ù(¬), are higher than the basic model 
reflecting a lower discount rate; 
• the State finds optimal to enter in the contract at the current date and this propensity 
increases with the concession price increase. 
• the Private Company, at the current date, finds optimal to wait when the concession price 
is greater or equal to 1440,71€ and finds optimal to invest when the concession price is 




§ Example 2 (´ = –%) 





























































1 0,9 0,8 0,7 0,6 0,5 0,4 0,3 0,2 0,1 0














• Hypothesis 2: investment costs sustained for the 75% by the Private Company and 
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• Hypothesis 3: investment costs sustained for the 50% by the Private Company and 































































1 0,9 0,8 0,7 0,6 0,5 0,4 0,3 0,2 0,1 0














• Hypothesis 4: investment costs sustained for the 25% by the Private Company and for 
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§ Results example 2 (´ = –%) 
 
First case (“general case”) 
 
The main results in all hypotheses of costs distribution are: 
 
• the decrease of the upper bound of the concession price range i.e. the decrease of the 
maximum concession price payable by the Private, this is due to the application of a higher 
discount rate; 
• the contract values for the parties, " ¬ 	'%=	"ù(¬), are lower than in the general case of  
the basic model reflecting a lower discount rate; 
• the State and the Private Company find optimal to enter in the contract and to invest at the 
current date for each concession price in the range; this propensity increases for the State 
and decreases for the Private company when the concession price increases. 
 
Second case (cooperative equilibrium) 
 
The cooperative price coincides with the lower bound of the concession prices range in the 
general model for each hypothesis of costs distribution. 
 
Third case (Nash equilibrium) 
 
The main results in all hypotheses of costs distribution are: 
 
• the decrease of the Nash equilibrium concession prices different from 0; 
• when !∗ß = 0,00€ the Nash equilibrium does not exist and the model collapses to the case 
of the cooperative equilibrium. 
• the contract values for both parties, " ¬ 	'%=	"ù(¬), are lower than in the basic model 
reflectin a higher discount rate; 
• the State finds optimal to enter in the contract at the current date and this propensity 
increases when the concession price increases; 
• the Private Company, at the current date, finds optimal to wait when the concession price 




7.2.2.2 Volatility increase 
 
The second input on which the static comparative analysis is made is the volatility. 
In the basic model the standard deviation of the cash flows is really low (µ = 1%); in fact, by 
remembering that the cash flows are computed as the difference between the revenues and the 
maintenance and operating costs we have that: 
• the revenues are computed assuming a constant price and a traffic volume update of an 
annual 1,5% for the first twenty years while for the last twenty years the traffic volume 
update is considered constant;  
• the operating and maintenance costs are constant over time; 
from which it follows that the cash flows variation from the twentieth year to the end of 
concession period is 0 while in the first twenty years is low. This is the reason for which we 
have this low standard deviation. 
 
It is indeed important to conjecture higher standard deviations to represent realistically the 
volatility of the cash flows. 
I have assumed µ = 10% (example 3) and µ = 20% (example 4). 
 
The inputs for the example 3 become: 
 
Table 72 
© ™ ´ ¨ T ≠	ÆØ∞ ± I ≤≥ ≤¥ 
0,95% 10,00% 5,00% 4,05% 40 523,50 € -397,96 € 3928,15 € 2,74 -3,64 
 
while for the example 4 the inputs become: 
 
Table 73 
© ™ ´ ¨ T ≠	ÆØ∞ ± I ≤≥ ≤¥ 
0,95% 20,00% 5,00% 4,05% 40 523,50 € -397,96 € 3928,15 € 1,87 -1,34 
 
Indeed, I have proceeded as follows: 
 
• as in the basic model, I have reported the plots under the different hypotheses of investment 
costs distribution; 
• after the plots of each example, I have done a general comment to understand how the 
volatility increase affects the outputs of the model. 
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§ Example 3 (— = ≥“%) 
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• Hypothesis 2: investment costs sustained for the 75% by the Private Compnay and 
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• Hypothesis 3: investment costs sustained for the 50% by the Private Company and 
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• Hypothesis 4: investment costs sustained for the 25% by the Private Company and for 
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§ Results example 3 (™ = ≥“%) 
 
First case (“general case”) 
 
The results in all hypotheses of investment costs distribution are: 
 
• the reduction of the upper bound of the concession prices range and indeed the reduction of 
the range itself wrt the general case of the basic model; this reduction is due to the fact that 
the computation of the concession price depends on the cash flows standard deviation which 
is higher (see equation 3D), in fact if the volatility is higher it is true that the cash flows can 
be higher but they can also be lower thus the concession price has to be lower because the 
investment risk is higher; 
• the State and the Private Company find optimal to enter in the contract and to invest at the 
current date for each concession price in the range; this propensity increases for the State 
and decreases for the Private Company when the concession price increases; 
 
Second case (cooperative equilibrium) 
 
The cooperative price coincides with the lower bound of the concession prices range in the 
general model for each hypothesis of costs distribution. 
 
Third case (Nash equilibrium) 
 
The results of the Nash equilibrium in all hypotheses of costs distribution are: 
 
• wrt the Nash equilibrium of the basic model there is the reduction of the Nash equilibrium 
concession prices caused by a higher volatility (see equation 10); 
• when !∗ß = 0,00€ the Nash equilibrium does not exist and the model collapses to the case 
of the cooperative equilibrium. 
• the State finds optimal to enter in the contract at the current date for each concession price; 
• the Private Company,at the current date, finds optimal to enter in the contract at a 
concession price lower than 1437,95€ (except for the first hypothesis in which it finds 
optimal to invest at a concession price equal to 0) instead it finds optimal to wait when the 
concession price is greater or equal to 1437,95€ (except for the first hypothesis in which it 
finds optimal to wait when the concession price is greater or equal to 212,95€). 
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§ Example 4 (— = ¥“%) 
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• Hypothesis 2: investment costs sustained for the 75% by the Private company and 
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• Hypothesis 3: investment costs sustained for the 50% by the Private Company and 
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• Hypothesis 4: investment costs sustained for the 25% by the Private Company and for 
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§ Results example 4 (™ = ¥“%) 
 
First case (“general case”) 
 
The results in all hypotheses of costs distribution are: 
 
• the  further reduction of the upper bound of the concession prices range and indeed the 
further reduction of the range itself wrt the general case of the basic model; this reduction 
is due to the fact that the computation of the concession price depends on the cash flows 
standard deviation which is higher (see equation 3D), in fact if the volatility is higher it is 
true that the cash flows can be higher but they can also be lower thus the concession price 
has to be lower because the  investment risk is higher; 
• the State and the Private Company find optimal to enter in the contract and to invest at the 
current date for each concession price in the range; this propensity increases for the State 
and decreases for the Private Company when the concession price increases. 
 
Second case (cooperative equilibrium) 
 
The cooperative price coincides with the lower bound of the concession prices range in the 
general model for each hypothesis of costs distribution. 
 
Third case (Nash equilibrium) 
 
The results in all hypotheses of costs distribution are: 
 
• wrt the Nash equilibrium of the basic model there is the reduction of the Nash equilibrium 
concession prices caused by a higher volatility (see equation 10); 
• when !∗ß = 0,00€ the Nash equilibrium does not exist and the model collapses to the case 
of the cooperative equilibrium. 
• the State finds optimal to enter in the contract at the current date for each concession price; 
• the Private Company, ate the current date, finds optimal to enter in the contract at a 
concession price equal to 0 instead it finds optimal to wait when the concession price is 




7.2.2.2 Investment costs increase 
 
The last input on which the comparative static analysis is made is represented by the investment 
costs. 
Since in the major part of the big infrastructures the investment costs differ between the 
estimation and the realization and in general they increase, I have believed opportune to 
conjecture an increase of the investment costs of 100% (example 5) and 200% (example 6) 
considering that the Italian average is around the 170%39. 
 
The inputs for the example 5 become: 
 
Table 74 
© ™ ´ ¨ T ≠	ÆØ∞ ± I ≤≥ ≤¥ 
0,95% 1,00% 5,00% 4,05% 40 523,50 € -397,96 € 7856,3 € 5,15 -194,16 
 
while for the example 6 become: 
 
Table 75 
© ™ ´ ¨ T ≠	ÆØ∞ ± I ≤≥ ≤¥ 
0,95% 1,00% 5,00% 4,05% 40 523,50 € -397,96 € 11784,45 € 5,15 -194,16 
 
Indeed, I have proceeded as follows: 
 
• as in the basic model, I have reported the plots under the different hypotheses of investment 
costs distribution; 
• after each hypothesis, I have reported a comment to understand how the investment costs 






§ Example 5 (” = ‘’÷–, ◊	€) 
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First case (“general case”) 
  
It is possible to note: 
 
• the reduction of the upper bound of the concession prices range and indeed the reduction of 
the range itself wrt the general case of the basic model; this reduction is due to the fact that 
the Private Company would not invest for high concession prices because it has to pay 
entirely the investment costs which are doubled; 
• the State finds optimal to enter in the contract at the current date for each concession price 
and this propensity increases when the concession price increases because the State gains 
more money from the concession; 
• the Private Company finds optimal to invest at the current date for each concession price 
and this propensity decreases when the concession price increases because the Private has 
to spend more money for the concession. 
 
Second case (cooperative equilibrium) 
 
The cooperative price coincides with the lower bound of the concession prices range in the 
general model. 
 
Third case (Nash equilibrium) 
 
It is possible to note that: 
 
• the major part of Nash equilibrium concession prices is equal to 0 thus they tend to be 
cooperative concession prices; 
• the State finds optimal to enter in the contract at the current date for each concession price 
and this propensity increases when the concession price increases because the State gains 
more money from the concession; 
• the Private Company finds optimal to invest at the current date only when the concession 





• Hypothesis 2: investment costs sustained for the 75% by the Private Company and 



































































































First case (“general case”) 
  
It is possible to note: 
 
• the increase of the upper bound of the concession prices range and indeed concession price 
range increase wrt the general case of the hypothesis 1; this is due to the fact that the Private 
Company could spend more money to obtain the concession because it has to spend less for 
the investment costs which are also sustained by the State; 
• the State finds optimal to enter in the contract at the current date for each concession price 
and this propensity increases when the concession price increases because the State gains 
more money from the concession; 
• the Private Company finds optimal to invest at the current date for each concession price 
and this propensity decreases when the concession price increases because the Private has 
to spend more money for the concession. 
 
Second case (cooperative equilibrium) 
 
The cooperative price coincides with the lower bound of the concession prices range in the 
general model. 
 
Third case (the Nash equilibrium) 
 
It is possible to note that: 
 
• the major part of Nash equilibrium concession prices is equal to 0 thus they tend to be 
cooperative concession prices; 
• the State finds optimal to enter in the contract at the current date for each concession price 
and this propensity increases when the concession price increases because the State gains 
more money from the concession; 
• the Private Company finds optimal to invest at the current date only when the concession 





• Hypothesis 3: investment costs sustained for the 50% by the Private Company and 

































































































First case (“general case”) 
  
It is possible to note: 
 
• the increase of the upper bound of the concession prices range and indeed concession price 
range increase wrt the general case of the hypothesis 1 and 2; this is due to the fact that the 
Private Company could spend more money to obtain the concession because it has to spend 
less for the investment costs which are also sustained by the State; 
• the State finds optimal to enter in the contract at the current date for each concession price 
and this propensity increases when the concession price increases because the State gains 
more money from the concession; 
• the Private Company finds optimal to invest at the current date for each concession price 
and this propensity decreases when the concession price increases because the Private has 
to spend more money for the concession. 
 
 
Second case (cooperative equilibrium) 
 
The cooperative price coincides with the lower bound of the concession prices range in the 
general model. 
 
Third case (the Nash equilibrium) 
 
It is possible to note that: 
 
• the major part of Nash equilibrium concession prices are equal to 0 thus they tend to be 
cooperative concession prices; 
• the State finds optimal to enter in the contract at the current date for each concession price 
and this propensity increases when the concession price increases because the State gains 
more money from the concession; 
• the Private Company finds optimal to invest at the current date only when the concession 





• Hypothesis 4: investment costs sustained for the 25% by the Private Company and for 

































































































First case (“general case”) 
  
It is possible to note: 
 
• the increase of the upper bound of the concession prices range and indeed concession price 
range increase wrt the general case of the hypothesis 1, 2 and 3; this is due to the fact that 
the Private Company could spend more money to obtain the concession because it has to 
spend less for the investment costs which are also sustained by the State; 
• the State finds optimal to enter in the contract at the current date for each concession price 
and this propensity increases when the concession price increases because the State gains 
more money from the concession; 
• the Private Company finds optimal to invest at the current date for each concession price 
and this propensity decreases when the concession price increases because the Private has 
to spend more money for the concession. 
 
 
Second case (cooperative equilibrium) 
The cooperative price coincides with the lower bound of the concession prices range in the 
general model. 
 
Third case (the Nash equilibrium) 
 
It is possible to note that: 
 
• the major part of Nash equilibrium concession prices are equal to 0 thus they tend to be 
cooperative concession prices; 
• the State finds optimal to enter in the contract at the current date for each concession price 
and this propensity increases when the concession price increases because the State gains 
more money from the concession; 
• the Private Company finds optimal to invest at the current date only when the concession 
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First case (“general case”) 
  
It is possible to note that: 
 
• in this hypothesis of investment costs distribution, the upper bound of the concession price 
range and so the range itself reaches its maximum since the investments costs are entirely 
sustained by the State thus the Private company could spend more money to obtain the 
concession; 
• the State finds optimal to enter in the contract at the current date for each concession price 
and this propensity increases when the concession price increases because the State gains 
more money from the concession; 
• the Private Company finds optimal to invest at the current date for each concession price 
and this propensity decreases when the concession price increases; 
 
Second case (cooperative equilibrium) 
 
The cooperative price coincides with the lower bound of the concession prices range in the 
general model. 
 
Third case (the Nash equilibrium) 
 
It is possible to note that: 
 
• the major part of Nash equilibrium concession prices is equal to 0 thus they tend to be 
cooperative concession prices;  
• the State finds optimal to enter in the contract at the current date for each concession price 
and this propensity increases when the concession prices increases. 
• the Private Company finds optimal to invest at the current date for each concession price 








A summary is made to allow to synthetize the results of the example 5. 
 
Ø In the general case: 
 
• the concession price range increases from hypothesis 1 to hypothesis 5 as result of 
the major propensity of the Private Company to spend more money to obtain the 
concession when the State assumes a percentage of investment costs; 
• the State finds optimal to enter in the contract at the current date for each concession 
price and this propensity increases when the concession price increases because it 
gains more money; 
•  the Private finds optimal to enter in the contract at the current date for each 
concession price and this propensity decreases when the concession price increases 
because it has to spend more money for the concession; 
 
Ø in the Nash equilibrium: 
 
• the State finds optimal to enter in the contract at the current date for each concession 
price and this propensity increases when the concession price increases because it 
gains more money; 
• the Private Company finds optimal to enter in the contract at the current date when 
the concession price is equal to 0 otherwise if it is equal to 499,89€ it finds optimal 
to wait; this is valid for all hypotheses of costs distribution except for the hypothesis 
5 where it finds optimal invest for each concession price since the investment costs 






§ Example 6 (” = ≥≥‘’œ, œ÷	€) 
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First case (“general case”) 
 
It is possible to note that: 
 
• the concession price range does not exist because the minimum acceptable price by the State 
coincides with the maximum affordable price by the Private Company; 
• the State finds optimal to enter in the contract at the current date; 
• the Private Company finds optimal to wait at the current date. 
 
Second case (cooperative equilibrium) 
 
The cooperative price coincides with price of the general model. 
 
Third case (the Nash equilibrium) 
 





• Hypothesis 2: investment costs sustained for the 75% by the Private Company and 
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First case (“general case”) 
 
It is possible to note that: 
 
• the concession price range does not exist because the minimum acceptable price by the State 
coincides with the maximum affordable price by the Private Company; 
• the State finds optimal to enter in the contract at the current date; 
• the Private Company finds optimal to wait at the current date. 
 
Second case (cooperative equilibrium) 
 
The cooperative price coincides with price of the general model. 
 
Third case (the Nash equilibrium) 
 





• Hypothesis 3: investment costs sustained for the 50% by the Private Company and 
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First case (general case) 
 
It is possible to note that: 
 
• when the State starts to assume a percentage of investment costs the concession price range 
increases because the Private Company could spend more money for the concession price 
when a part of the investment costs is sustained by the State; 
• the State finds optimal to enter in the contract at the current date for each concession price 
and this propensity increases when the concession price increases; 
• the Private Company finds optimal to invest at the current date for each concession price 
and this propensity decreases when the concession price increases; 
 
Second case (cooperative equilibrium) 
 
The cooperative price coincides with the lower bound of the concession prices range in the 
general model. 
 
Third case (Nash equilibrium) 
 




• Hypothesis 4: investment costs sustained for the 25% by the Private Company and for 
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First case (“general case”) 
 
It is possible to note that: 
 
• the State finds optimal to enter in the contract at the current date for each concession price 
and this propensity increases when the concession price increases; 
• the Private Company finds optimal to invest at the current date for each concession price 
and this propensity decreases when the concession price increases; 
 
Second case (cooperative equilibrium) 
 
The cooperative price coincides with the lower bound of the concession prices range in the 
general model. 
 
Third case (Nash equilibrium) 
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First case (“general case”) 
 
It is possible to note that: 
 
• the State finds optimal to wait at the current date for the concession prices equal to 0 and 
100,00 € otherwise it finds optimal to enter in the contract when the concession price is 
higher and so when it gains more money; 
• the Private Company finds optimal to invest at the current date for each concession price 
and this propensity decreases when the concession price increases because it has to spend 
more money for the concession. 
 
Second case (cooperative equilibrium) 
 
The cooperative price coincides with the lower bound of the concession prices range in the 
general model. 
 
Third case (Nash equilibrium) 
 

















A summary is made to allow to synthetize the results of the example 6. 
 
Ø In the general case: 
 
• the State finds optimal to enter in the contract at the current date for each concession 
price except under hypothesis 5 of costs distribution (so when it sustains entirely the 
investment costs) in which for the lower values of concession prices the State finds 
optimal to wait; 
• the Private, under hypothesis 1 and 2 of costs distribution (so when it sustains entirely 
or at the level of 75% the investments costs), finds optimal to wait at the current date 
but this propensity decreases when the State starts to assume a greater percentage of 
investments costs and the option to wait becomes 0 from the hypothesis 3. 
 

























At the conclusion of my work I report its main results by giving a general overview. 
The economic and financial analysis and the socio-economic analysis, which I have made with 
the updated data, have confirmed the project solution chosen by RFI; the NPV results positive 
in both analysis indicating the convenience to realize the project both from the economic point 
of view both from the social point of view. 
Thanks to the application of the model of the economists Scandizzo and Ventura, I could 
identify how the interaction between the State and the Private Company, with the purpose of 
enter into a concession contract, varies according to the different hypotheses of investment costs 
distribution between the two parties and according to the different economic models of 
equilibrium used to establish the concession price. 
The plurality of the obtained results opens a variegated scenario on the possible decisions of 
the State and the Private Company. 
Finally, through the use of the comparative static analysis I highlighted how the obtained results 
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5 Economic and financial analysis 
 
Each number of the table (for example 5.1.1 A) indicates the relative paragraph in the thesis 
(for example 5.1.1); if a table has not a number it implies that it is part of the same paragraph 
of the precedent table. 
 
 





















Year	 A	 B	 C	 D	
2016	 597,93	€	 544,13	€	 512,72	€	 566,52	€	
2017	 609,89	€	 555,01	€	 522,98	€	 577,85	€	
2018	 622,09	€	 566,11	€	 533,43	€	 589,41	€	
2019	 634,53	€	 577,43	€	 544,10	€	 601,20	€	
2020	 647,22	€	 588,98	€	 554,99	€	 613,22	€	
2021	 660,16	€	 600,76	€	 566,09	€	 625,49	€	
2022	 673,37	€	 612,78	€	 577,41	€	 638,00	€	







Year	 A	 B	 C	 D	
2020	 1,29	€	 1,61	€	 1,50	€	 1,18	€	
2021	 1,31	€	 1,64	€	 1,53	€	 1,20	€	
2022	 1,34	€	 1,67	€	 1,56	€	 1,23	€	
2023	 1,37	€	 1,71	€	 1,59	€	 1,25	€	
2024	 1,39	€	 1,74	€	 1,63	€	 1,28	€	
2025	 1,42	€	 1,78	€	 1,66	€	 1,30	€	
2026	 1,45	€	 1,81	€	 1,69	€	 1,33	€	
2027	 1,48	€	 1,85	€	 1,72	€	 1,36	€	
2028	 1,51	€	 1,89	€	 1,76	€	 1,38	€	
2029	 1,54	€	 1,92	€	 1,79	€	 1,41	€	
2030	 1,57	€	 1,96	€	 1,83	€	 1,44	€	
2031	 1,60	€	 2,00	€	 1,87	€	 1,47	€	
2032	 1,63	€	 2,04	€	 1,90	€	 1,50	€	
2033	 1,67	€	 2,08	€	 1,94	€	 1,53	€	
2034	 1,70	€	 2,12	€	 1,98	€	 1,56	€	
2035	 1,73	€	 2,17	€	 2,02	€	 1,59	€	
2036	 1,77	€	 2,21	€	 2,06	€	 1,62	€	
2037	 1,80	€	 2,25	€	 2,10	€	 1,65	€	
2038	 1,84	€	 2,30	€	 2,14	€	 1,69	€	
2039	 1,88	€	 2,34	€	 2,19	€	 1,72	€	
2040	 1,91	€	 2,39	€	 2,23	€	 1,75	€	
2041	 1,95	€	 2,44	€	 2,28	€	 1,79	€	
2042	 1,99	€	 2,49	€	 2,32	€	 1,82	€	
2043	 2,03	€	 2,54	€	 2,37	€	 1,86	€	
2044	 2,07	€	 2,59	€	 2,42	€	 1,90	€	
2045	 2,11	€	 2,64	€	 2,46	€	 1,94	€	
2046	 2,15	€	 2,69	€	 2,51	€	 1,97	€	
2047	 2,20	€	 2,75	€	 2,56	€	 2,01	€	
2048	 2,24	€	 2,80	€	 2,61	€	 2,05	€	
2049	 2,29	€	 2,86	€	 2,67	€	 2,10	€	
2050	 2,33	€	 2,91	€	 2,72	€	 2,14	€	
2051	 2,38	€	 2,97	€	 2,77	€	 2,18	€	
2052	 2,43	€	 3,03	€	 2,83	€	 2,22	€	
2053	 2,47	€	 3,09	€	 2,89	€	 2,27	€	
2054	 2,52	€	 3,15	€	 2,94	€	 2,31	€	
2055	 2,57	€	 3,22	€	 3,00	€	 2,36	€	
2056	 2,63	€	 3,28	€	 3,06	€	 2,41	€	
2057	 2,68	€	 3,35	€	 3,12	€	 2,45	€	
2058	 2,73	€	 3,41	€	 3,19	€	 2,50	€	
2059	 2,79	€	 3,48	€	 3,25	€	 2,55	€	



























































In the following tables the annual revenues for the short distance passenger transport service 
are reported. 
The PV of short distance passenger transport service revenues for each solution is computed 
through the sum of PVs of the annual revenues of the routes composing the same solution. 
	
Benevento-Caserta	(solution	A)	
Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2020	 3,10	€	 1900	 5.890,00	€	 1.484.280,00	€	
2021	 3,16	€	 1928,5	 6.097,92	€	 1.536.675,08	€	
2022	 3,23	€	 1957,4275	 6.313,17	€	 1.590.919,71	€	
2023	 3,29	€	 1986,788913	 6.536,03	€	 1.647.079,18	€	
2024	 3,36	€	 2016,590746	 6.766,75	€	 1.705.221,08	€	
2025	 3,42	€	 2046,839607	 7.005,62	€	 1.765.415,38	€	
2026	 3,49	€	 2077,542201	 7.252,91	€	 1.827.734,54	€	
2027	 3,56	€	 2108,705335	 7.508,94	€	 1.892.253,57	€	
2028	 3,63	€	 2140,335915	 7.774,01	€	 1.959.050,12	€	
2029	 3,70	€	 2172,440953	 8.048,43	€	 2.028.204,59	€	
2030	 3,78	€	 2205,027568	 8.332,54	€	 2.099.800,21	€	
2031	 3,85	€	 2238,102981	 8.626,68	€	 2.173.923,16	€	
2032	 3,93	€	 2271,674526	 8.931,20	€	 2.250.662,65	€	
2033	 4,01	€	 2305,749644	 9.246,47	€	 2.330.111,04	€	
2034	 4,09	€	 2340,335888	 9.572,87	€	 2.412.363,96	€	
2035	 4,17	€	 2375,440927	 9.910,80	€	 2.497.520,41	€	
2036	 4,26	€	 2411,072541	 10.260,65	€	 2.585.682,88	€	
2037	 4,34	€	 2447,238629	 10.622,85	€	 2.676.957,48	€	
2038	 4,43	€	 2483,947208	 10.997,83	€	 2.771.454,08	€	
2039	 4,52	€	 2521,206416	 11.386,06	€	 2.869.286,41	€	
2040	 4,61	€	 2559,024512	 11.787,99	€	 2.970.572,22	€	
2041	 4,70	€	 2559,024512	 12.023,74	€	 3.029.983,67	€	
2042	 4,79	€	 2559,024512	 12.264,22	€	 3.090.583,34	€	
2043	 4,89	€	 2559,024512	 12.509,50	€	 3.152.395,01	€	
2044	 4,99	€	 2559,024512	 12.759,69	€	 3.215.442,91	€	
2045	 5,09	€	 2559,024512	 13.014,89	€	 3.279.751,77	€	
2046	 5,19	€	 2559,024512	 13.275,19	€	 3.345.346,80	€	
2047	 5,29	€	 2559,024512	 13.540,69	€	 3.412.253,74	€	
2048	 5,40	€	 2559,024512	 13.811,50	€	 3.480.498,81	€	
2049	 5,51	€	 2559,024512	 14.087,73	€	 3.550.108,79	€	
2050	 5,62	€	 2559,024512	 14.369,49	€	 3.621.110,96	€	
2051	 5,73	€	 2559,024512	 14.656,88	€	 3.693.533,18	€	
2052	 5,84	€	 2559,024512	 14.950,02	€	 3.767.403,85	€	
2053	 5,96	€	 2559,024512	 15.249,02	€	 3.842.751,92	€	
2054	 6,08	€	 2559,024512	 15.554,00	€	 3.919.606,96	€	
2055	 6,20	€	 2559,024512	 15.865,08	€	 3.997.999,10	€	
2056	 6,32	€	 2559,024512	 16.182,38	€	 4.077.959,08	€	
2057	 6,45	€	 2559,024512	 16.506,02	€	 4.159.518,27	€	
2058	 6,58	€	 2559,024512	 16.836,15	€	 4.242.708,63	€	
2059	 6,71	€	 2559,024512	 17.172,87	€	 4.327.562,80	€	




Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2020	 5,10	€	 3400	 17.340,00	€	 4.369.680,00	€	
2021	 5,20	€	 3451	 17.952,10	€	 4.523.929,70	€	
2022	 5,31	€	 3502,765	 18.585,81	€	 4.683.624,42	€	
2023	 5,41	€	 3555,306475	 19.241,89	€	 4.848.956,36	€	
2024	 5,52	€	 3608,636072	 19.921,13	€	 5.020.124,52	€	
2025	 5,63	€	 3662,765613	 20.624,34	€	 5.197.334,92	€	
2026	 5,74	€	 3717,707097	 21.352,38	€	 5.380.800,84	€	
2027	 5,86	€	 3773,472704	 22.106,12	€	 5.570.743,11	€	
2028	 5,98	€	 3830,074794	 22.886,47	€	 5.767.390,34	€	
2029	 6,09	€	 3887,525916	 23.694,36	€	 5.970.979,22	€	
2030	 6,22	€	 3945,838805	 24.530,77	€	 6.181.754,79	€	
2031	 6,34	€	 4005,026387	 25.396,71	€	 6.399.970,73	€	
2032	 6,47	€	 4065,101783	 26.293,21	€	 6.625.889,70	€	
2033	 6,60	€	 4126,07831	 27.221,36	€	 6.859.783,61	€	
2034	 6,73	€	 4187,969484	 28.182,28	€	 7.101.933,97	€	
2035	 6,86	€	 4250,789027	 29.177,11	€	 7.352.632,24	€	
2036	 7,00	€	 4314,550862	 30.207,06	€	 7.612.180,16	€	
2037	 7,14	€	 4379,269125	 31.273,37	€	 7.880.890,12	€	
2038	 7,28	€	 4444,958162	 32.377,32	€	 8.159.085,54	€	
2039	 7,43	€	 4511,632534	 33.520,24	€	 8.447.101,26	€	
2040	 7,58	€	 4579,307022	 34.703,51	€	 8.745.283,93	€	
2041	 7,73	€	 4579,307022	 35.397,58	€	 8.920.189,61	€	
2042	 7,88	€	 4579,307022	 36.105,53	€	 9.098.593,40	€	
2043	 8,04	€	 4579,307022	 36.827,64	€	 9.280.565,27	€	
2044	 8,20	€	 4579,307022	 37.564,19	€	 9.466.176,57	€	
2045	 8,37	€	 4579,307022	 38.315,48	€	 9.655.500,11	€	
2046	 8,53	€	 4579,307022	 39.081,79	€	 9.848.610,11	€	
2047	 8,71	€	 4579,307022	 39.863,42	€	 10.045.582,31	€	
2048	 8,88	€	 4579,307022	 40.660,69	€	 10.246.493,96	€	
2049	 9,06	€	 4579,307022	 41.473,90	€	 10.451.423,84	€	
2050	 9,24	€	 4579,307022	 42.303,38	€	 10.660.452,31	€	
2051	 9,42	€	 4579,307022	 43.149,45	€	 10.873.661,36	€	
2052	 9,61	€	 4579,307022	 44.012,44	€	 11.091.134,59	€	
2053	 9,80	€	 4579,307022	 44.892,69	€	 11.312.957,28	€	
2054	 10,00	€	 4579,307022	 45.790,54	€	 11.539.216,42	€	
2055	 10,20	€	 4579,307022	 46.706,35	€	 11.770.000,75	€	
2056	 10,40	€	 4579,307022	 47.640,48	€	 12.005.400,77	€	
2057	 10,61	€	 4579,307022	 48.593,29	€	 12.245.508,78	€	
2058	 10,82	€	 4579,307022	 49.565,15	€	 12.490.418,96	€	
2059	 11,04	€	 4579,307022	 50.556,46	€	 12.740.227,34	€	





Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2020	 3,10	€	 7000	 21.700,00	€	 5.468.400,00	€	
2021	 3,16	€	 7105	 22.466,01	€	 5.661.434,52	€	
2022	 3,23	€	 7211,575	 23.259,06	€	 5.861.283,16	€	
2023	 3,29	€	 7319,748625	 24.080,10	€	 6.068.186,45	€	
2024	 3,36	€	 7429,544854	 24.930,13	€	 6.282.393,44	€	
2025	 3,42	€	 7540,988027	 25.810,17	€	 6.504.161,92	€	
2026	 3,49	€	 7654,102848	 26.721,27	€	 6.733.758,84	€	
2027	 3,56	€	 7768,91439	 27.664,53	€	 6.971.460,53	€	
2028	 3,63	€	 7885,448106	 28.641,08	€	 7.217.553,08	€	
2029	 3,70	€	 8003,729828	 29.652,11	€	 7.472.332,71	€	
2030	 3,78	€	 8123,785775	 30.698,83	€	 7.736.106,05	€	
2031	 3,85	€	 8245,642562	 31.782,50	€	 8.009.190,60	€	
2032	 3,93	€	 8369,3272	 32.904,42	€	 8.291.915,02	€	
2033	 4,01	€	 8494,867108	 34.065,95	€	 8.584.619,62	€	
2034	 4,09	€	 8622,290115	 35.268,48	€	 8.887.656,70	€	
2035	 4,17	€	 8751,624467	 36.513,46	€	 9.201.390,98	€	
2036	 4,26	€	 8882,898834	 37.802,38	€	 9.526.200,08	€	
2037	 4,34	€	 9016,142316	 39.136,81	€	 9.862.474,94	€	
2038	 4,43	€	 9151,384451	 40.518,33	€	 10.210.620,31	€	
2039	 4,52	€	 9288,655218	 41.948,63	€	 10.571.055,21	€	
2040	 4,61	€	 9427,985046	 43.429,42	€	 10.944.213,45	€	
2041	 4,70	€	 9427,985046	 44.298,01	€	 11.163.097,72	€	
2042	 4,79	€	 9427,985046	 45.183,97	€	 11.386.359,68	€	
2043	 4,89	€	 9427,985046	 46.087,65	€	 11.614.086,87	€	
2044	 4,99	€	 9427,985046	 47.009,40	€	 11.846.368,61	€	
2045	 5,09	€	 9427,985046	 47.949,59	€	 12.083.295,98	€	
2046	 5,19	€	 9427,985046	 48.908,58	€	 12.324.961,90	€	
2047	 5,29	€	 9427,985046	 49.886,75	€	 12.571.461,14	€	
2048	 5,40	€	 9427,985046	 50.884,49	€	 12.822.890,36	€	
2049	 5,51	€	 9427,985046	 51.902,18	€	 13.079.348,17	€	
2050	 5,62	€	 9427,985046	 52.940,22	€	 13.340.935,13	€	
2051	 5,73	€	 9427,985046	 53.999,02	€	 13.607.753,83	€	
2052	 5,84	€	 9427,985046	 55.079,00	€	 13.879.908,91	€	
2053	 5,96	€	 9427,985046	 56.180,58	€	 14.157.507,09	€	
2054	 6,08	€	 9427,985046	 57.304,20	€	 14.440.657,23	€	
2055	 6,20	€	 9427,985046	 58.450,28	€	 14.729.470,38	€	
2056	 6,32	€	 9427,985046	 59.619,28	€	 15.024.059,78	€	
2057	 6,45	€	 9427,985046	 60.811,67	€	 15.324.540,98	€	
2058	 6,58	€	 9427,985046	 62.027,90	€	 15.631.031,80	€	
2059	 6,71	€	 9427,985046	 63.268,46	€	 15.943.652,43	€	







Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2020	 16,36	€	 2800	 45.808,00	€	 11.543.616,00	€	
2021	 16,69	€	 2842	 47.425,02	€	 11.951.105,64	€	
2022	 17,02	€	 2884,63	 49.099,13	€	 12.372.979,67	€	
2023	 17,36	€	 2927,89945	 50.832,32	€	 12.809.745,86	€	
2024	 17,71	€	 2971,817942	 52.626,71	€	 13.261.929,89	€	
2025	 18,06	€	 3016,395211	 54.484,43	€	 13.730.076,01	€	
2026	 18,42	€	 3061,641139	 56.407,73	€	 14.214.747,69	€	
2027	 18,79	€	 3107,565756	 58.398,92	€	 14.716.528,29	€	
2028	 19,17	€	 3154,179242	 60.460,40	€	 15.236.021,74	€	
2029	 19,55	€	 3201,491931	 62.594,66	€	 15.773.853,30	€	
2030	 19,94	€	 3249,51431	 64.804,25	€	 16.330.670,32	€	
2031	 20,34	€	 3298,257025	 67.091,84	€	 16.907.142,99	€	
2032	 20,75	€	 3347,73088	 69.460,18	€	 17.503.965,13	€	
2033	 21,16	€	 3397,946843	 71.912,12	€	 18.121.855,10	€	
2034	 21,59	€	 3448,916046	 74.450,62	€	 18.761.556,59	€	
2035	 22,02	€	 3500,649787	 77.078,73	€	 19.423.839,54	€	
2036	 22,46	€	 3553,159533	 79.799,61	€	 20.109.501,07	€	
2037	 22,91	€	 3606,456926	 82.616,53	€	 20.819.366,46	€	
2038	 23,37	€	 3660,55378	 85.532,90	€	 21.554.290,10	€	
2039	 23,83	€	 3715,462087	 88.552,21	€	 22.315.156,54	€	
2040	 24,31	€	 3771,194018	 91.678,10	€	 23.102.881,56	€	
2041	 24,80	€	 3771,194018	 93.511,66	€	 23.564.939,19	€	
2042	 25,29	€	 3771,194018	 95.381,90	€	 24.036.237,98	€	
2043	 25,80	€	 3771,194018	 97.289,53	€	 24.516.962,74	€	
2044	 26,31	€	 3771,194018	 99.235,33	€	 25.007.301,99	€	
2045	 26,84	€	 3771,194018	 101.220,03	€	 25.507.448,03	€	
2046	 27,38	€	 3771,194018	 103.244,43	€	 26.017.596,99	€	
2047	 27,92	€	 3771,194018	 105.309,32	€	 26.537.948,93	€	
2048	 28,48	€	 3771,194018	 107.415,51	€	 27.068.707,91	€	
2049	 29,05	€	 3771,194018	 109.563,82	€	 27.610.082,07	€	
2050	 29,63	€	 3771,194018	 111.755,09	€	 28.162.283,71	€	
2051	 30,23	€	 3771,194018	 113.990,20	€	 28.725.529,38	€	
2052	 30,83	€	 3771,194018	 116.270,00	€	 29.300.039,97	€	
2053	 31,45	€	 3771,194018	 118.595,40	€	 29.886.040,77	€	
2054	 32,08	€	 3771,194018	 120.967,31	€	 30.483.761,59	€	
2055	 32,72	€	 3771,194018	 123.386,65	€	 31.093.436,82	€	
2056	 33,37	€	 3771,194018	 125.854,39	€	 31.715.305,55	€	
2057	 34,04	€	 3771,194018	 128.371,47	€	 32.349.611,67	€	
2058	 34,72	€	 3771,194018	 130.938,90	€	 32.996.603,90	€	
2059	 35,42	€	 3771,194018	 133.557,68	€	 33.656.535,98	€	





Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2020	 2,50	€	 4350	 10.875,00	€	 2.740.500,00	€	
2021	 2,55	€	 4415,25	 11.258,89	€	 2.837.239,65	€	
2022	 2,60	€	 4481,47875	 11.656,33	€	 2.937.394,21	€	
2023	 2,65	€	 4548,700931	 12.067,79	€	 3.041.084,23	€	
2024	 2,71	€	 4616,931445	 12.493,79	€	 3.148.434,50	€	
2025	 2,76	€	 4686,185417	 12.934,82	€	 3.259.574,24	€	
2026	 2,82	€	 4756,478198	 13.391,42	€	 3.374.637,21	€	
2027	 2,87	€	 4827,825371	 13.864,13	€	 3.493.761,90	€	
2028	 2,93	€	 4900,242752	 14.353,54	€	 3.617.091,70	€	
2029	 2,99	€	 4973,746393	 14.860,22	€	 3.744.775,03	€	
2030	 3,05	€	 5048,352589	 15.384,78	€	 3.876.965,59	€	
2031	 3,11	€	 5124,077878	 15.927,87	€	 4.013.822,48	€	
2032	 3,17	€	 5200,939046	 16.490,12	€	 4.155.510,41	€	
2033	 3,23	€	 5278,953132	 17.072,22	€	 4.302.199,93	€	
2034	 3,30	€	 5358,137429	 17.674,87	€	 4.454.067,58	€	
2035	 3,36	€	 5438,50949	 18.298,79	€	 4.611.296,17	€	
2036	 3,43	€	 5520,087132	 18.944,74	€	 4.774.074,92	€	
2037	 3,50	€	 5602,888439	 19.613,49	€	 4.942.599,77	€	
2038	 3,57	€	 5686,931766	 20.305,85	€	 5.117.073,54	€	
2039	 3,64	€	 5772,235742	 21.022,64	€	 5.297.706,24	€	
2040	 3,71	€	 5858,819278	 21.764,74	€	 5.484.715,27	€	
2041	 3,79	€	 5858,819278	 22.200,04	€	 5.594.409,57	€	
2042	 3,86	€	 5858,819278	 22.644,04	€	 5.706.297,76	€	
2043	 3,94	€	 5858,819278	 23.096,92	€	 5.820.423,72	€	
2044	 4,02	€	 5858,819278	 23.558,86	€	 5.936.832,19	€	
2045	 4,10	€	 5858,819278	 24.030,04	€	 6.055.568,84	€	
2046	 4,18	€	 5858,819278	 24.510,64	€	 6.176.680,21	€	
2047	 4,27	€	 5858,819278	 25.000,85	€	 6.300.213,82	€	
2048	 4,35	€	 5858,819278	 25.500,87	€	 6.426.218,10	€	
2049	 4,44	€	 5858,819278	 26.010,88	€	 6.554.742,46	€	
2050	 4,53	€	 5858,819278	 26.531,10	€	 6.685.837,31	€	
2051	 4,62	€	 5858,819278	 27.061,72	€	 6.819.554,05	€	
2052	 4,71	€	 5858,819278	 27.602,96	€	 6.955.945,13	€	
2053	 4,81	€	 5858,819278	 28.155,02	€	 7.095.064,04	€	
2054	 4,90	€	 5858,819278	 28.718,12	€	 7.236.965,32	€	
2055	 5,00	€	 5858,819278	 29.292,48	€	 7.381.704,62	€	
2056	 5,10	€	 5858,819278	 29.878,33	€	 7.529.338,72	€	
2057	 5,20	€	 5858,819278	 30.475,89	€	 7.679.925,49	€	
2058	 5,31	€	 5858,819278	 31.085,41	€	 7.833.524,00	€	
2059	 5,41	€	 5858,819278	 31.707,12	€	 7.990.194,48	€	






Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2020	 3,10	€	 1900	 5.890,00	€	 1.484.280,00	€	
2021	 3,16	€	 1928,5	 6.097,92	€	 1.536.675,08	€	
2022	 3,23	€	 1957,4275	 6.313,17	€	 1.590.919,71	€	
2023	 3,29	€	 1986,788913	 6.536,03	€	 1.647.079,18	€	
2024	 3,36	€	 2016,590746	 6.766,75	€	 1.705.221,08	€	
2025	 3,42	€	 2046,839607	 7.005,62	€	 1.765.415,38	€	
2026	 3,49	€	 2077,542201	 7.252,91	€	 1.827.734,54	€	
2027	 3,56	€	 2108,705335	 7.508,94	€	 1.892.253,57	€	
2028	 3,63	€	 2140,335915	 7.774,01	€	 1.959.050,12	€	
2029	 3,70	€	 2172,440953	 8.048,43	€	 2.028.204,59	€	
2030	 3,78	€	 2205,027568	 8.332,54	€	 2.099.800,21	€	
2031	 3,85	€	 2238,102981	 8.626,68	€	 2.173.923,16	€	
2032	 3,93	€	 2271,674526	 8.931,20	€	 2.250.662,65	€	
2033	 4,01	€	 2305,749644	 9.246,47	€	 2.330.111,04	€	
2034	 4,09	€	 2340,335888	 9.572,87	€	 2.412.363,96	€	
2035	 4,17	€	 2375,440927	 9.910,80	€	 2.497.520,41	€	
2036	 4,26	€	 2411,072541	 10.260,65	€	 2.585.682,88	€	
2037	 4,34	€	 2447,238629	 10.622,85	€	 2.676.957,48	€	
2038	 4,43	€	 2483,947208	 10.997,83	€	 2.771.454,08	€	
2039	 4,52	€	 2521,206416	 11.386,06	€	 2.869.286,41	€	
2040	 4,61	€	 2559,024512	 11.787,99	€	 2.970.572,22	€	
2041	 4,70	€	 2559,024512	 12.023,74	€	 3.029.983,67	€	
2042	 4,79	€	 2559,024512	 12.264,22	€	 3.090.583,34	€	
2043	 4,89	€	 2559,024512	 12.509,50	€	 3.152.395,01	€	
2044	 4,99	€	 2559,024512	 12.759,69	€	 3.215.442,91	€	
2045	 5,09	€	 2559,024512	 13.014,89	€	 3.279.751,77	€	
2046	 5,19	€	 2559,024512	 13.275,19	€	 3.345.346,80	€	
2047	 5,29	€	 2559,024512	 13.540,69	€	 3.412.253,74	€	
2048	 5,40	€	 2559,024512	 13.811,50	€	 3.480.498,81	€	
2049	 5,51	€	 2559,024512	 14.087,73	€	 3.550.108,79	€	
2050	 5,62	€	 2559,024512	 14.369,49	€	 3.621.110,96	€	
2051	 5,73	€	 2559,024512	 14.656,88	€	 3.693.533,18	€	
2052	 5,84	€	 2559,024512	 14.950,02	€	 3.767.403,85	€	
2053	 5,96	€	 2559,024512	 15.249,02	€	 3.842.751,92	€	
2054	 6,08	€	 2559,024512	 15.554,00	€	 3.919.606,96	€	
2055	 6,20	€	 2559,024512	 15.865,08	€	 3.997.999,10	€	
2056	 6,32	€	 2559,024512	 16.182,38	€	 4.077.959,08	€	
2057	 6,45	€	 2559,024512	 16.506,02	€	 4.159.518,27	€	
2058	 6,58	€	 2559,024512	 16.836,15	€	 4.242.708,63	€	
2059	 6,71	€	 2559,024512	 17.172,87	€	 4.327.562,80	€	







Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2020	 5,10	€	 2600	 13.260,00	€	 3.341.520,00	€	
2021	 5,20	€	 2639	 13.728,08	€	 3.459.475,66	€	
2022	 5,31	€	 2678,585	 14.212,68	€	 3.581.595,15	€	
2023	 5,41	€	 2718,763775	 14.714,39	€	 3.708.025,46	€	
2024	 5,52	€	 2759,545232	 15.233,80	€	 3.838.918,75	€	
2025	 5,63	€	 2800,93841	 15.771,56	€	 3.974.432,59	€	
2026	 5,74	€	 2842,952486	 16.328,29	€	 4.114.730,06	€	
2027	 5,86	€	 2885,596774	 16.904,68	€	 4.259.980,03	€	
2028	 5,98	€	 2928,880725	 17.501,42	€	 4.410.357,32	€	
2029	 6,09	€	 2972,813936	 18.119,22	€	 4.566.042,94	€	
2030	 6,22	€	 3017,406145	 18.758,83	€	 4.727.224,25	€	
2031	 6,34	€	 3062,667237	 19.421,01	€	 4.894.095,27	€	
2032	 6,47	€	 3108,607246	 20.106,57	€	 5.066.856,83	€	
2033	 6,60	€	 3155,236354	 20.816,34	€	 5.245.716,88	€	
2034	 6,73	€	 3202,5649	 21.551,15	€	 5.430.890,68	€	
2035	 6,86	€	 3250,603373	 22.311,91	€	 5.622.601,12	€	
2036	 7,00	€	 3299,362424	 23.099,52	€	 5.821.078,94	€	
2037	 7,14	€	 3348,85286	 23.914,93	€	 6.026.563,03	€	
2038	 7,28	€	 3399,085653	 24.759,13	€	 6.239.300,70	€	
2039	 7,43	€	 3450,071938	 25.633,13	€	 6.459.548,02	€	
2040	 7,58	€	 3501,823017	 26.537,98	€	 6.687.570,06	€	
2041	 7,73	€	 3501,823017	 27.068,74	€	 6.821.321,47	€	
2042	 7,88	€	 3501,823017	 27.610,11	€	 6.957.747,89	€	
2043	 8,04	€	 3501,823017	 28.162,31	€	 7.096.902,85	€	
2044	 8,20	€	 3501,823017	 28.725,56	€	 7.238.840,91	€	
2045	 8,37	€	 3501,823017	 29.300,07	€	 7.383.617,73	€	
2046	 8,53	€	 3501,823017	 29.886,07	€	 7.531.290,08	€	
2047	 8,71	€	 3501,823017	 30.483,79	€	 7.681.915,88	€	
2048	 8,88	€	 3501,823017	 31.093,47	€	 7.835.554,20	€	
2049	 9,06	€	 3501,823017	 31.715,34	€	 7.992.265,29	€	
2050	 9,24	€	 3501,823017	 32.349,65	€	 8.152.110,59	€	
2051	 9,42	€	 3501,823017	 32.996,64	€	 8.315.152,80	€	
2052	 9,61	€	 3501,823017	 33.656,57	€	 8.481.455,86	€	
2053	 9,80	€	 3501,823017	 34.329,70	€	 8.651.084,98	€	
2054	 10,00	€	 3501,823017	 35.016,30	€	 8.824.106,68	€	
2055	 10,20	€	 3501,823017	 35.716,62	€	 9.000.588,81	€	
2056	 10,40	€	 3501,823017	 36.430,95	€	 9.180.600,59	€	
2057	 10,61	€	 3501,823017	 37.159,57	€	 9.364.212,60	€	
2058	 10,82	€	 3501,823017	 37.902,77	€	 9.551.496,85	€	
2059	 11,04	€	 3501,823017	 38.660,82	€	 9.742.526,79	€	








Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2020	 3,10	€	 7000	 21.700,00	€	 5.468.400,00	€	
2021	 3,16	€	 7105	 22.466,01	€	 5.661.434,52	€	
2022	 3,23	€	 7211,575	 23.259,06	€	 5.861.283,16	€	
2023	 3,29	€	 7319,748625	 24.080,10	€	 6.068.186,45	€	
2024	 3,36	€	 7429,544854	 24.930,13	€	 6.282.393,44	€	
2025	 3,42	€	 7540,988027	 25.810,17	€	 6.504.161,92	€	
2026	 3,49	€	 7654,102848	 26.721,27	€	 6.733.758,84	€	
2027	 3,56	€	 7768,91439	 27.664,53	€	 6.971.460,53	€	
2028	 3,63	€	 7885,448106	 28.641,08	€	 7.217.553,08	€	
2029	 3,70	€	 8003,729828	 29.652,11	€	 7.472.332,71	€	
2030	 3,78	€	 8123,785775	 30.698,83	€	 7.736.106,05	€	
2031	 3,85	€	 8245,642562	 31.782,50	€	 8.009.190,60	€	
2032	 3,93	€	 8369,3272	 32.904,42	€	 8.291.915,02	€	
2033	 4,01	€	 8494,867108	 34.065,95	€	 8.584.619,62	€	
2034	 4,09	€	 8622,290115	 35.268,48	€	 8.887.656,70	€	
2035	 4,17	€	 8751,624467	 36.513,46	€	 9.201.390,98	€	
2036	 4,26	€	 8882,898834	 37.802,38	€	 9.526.200,08	€	
2037	 4,34	€	 9016,142316	 39.136,81	€	 9.862.474,94	€	
2038	 4,43	€	 9151,384451	 40.518,33	€	 10.210.620,31	€	
2039	 4,52	€	 9288,655218	 41.948,63	€	 10.571.055,21	€	
2040	 4,61	€	 9427,985046	 43.429,42	€	 10.944.213,45	€	
2041	 4,70	€	 9427,985046	 44.298,01	€	 11.163.097,72	€	
2042	 4,79	€	 9427,985046	 45.183,97	€	 11.386.359,68	€	
2043	 4,89	€	 9427,985046	 46.087,65	€	 11.614.086,87	€	
2044	 4,99	€	 9427,985046	 47.009,40	€	 11.846.368,61	€	
2045	 5,09	€	 9427,985046	 47.949,59	€	 12.083.295,98	€	
2046	 5,19	€	 9427,985046	 48.908,58	€	 12.324.961,90	€	
2047	 5,29	€	 9427,985046	 49.886,75	€	 12.571.461,14	€	
2048	 5,40	€	 9427,985046	 50.884,49	€	 12.822.890,36	€	
2049	 5,51	€	 9427,985046	 51.902,18	€	 13.079.348,17	€	
2050	 5,62	€	 9427,985046	 52.940,22	€	 13.340.935,13	€	
2051	 5,73	€	 9427,985046	 53.999,02	€	 13.607.753,83	€	
2052	 5,84	€	 9427,985046	 55.079,00	€	 13.879.908,91	€	
2053	 5,96	€	 9427,985046	 56.180,58	€	 14.157.507,09	€	
2054	 6,08	€	 9427,985046	 57.304,20	€	 14.440.657,23	€	
2055	 6,20	€	 9427,985046	 58.450,28	€	 14.729.470,38	€	
2056	 6,32	€	 9427,985046	 59.619,28	€	 15.024.059,78	€	
2057	 6,45	€	 9427,985046	 60.811,67	€	 15.324.540,98	€	
2058	 6,58	€	 9427,985046	 62.027,90	€	 15.631.031,80	€	
2059	 6,71	€	 9427,985046	 63.268,46	€	 15.943.652,43	€	







Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2020	 6,00	€	 750	 4.500,00	€	 1.134.000,00	€	
2021	 6,12	€	 761,25	 4.658,85	€	 1.174.030,20	€	
2022	 6,24	€	 772,66875	 4.823,31	€	 1.215.473,47	€	
2023	 6,37	€	 784,2587813	 4.993,57	€	 1.258.379,68	€	
2024	 6,49	€	 796,022663	 5.169,84	€	 1.302.800,48	€	
2025	 6,62	€	 807,9630029	 5.352,34	€	 1.348.789,34	€	
2026	 6,76	€	 820,082448	 5.541,28	€	 1.396.401,60	€	
2027	 6,89	€	 832,3836847	 5.736,88	€	 1.445.694,58	€	
2028	 7,03	€	 844,8694399	 5.939,40	€	 1.496.727,60	€	
2029	 7,17	€	 857,5424815	 6.149,06	€	 1.549.562,08	€	
2030	 7,31	€	 870,4056188	 6.366,12	€	 1.604.261,62	€	
2031	 7,46	€	 883,4617031	 6.590,84	€	 1.660.892,06	€	
2032	 7,61	€	 896,7136286	 6.823,50	€	 1.719.521,55	€	
2033	 7,76	€	 910,164333	 7.064,37	€	 1.780.220,66	€	
2034	 7,92	€	 923,816798	 7.313,74	€	 1.843.062,45	€	
2035	 8,08	€	 937,67405	 7.571,91	€	 1.908.122,55	€	
2036	 8,24	€	 951,7391607	 7.839,20	€	 1.975.479,28	€	
2037	 8,40	€	 966,0152482	 8.115,93	€	 2.045.213,70	€	
2038	 8,57	€	 980,5054769	 8.402,42	€	 2.117.409,74	€	
2039	 8,74	€	 995,213059	 8.699,03	€	 2.192.154,31	€	
2040	 8,92	€	 1010,141255	 9.006,10	€	 2.269.537,35	€	
2041	 9,09	€	 1010,141255	 9.186,22	€	 2.314.928,10	€	
2042	 9,28	€	 1010,141255	 9.369,95	€	 2.361.226,66	€	
2043	 9,46	€	 1010,141255	 9.557,35	€	 2.408.451,19	€	
2044	 9,65	€	 1010,141255	 9.748,49	€	 2.456.620,22	€	
2045	 9,84	€	 1010,141255	 9.943,46	€	 2.505.752,62	€	
2046	 10,04	€	 1010,141255	 10.142,33	€	 2.555.867,68	€	
2047	 10,24	€	 1010,141255	 10.345,18	€	 2.606.985,03	€	
2048	 10,45	€	 1010,141255	 10.552,08	€	 2.659.124,73	€	
2049	 10,66	€	 1010,141255	 10.763,12	€	 2.712.307,22	€	
2050	 10,87	€	 1010,141255	 10.978,39	€	 2.766.553,37	€	
2051	 11,09	€	 1010,141255	 11.197,95	€	 2.821.884,44	€	
2052	 11,31	€	 1010,141255	 11.421,91	€	 2.878.322,12	€	
2053	 11,53	€	 1010,141255	 11.650,35	€	 2.935.888,57	€	
2054	 11,76	€	 1010,141255	 11.883,36	€	 2.994.606,34	€	
2055	 12,00	€	 1010,141255	 12.121,03	€	 3.054.498,46	€	
2056	 12,24	€	 1010,141255	 12.363,45	€	 3.115.588,43	€	
2057	 12,48	€	 1010,141255	 12.610,72	€	 3.177.900,20	€	
2058	 12,73	€	 1010,141255	 12.862,93	€	 3.241.458,21	€	
2059	 12,99	€	 1010,141255	 13.120,19	€	 3.306.287,37	€	









Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2020	 2,50	€	 4350	 10.875,00	€	 2.740.500,00	€	
2021	 2,55	€	 4415,25	 11.258,89	€	 2.837.239,65	€	
2022	 2,60	€	 4481,47875	 11.656,33	€	 2.937.394,21	€	
2023	 2,65	€	 4548,700931	 12.067,79	€	 3.041.084,23	€	
2024	 2,71	€	 4616,931445	 12.493,79	€	 3.148.434,50	€	
2025	 2,76	€	 4686,185417	 12.934,82	€	 3.259.574,24	€	
2026	 2,82	€	 4756,478198	 13.391,42	€	 3.374.637,21	€	
2027	 2,87	€	 4827,825371	 13.864,13	€	 3.493.761,90	€	
2028	 2,93	€	 4900,242752	 14.353,54	€	 3.617.091,70	€	
2029	 2,99	€	 4973,746393	 14.860,22	€	 3.744.775,03	€	
2030	 3,05	€	 5048,352589	 15.384,78	€	 3.876.965,59	€	
2031	 3,11	€	 5124,077878	 15.927,87	€	 4.013.822,48	€	
2032	 3,17	€	 5200,939046	 16.490,12	€	 4.155.510,41	€	
2033	 3,23	€	 5278,953132	 17.072,22	€	 4.302.199,93	€	
2034	 3,30	€	 5358,137429	 17.674,87	€	 4.454.067,58	€	
2035	 3,36	€	 5438,50949	 18.298,79	€	 4.611.296,17	€	
2036	 3,43	€	 5520,087132	 18.944,74	€	 4.774.074,92	€	
2037	 3,50	€	 5602,888439	 19.613,49	€	 4.942.599,77	€	
2038	 3,57	€	 5686,931766	 20.305,85	€	 5.117.073,54	€	
2039	 3,64	€	 5772,235742	 21.022,64	€	 5.297.706,24	€	
2040	 3,71	€	 5858,819278	 21.764,74	€	 5.484.715,27	€	
2041	 3,79	€	 5858,819278	 22.200,04	€	 5.594.409,57	€	
2042	 3,86	€	 5858,819278	 22.644,04	€	 5.706.297,76	€	
2043	 3,94	€	 5858,819278	 23.096,92	€	 5.820.423,72	€	
2044	 4,02	€	 5858,819278	 23.558,86	€	 5.936.832,19	€	
2045	 4,10	€	 5858,819278	 24.030,04	€	 6.055.568,84	€	
2046	 4,18	€	 5858,819278	 24.510,64	€	 6.176.680,21	€	
2047	 4,27	€	 5858,819278	 25.000,85	€	 6.300.213,82	€	
2048	 4,35	€	 5858,819278	 25.500,87	€	 6.426.218,10	€	
2049	 4,44	€	 5858,819278	 26.010,88	€	 6.554.742,46	€	
2050	 4,53	€	 5858,819278	 26.531,10	€	 6.685.837,31	€	
2051	 4,62	€	 5858,819278	 27.061,72	€	 6.819.554,05	€	
2052	 4,71	€	 5858,819278	 27.602,96	€	 6.955.945,13	€	
2053	 4,81	€	 5858,819278	 28.155,02	€	 7.095.064,04	€	
2054	 4,90	€	 5858,819278	 28.718,12	€	 7.236.965,32	€	
2055	 5,00	€	 5858,819278	 29.292,48	€	 7.381.704,62	€	
2056	 5,10	€	 5858,819278	 29.878,33	€	 7.529.338,72	€	
2057	 5,20	€	 5858,819278	 30.475,89	€	 7.679.925,49	€	
2058	 5,31	€	 5858,819278	 31.085,41	€	 7.833.524,00	€	
2059	 5,41	€	 5858,819278	 31.707,12	€	 7.990.194,48	€	




The solution C presents the same tables of the solution A except for the line Benevento-Caserta 
and Benevento-Napoli which are reported in the following tables. 
	
Benevento-Caserta	(solution	C)	
Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2020	 3,10	€	 1700	 5.270,00	€	 1.328.040,00	€	
2021	 3,16	€	 1725,5	 5.456,03	€	 1.374.919,81	€	
2022	 3,23	€	 1751,3825	 5.648,63	€	 1.423.454,48	€	
2023	 3,29	€	 1777,653238	 5.848,03	€	 1.473.702,42	€	
2024	 3,36	€	 1804,318036	 6.054,46	€	 1.525.724,12	€	
2025	 3,42	€	 1831,382807	 6.268,18	€	 1.579.582,18	€	
2026	 3,49	€	 1858,853549	 6.489,45	€	 1.635.341,43	€	
2027	 3,56	€	 1886,736352	 6.718,53	€	 1.693.068,99	€	
2028	 3,63	€	 1915,037397	 6.955,69	€	 1.752.834,32	€	
2029	 3,70	€	 1943,762958	 7.201,23	€	 1.814.709,37	€	
2030	 3,78	€	 1972,919403	 7.455,43	€	 1.878.768,61	€	
2031	 3,85	€	 2002,513194	 7.718,61	€	 1.945.089,14	€	
2032	 3,93	€	 2032,550891	 7.991,07	€	 2.013.750,79	€	
2033	 4,01	€	 2063,039155	 8.273,16	€	 2.084.836,19	€	
2034	 4,09	€	 2093,984742	 8.565,20	€	 2.158.430,91	€	
2035	 4,17	€	 2125,394513	 8.867,55	€	 2.234.623,52	€	
2036	 4,26	€	 2157,275431	 9.180,58	€	 2.313.505,73	€	
2037	 4,34	€	 2189,634562	 9.504,65	€	 2.395.172,49	€	
2038	 4,43	€	 2222,479081	 9.840,17	€	 2.479.722,07	€	
2039	 4,52	€	 2255,816267	 10.187,52	€	 2.567.256,26	€	
2040	 4,61	€	 2289,653511	 10.547,14	€	 2.657.880,41	€	
2041	 4,70	€	 2289,653511	 10.758,09	€	 2.711.038,02	€	
2042	 4,79	€	 2289,653511	 10.973,25	€	 2.765.258,78	€	
2043	 4,89	€	 2289,653511	 11.192,71	€	 2.820.563,95	€	
2044	 4,99	€	 2289,653511	 11.416,57	€	 2.876.975,23	€	
2045	 5,09	€	 2289,653511	 11.644,90	€	 2.934.514,74	€	
2046	 5,19	€	 2289,653511	 11.877,80	€	 2.993.205,03	€	
2047	 5,29	€	 2289,653511	 12.115,35	€	 3.053.069,13	€	
2048	 5,40	€	 2289,653511	 12.357,66	€	 3.114.130,52	€	
2049	 5,51	€	 2289,653511	 12.604,81	€	 3.176.413,13	€	
2050	 5,62	€	 2289,653511	 12.856,91	€	 3.239.941,39	€	
2051	 5,73	€	 2289,653511	 13.114,05	€	 3.304.740,22	€	
2052	 5,84	€	 2289,653511	 13.376,33	€	 3.370.835,02	€	
2053	 5,96	€	 2289,653511	 13.643,86	€	 3.438.251,72	€	
2054	 6,08	€	 2289,653511	 13.916,73	€	 3.507.016,76	€	
2055	 6,20	€	 2289,653511	 14.195,07	€	 3.577.157,09	€	
2056	 6,32	€	 2289,653511	 14.478,97	€	 3.648.700,23	€	
2057	 6,45	€	 2289,653511	 14.768,55	€	 3.721.674,24	€	
2058	 6,58	€	 2289,653511	 15.063,92	€	 3.796.107,72	€	
2059	 6,71	€	 2289,653511	 15.365,20	€	 3.872.029,88	€	







Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2020	 5,10	€	 3100	 15.810,00	€	 3.984.120,00	€	
2021	 5,20	€	 3146,5	 16.368,09	€	 4.124.759,44	€	
2022	 5,31	€	 3193,6975	 16.945,89	€	 4.270.363,44	€	
2023	 5,41	€	 3241,602963	 17.544,08	€	 4.421.107,27	€	
2024	 5,52	€	 3290,227007	 18.163,38	€	 4.577.172,36	€	
2025	 5,63	€	 3339,580412	 18.804,55	€	 4.738.746,54	€	
2026	 5,74	€	 3389,674118	 19.468,35	€	 4.906.024,30	€	
2027	 5,86	€	 3440,51923	 20.155,58	€	 5.079.206,96	€	
2028	 5,98	€	 3492,127018	 20.867,08	€	 5.258.502,96	€	
2029	 6,09	€	 3544,508924	 21.603,68	€	 5.444.128,12	€	
2030	 6,22	€	 3597,676558	 22.366,29	€	 5.636.305,84	€	
2031	 6,34	€	 3651,641706	 23.155,82	€	 5.835.267,43	€	
2032	 6,47	€	 3706,416332	 23.973,22	€	 6.041.252,37	€	
2033	 6,60	€	 3762,012577	 24.819,48	€	 6.254.508,58	€	
2034	 6,73	€	 3818,442765	 25.695,61	€	 6.475.292,74	€	
2035	 6,86	€	 3875,719407	 26.602,66	€	 6.703.870,57	€	
2036	 7,00	€	 3933,855198	 27.541,73	€	 6.940.517,20	€	
2037	 7,14	€	 3992,863026	 28.513,96	€	 7.185.517,46	€	
2038	 7,28	€	 4052,755971	 29.520,50	€	 7.439.166,22	€	
2039	 7,43	€	 4113,547311	 30.562,57	€	 7.701.768,79	€	
2040	 7,58	€	 4175,25052	 31.641,43	€	 7.973.641,23	€	
2041	 7,73	€	 4175,25052	 32.274,26	€	 8.133.114,06	€	
2042	 7,88	€	 4175,25052	 32.919,75	€	 8.295.776,34	€	
2043	 8,04	€	 4175,25052	 33.578,14	€	 8.461.691,86	€	
2044	 8,20	€	 4175,25052	 34.249,71	€	 8.630.925,70	€	
2045	 8,37	€	 4175,25052	 34.934,70	€	 8.803.544,21	€	
2046	 8,53	€	 4175,25052	 35.633,39	€	 8.979.615,10	€	
2047	 8,71	€	 4175,25052	 36.346,06	€	 9.159.207,40	€	
2048	 8,88	€	 4175,25052	 37.072,98	€	 9.342.391,55	€	
2049	 9,06	€	 4175,25052	 37.814,44	€	 9.529.239,38	€	
2050	 9,24	€	 4175,25052	 38.570,73	€	 9.719.824,17	€	
2051	 9,42	€	 4175,25052	 39.342,15	€	 9.914.220,65	€	
2052	 9,61	€	 4175,25052	 40.128,99	€	 10.112.505,06	€	
2053	 9,80	€	 4175,25052	 40.931,57	€	 10.314.755,16	€	
2054	 10,00	€	 4175,25052	 41.750,20	€	 10.521.050,27	€	
2055	 10,20	€	 4175,25052	 42.585,20	€	 10.731.471,27	€	
2056	 10,40	€	 4175,25052	 43.436,91	€	 10.946.100,70	€	
2057	 10,61	€	 4175,25052	 44.305,65	€	 11.165.022,71	€	
2058	 10,82	€	 4175,25052	 45.191,76	€	 11.388.323,17	€	
2059	 11,04	€	 4175,25052	 46.095,59	€	 11.616.089,63	€	




The solution D presents the same tables of the solution B except for the line Benevento-Caserta 
and Benevento-Napoli which are reported in the following tables. 
	
Benevento-Caserta	(solution	D)	
Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2020	 3,10	€	 1700	 5.270,00	€	 1.328.040,00	€	
2021	 3,16	€	 1725,5	 5.456,03	€	 1.374.919,81	€	
2022	 3,23	€	 1751,3825	 5.648,63	€	 1.423.454,48	€	
2023	 3,29	€	 1777,653238	 5.848,03	€	 1.473.702,42	€	
2024	 3,36	€	 1804,318036	 6.054,46	€	 1.525.724,12	€	
2025	 3,42	€	 1831,382807	 6.268,18	€	 1.579.582,18	€	
2026	 3,49	€	 1858,853549	 6.489,45	€	 1.635.341,43	€	
2027	 3,56	€	 1886,736352	 6.718,53	€	 1.693.068,99	€	
2028	 3,63	€	 1915,037397	 6.955,69	€	 1.752.834,32	€	
2029	 3,70	€	 1943,762958	 7.201,23	€	 1.814.709,37	€	
2030	 3,78	€	 1972,919403	 7.455,43	€	 1.878.768,61	€	
2031	 3,85	€	 2002,513194	 7.718,61	€	 1.945.089,14	€	
2032	 3,93	€	 2032,550891	 7.991,07	€	 2.013.750,79	€	
2033	 4,01	€	 2063,039155	 8.273,16	€	 2.084.836,19	€	
2034	 4,09	€	 2093,984742	 8.565,20	€	 2.158.430,91	€	
2035	 4,17	€	 2125,394513	 8.867,55	€	 2.234.623,52	€	
2036	 4,26	€	 2157,275431	 9.180,58	€	 2.313.505,73	€	
2037	 4,34	€	 2189,634562	 9.504,65	€	 2.395.172,49	€	
2038	 4,43	€	 2222,479081	 9.840,17	€	 2.479.722,07	€	
2039	 4,52	€	 2255,816267	 10.187,52	€	 2.567.256,26	€	
2040	 4,61	€	 2289,653511	 10.547,14	€	 2.657.880,41	€	
2041	 4,70	€	 2289,653511	 10.758,09	€	 2.711.038,02	€	
2042	 4,79	€	 2289,653511	 10.973,25	€	 2.765.258,78	€	
2043	 4,89	€	 2289,653511	 11.192,71	€	 2.820.563,95	€	
2044	 4,99	€	 2289,653511	 11.416,57	€	 2.876.975,23	€	
2045	 5,09	€	 2289,653511	 11.644,90	€	 2.934.514,74	€	
2046	 5,19	€	 2289,653511	 11.877,80	€	 2.993.205,03	€	
2047	 5,29	€	 2289,653511	 12.115,35	€	 3.053.069,13	€	
2048	 5,40	€	 2289,653511	 12.357,66	€	 3.114.130,52	€	
2049	 5,51	€	 2289,653511	 12.604,81	€	 3.176.413,13	€	
2050	 5,62	€	 2289,653511	 12.856,91	€	 3.239.941,39	€	
2051	 5,73	€	 2289,653511	 13.114,05	€	 3.304.740,22	€	
2052	 5,84	€	 2289,653511	 13.376,33	€	 3.370.835,02	€	
2053	 5,96	€	 2289,653511	 13.643,86	€	 3.438.251,72	€	
2054	 6,08	€	 2289,653511	 13.916,73	€	 3.507.016,76	€	
2055	 6,20	€	 2289,653511	 14.195,07	€	 3.577.157,09	€	
2056	 6,32	€	 2289,653511	 14.478,97	€	 3.648.700,23	€	
2057	 6,45	€	 2289,653511	 14.768,55	€	 3.721.674,24	€	
2058	 6,58	€	 2289,653511	 15.063,92	€	 3.796.107,72	€	
2059	 6,71	€	 2289,653511	 15.365,20	€	 3.872.029,88	€	





Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2020	 5,10	€	 2300	 11.730,00	€	 2.955.960,00	€	
2021	 5,20	€	 2334,5	 12.144,07	€	 3.060.305,39	€	
2022	 5,31	€	 2369,5175	 12.572,75	€	 3.168.334,17	€	
2023	 5,41	€	 2405,060263	 13.016,57	€	 3.280.176,36	€	
2024	 5,52	€	 2441,136166	 13.476,06	€	 3.395.966,59	€	
2025	 5,63	€	 2477,753209	 13.951,76	€	 3.515.844,21	€	
2026	 5,74	€	 2514,919507	 14.444,26	€	 3.639.953,51	€	
2027	 5,86	€	 2552,6433	 14.954,14	€	 3.768.443,87	€	
2028	 5,98	€	 2590,932949	 15.482,02	€	 3.901.469,94	€	
2029	 6,09	€	 2629,796943	 16.028,54	€	 4.039.191,83	€	
2030	 6,22	€	 2669,243898	 16.594,35	€	 4.181.775,30	€	
2031	 6,34	€	 2709,282556	 17.180,13	€	 4.329.391,97	€	
2032	 6,47	€	 2749,921794	 17.786,59	€	 4.482.219,50	€	
2033	 6,60	€	 2791,170621	 18.414,45	€	 4.640.441,85	€	
2034	 6,73	€	 2833,038181	 19.064,48	€	 4.804.249,45	€	
2035	 6,86	€	 2875,533753	 19.737,46	€	 4.973.839,46	€	
2036	 7,00	€	 2918,66676	 20.434,19	€	 5.149.415,99	€	
2037	 7,14	€	 2962,446761	 21.155,52	€	 5.331.190,37	€	
2038	 7,28	€	 3006,883462	 21.902,31	€	 5.519.381,39	€	
2039	 7,43	€	 3051,986714	 22.675,46	€	 5.714.215,56	€	
2040	 7,58	€	 3097,766515	 23.475,90	€	 5.915.927,36	€	
2041	 7,73	€	 3097,766515	 23.945,42	€	 6.034.245,91	€	
2042	 7,88	€	 3097,766515	 24.424,33	€	 6.154.930,83	€	
2043	 8,04	€	 3097,766515	 24.912,82	€	 6.278.029,45	€	
2044	 8,20	€	 3097,766515	 25.411,07	€	 6.403.590,04	€	
2045	 8,37	€	 3097,766515	 25.919,29	€	 6.531.661,84	€	
2046	 8,53	€	 3097,766515	 26.437,68	€	 6.662.295,07	€	
2047	 8,71	€	 3097,766515	 26.966,43	€	 6.795.540,97	€	
2048	 8,88	€	 3097,766515	 27.505,76	€	 6.931.451,79	€	
2049	 9,06	€	 3097,766515	 28.055,88	€	 7.070.080,83	€	
2050	 9,24	€	 3097,766515	 28.616,99	€	 7.211.482,45	€	
2051	 9,42	€	 3097,766515	 29.189,33	€	 7.355.712,10	€	
2052	 9,61	€	 3097,766515	 29.773,12	€	 7.502.826,34	€	
2053	 9,80	€	 3097,766515	 30.368,58	€	 7.652.882,86	€	
2054	 10,00	€	 3097,766515	 30.975,95	€	 7.805.940,52	€	
2055	 10,20	€	 3097,766515	 31.595,47	€	 7.962.059,33	€	
2056	 10,40	€	 3097,766515	 32.227,38	€	 8.121.300,52	€	
2057	 10,61	€	 3097,766515	 32.871,93	€	 8.283.726,53	€	
2058	 10,82	€	 3097,766515	 33.529,37	€	 8.449.401,06	€	
2059	 11,04	€	 3097,766515	 34.199,96	€	 8.618.389,08	€	






In the following tables the annual revenues for the long distance passenger transport service are 
reported. 
The PV of long distance passenger transport service revenues is computed through the sum of 





Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2024	 59,00	€	 6909	 407.631,00	€	 148.785.315,00	€	
2025	 60,18	€	 7012,635	 422.020,37	€	 154.037.436,62	€	
2026	 61,38	€	 7117,824525	 436.917,69	€	 159.474.958,13	€	
2027	 62,61	€	 7224,591893	 452.340,89	€	 165.104.424,15	€	
2028	 63,86	€	 7332,960771	 468.308,52	€	 170.932.610,33	€	
2029	 65,14	€	 7442,955183	 484.839,81	€	 176.966.531,47	€	
2030	 66,44	€	 7554,599511	 501.954,66	€	 183.213.450,03	€	
2031	 67,77	€	 7667,918503	 519.673,66	€	 189.680.884,82	€	
2032	 69,13	€	 7782,937281	 538.018,14	€	 196.376.620,05	€	
2033	 70,51	€	 7899,68134	 557.010,18	€	 203.308.714,74	€	
2034	 71,92	€	 8018,17656	 576.672,64	€	 210.485.512,37	€	
2035	 73,36	€	 8138,449209	 597.029,18	€	 217.915.650,96	€	
2036	 74,83	€	 8260,525947	 618.104,31	€	 225.608.073,44	€	
2037	 76,32	€	 8384,433836	 639.923,39	€	 233.572.038,43	€	
2038	 77,85	€	 8510,200343	 662.512,69	€	 241.817.131,39	€	
2039	 79,41	€	 8637,853349	 685.899,39	€	 250.353.276,12	€	
2040	 80,99	€	 8767,421149	 710.111,63	€	 259.190.746,77	€	
2041	 82,61	€	 8898,932466	 735.178,58	€	 268.340.180,13	€	
2042	 84,27	€	 9032,416453	 761.130,38	€	 277.812.588,49	€	
2043	 85,95	€	 9167,9027	 787.998,28	€	 287.619.372,86	€	
2044	 87,67	€	 9305,42124	 815.814,62	€	 297.772.336,73	€	
2045	 89,42	€	 9305,42124	 832.130,91	€	 303.727.783,46	€	
2046	 91,21	€	 9305,42124	 848.773,53	€	 309.802.339,13	€	
2047	 93,04	€	 9305,42124	 865.749,00	€	 315.998.385,91	€	
2048	 94,90	€	 9305,42124	 883.063,98	€	 322.318.353,63	€	
2049	 96,80	€	 9305,42124	 900.725,26	€	 328.764.720,70	€	
2050	 98,73	€	 9305,42124	 918.739,77	€	 335.340.015,12	€	
2051	 100,71	€	 9305,42124	 937.114,56	€	 342.046.815,42	€	
2052	 102,72	€	 9305,42124	 955.856,85	€	 348.887.751,73	€	
2053	 104,77	€	 9305,42124	 974.973,99	€	 355.865.506,76	€	
2054	 106,87	€	 9305,42124	 994.473,47	€	 362.982.816,90	€	
2055	 109,01	€	 9305,42124	 1.014.362,94	€	 370.242.473,24	€	
2056	 111,19	€	 9305,42124	 1.034.650,20	€	 377.647.322,70	€	
2057	 113,41	€	 9305,42124	 1.055.343,20	€	 385.200.269,15	€	
2058	 115,68	€	 9305,42124	 1.076.450,07	€	 392.904.274,54	€	
2059	 117,99	€	 9305,42124	 1.097.979,07	€	 400.762.360,03	€	








Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2024	 159,00	€	 2590	 411.810,00	€	 150.310.650,00	€	
2025	 162,18	€	 2628,85	 426.346,89	€	 155.616.615,95	€	
2026	 165,42	€	 2668,28275	 441.396,94	€	 161.109.882,49	€	
2027	 168,73	€	 2708,306991	 456.978,25	€	 166.797.061,34	€	
2028	 172,11	€	 2748,931596	 473.109,58	€	 172.684.997,60	€	
2029	 175,55	€	 2790,16557	 489.810,35	€	 178.780.778,02	€	
2030	 179,06	€	 2832,018054	 507.100,66	€	 185.091.739,48	€	
2031	 182,64	€	 2874,498324	 525.001,31	€	 191.625.477,89	€	
2032	 186,29	€	 2917,615799	 543.533,86	€	 198.389.857,26	€	
2033	 190,02	€	 2961,380036	 562.720,60	€	 205.393.019,22	€	
2034	 193,82	€	 3005,800737	 582.584,64	€	 212.643.392,80	€	
2035	 197,70	€	 3050,887748	 603.149,88	€	 220.149.704,56	€	
2036	 201,65	€	 3096,651064	 624.441,07	€	 227.920.989,13	€	
2037	 205,68	€	 3143,10083	 646.483,84	€	 235.966.600,05	€	
2038	 209,80	€	 3190,247342	 669.304,72	€	 244.296.221,03	€	
2039	 213,99	€	 3238,101053	 692.931,17	€	 252.919.877,63	€	
2040	 218,27	€	 3286,672568	 717.391,64	€	 261.847.949,32	€	
2041	 222,64	€	 3335,972657	 742.715,57	€	 271.091.181,93	€	
2042	 227,09	€	 3386,012247	 768.933,43	€	 280.660.700,65	€	
2043	 231,63	€	 3436,802431	 796.076,78	€	 290.568.023,38	€	
2044	 236,27	€	 3488,354467	 824.178,29	€	 300.825.074,61	€	
2045	 240,99	€	 3488,354467	 840.661,85	€	 306.841.576,10	€	
2046	 245,81	€	 3488,354467	 857.475,09	€	 312.978.407,62	€	
2047	 250,73	€	 3488,354467	 874.624,59	€	 319.237.975,77	€	
2048	 255,74	€	 3488,354467	 892.117,08	€	 325.622.735,29	€	
2049	 260,86	€	 3488,354467	 909.959,42	€	 332.135.189,99	€	
2050	 266,07	€	 3488,354467	 928.158,61	€	 338.777.893,79	€	
2051	 271,39	€	 3488,354467	 946.721,79	€	 345.553.451,67	€	
2052	 276,82	€	 3488,354467	 965.656,22	€	 352.464.520,70	€	
2053	 282,36	€	 3488,354467	 984.969,35	€	 359.513.811,12	€	
2054	 288,01	€	 3488,354467	 1.004.668,73	€	 366.704.087,34	€	
2055	 293,77	€	 3488,354467	 1.024.762,11	€	 374.038.169,09	€	
2056	 299,64	€	 3488,354467	 1.045.257,35	€	 381.518.932,47	€	
2057	 305,63	€	 3488,354467	 1.066.162,50	€	 389.149.311,12	€	
2058	 311,75	€	 3488,354467	 1.087.485,75	€	 396.932.297,34	€	
2059	 317,98	€	 3488,354467	 1.109.235,46	€	 404.870.943,29	€	








Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2024	 47,10	€	 3750	 176.625,00	€	 64.468.125,00	€	
2025	 48,04	€	 3806,25	 182.859,86	€	 66.743.849,81	€	
2026	 49,00	€	 3863,34375	 189.314,82	€	 69.099.907,71	€	
2027	 49,98	€	 3921,293906	 195.997,63	€	 71.539.134,45	€	
2028	 50,98	€	 3980,113315	 202.916,34	€	 74.064.465,90	€	
2029	 52,00	€	 4039,815015	 210.079,29	€	 76.678.941,55	€	
2030	 53,04	€	 4100,41224	 217.495,09	€	 79.385.708,18	€	
2031	 54,10	€	 4161,918423	 225.172,67	€	 82.188.023,68	€	
2032	 55,19	€	 4224,3472	 233.121,26	€	 85.089.260,92	€	
2033	 56,29	€	 4287,712408	 241.350,44	€	 88.092.911,83	€	
2034	 57,41	€	 4352,028094	 249.870,11	€	 91.202.591,61	€	
2035	 58,56	€	 4417,308515	 258.690,53	€	 94.422.043,10	€	
2036	 59,73	€	 4483,568143	 267.822,30	€	 97.755.141,22	€	
2037	 60,93	€	 4550,821665	 277.276,43	€	 101.205.897,71	€	
2038	 62,15	€	 4619,08399	 287.064,29	€	 104.778.465,89	€	
2039	 63,39	€	 4688,37025	 297.197,66	€	 108.477.145,74	€	
2040	 64,66	€	 4758,695804	 307.688,74	€	 112.306.388,98	€	
2041	 65,95	€	 4830,076241	 318.550,15	€	 116.270.804,52	€	
2042	 67,27	€	 4902,527384	 329.794,97	€	 120.375.163,92	€	
2043	 68,62	€	 4976,065295	 341.436,73	€	 124.624.407,20	€	
2044	 69,99	€	 5050,706275	 353.489,45	€	 129.023.648,78	€	
2045	 71,39	€	 5050,706275	 360.559,24	€	 131.604.121,75	€	
2046	 72,82	€	 5050,706275	 367.770,42	€	 134.236.204,19	€	
2047	 74,27	€	 5050,706275	 375.125,83	€	 136.920.928,27	€	
2048	 75,76	€	 5050,706275	 382.628,35	€	 139.659.346,84	€	
2049	 77,27	€	 5050,706275	 390.280,91	€	 142.452.533,77	€	
2050	 78,82	€	 5050,706275	 398.086,53	€	 145.301.584,45	€	
2051	 80,39	€	 5050,706275	 406.048,26	€	 148.207.616,14	€	
2052	 82,00	€	 5050,706275	 414.169,23	€	 151.171.768,46	€	
2053	 83,64	€	 5050,706275	 422.452,61	€	 154.195.203,83	€	
2054	 85,32	€	 5050,706275	 430.901,67	€	 157.279.107,91	€	
2055	 87,02	€	 5050,706275	 439.519,70	€	 160.424.690,06	€	
2056	 88,76	€	 5050,706275	 448.310,09	€	 163.633.183,86	€	
2057	 90,54	€	 5050,706275	 457.276,29	€	 166.905.847,54	€	
2058	 92,35	€	 5050,706275	 466.421,82	€	 170.243.964,49	€	
2059	 94,19	€	 5050,706275	 475.750,26	€	 173.648.843,78	€	










Year				 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2024	 49,00	€	 2200	 107.800,00	€	 39.347.000,00	€	
2025	 49,98	€	 2233	 111.605,34	€	 40.735.949,10	€	
2026	 50,98	€	 2266,495	 115.545,01	€	 42.173.928,10	€	
2027	 52,00	€	 2300,492425	 119.623,75	€	 43.662.667,77	€	
2028	 53,04	€	 2334,999811	 123.846,47	€	 45.203.959,94	€	
2029	 54,10	€	 2370,024809	 128.218,25	€	 46.799.659,72	€	
2030	 55,18	€	 2405,575181	 132.744,35	€	 48.451.687,71	€	
2031	 56,29	€	 2441,658808	 137.430,23	€	 50.162.032,29	€	
2032	 57,41	€	 2478,283691	 142.281,51	€	 51.932.752,03	€	
2033	 58,56	€	 2515,457946	 147.304,05	€	 53.765.978,17	€	
2034	 59,73	€	 2553,189815	 152.503,88	€	 55.663.917,20	€	
2035	 60,93	€	 2591,487662	 157.887,27	€	 57.628.853,48	€	
2036	 62,14	€	 2630,359977	 163.460,69	€	 59.663.152,01	€	
2037	 63,39	€	 2669,815377	 169.230,85	€	 61.769.261,27	€	
2038	 64,65	€	 2709,862608	 175.204,70	€	 63.949.716,20	€	
2039	 65,95	€	 2750,510547	 181.389,43	€	 66.207.141,18	€	
2040	 67,27	€	 2791,768205	 187.792,47	€	 68.544.253,26	€	
2041	 68,61	€	 2833,644728	 194.421,55	€	 70.963.865,40	€	
2042	 69,98	€	 2876,149399	 201.284,63	€	 73.468.889,85	€	
2043	 71,38	€	 2919,29164	 208.389,98	€	 76.062.341,66	€	
2044	 72,81	€	 2963,081014	 215.746,14	€	 78.747.342,32	€	
2045	 74,27	€	 2963,081014	 220.061,07	€	 80.322.289,17	€	
2046	 75,75	€	 2963,081014	 224.462,29	€	 81.928.734,95	€	
2047	 77,27	€	 2963,081014	 228.951,53	€	 83.567.309,65	€	
2048	 78,81	€	 2963,081014	 233.530,56	€	 85.238.655,85	€	
2049	 80,39	€	 2963,081014	 238.201,18	€	 86.943.428,96	€	
2050	 82,00	€	 2963,081014	 242.965,20	€	 88.682.297,54	€	
2051	 83,64	€	 2963,081014	 247.824,50	€	 90.455.943,49	€	
2052	 85,31	€	 2963,081014	 252.780,99	€	 92.265.062,36	€	
2053	 87,02	€	 2963,081014	 257.836,61	€	 94.110.363,61	€	
2054	 88,76	€	 2963,081014	 262.993,34	€	 95.992.570,88	€	
2055	 90,53	€	 2963,081014	 268.253,21	€	 97.912.422,30	€	
2056	 92,34	€	 2963,081014	 273.618,28	€	 99.870.670,75	€	
2057	 94,19	€	 2963,081014	 279.090,64	€	 101.868.084,16	€	
2058	 96,07	€	 2963,081014	 284.672,45	€	 103.905.445,84	€	
2059	 97,99	€	 2963,081014	 290.365,90	€	 105.983.554,76	€	










Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2024	 31,50	€	 200	 6.300,00	€	 2.299.500,00	€	
2025	 32,13	€	 203	 6.522,39	€	 2.380.672,35	€	
2026	 32,77	€	 206,045	 6.752,63	€	 2.464.710,08	€	
2027	 33,43	€	 209,135675	 6.991,00	€	 2.551.714,35	€	
2028	 34,10	€	 212,2727101	 7.237,78	€	 2.641.789,87	€	
2029	 34,78	€	 215,4568008	 7.493,27	€	 2.735.045,05	€	
2030	 35,47	€	 218,6886528	 7.757,79	€	 2.831.592,14	€	
2031	 36,18	€	 221,9689826	 8.031,64	€	 2.931.547,34	€	
2032	 36,91	€	 225,2985173	 8.315,15	€	 3.035.030,96	€	
2033	 37,65	€	 228,6779951	 8.608,68	€	 3.142.167,56	€	
2034	 38,40	€	 232,108165	 8.912,56	€	 3.253.086,07	€	
2035	 39,17	€	 235,5897875	 9.227,18	€	 3.367.920,01	€	
2036	 39,95	€	 239,1236343	 9.552,90	€	 3.486.807,58	€	
2037	 40,75	€	 242,7104888	 9.890,11	€	 3.609.891,89	€	
2038	 41,56	€	 246,3511461	 10.239,24	€	 3.737.321,08	€	
2039	 42,39	€	 250,0464133	 10.600,68	€	 3.869.248,51	€	
2040	 43,24	€	 253,7971095	 10.974,88	€	 4.005.832,98	€	
2041	 44,11	€	 257,6040662	 11.362,30	€	 4.147.238,89	€	
2042	 44,99	€	 261,4681272	 11.763,39	€	 4.293.636,42	€	
2043	 45,89	€	 265,3901491	 12.178,64	€	 4.445.201,79	€	
2044	 46,81	€	 269,3710013	 12.608,54	€	 4.602.117,41	€	
2045	 47,74	€	 269,3710013	 12.860,71	€	 4.694.159,76	€	
2046	 48,70	€	 269,3710013	 13.117,93	€	 4.788.042,95	€	
2047	 49,67	€	 269,3710013	 13.380,28	€	 4.883.803,81	€	
2048	 50,67	€	 269,3710013	 13.647,89	€	 4.981.479,89	€	
2049	 51,68	€	 269,3710013	 13.920,85	€	 5.081.109,48	€	
2050	 52,71	€	 269,3710013	 14.199,26	€	 5.182.731,67	€	
2051	 53,77	€	 269,3710013	 14.483,25	€	 5.286.386,31	€	
2052	 54,84	€	 269,3710013	 14.772,92	€	 5.392.114,03	€	
2053	 55,94	€	 269,3710013	 15.068,37	€	 5.499.956,31	€	
2054	 57,06	€	 269,3710013	 15.369,74	€	 5.609.955,44	€	
2055	 58,20	€	 269,3710013	 15.677,14	€	 5.722.154,55	€	
2056	 59,36	€	 269,3710013	 15.990,68	€	 5.836.597,64	€	
2057	 60,55	€	 269,3710013	 16.310,49	€	 5.953.329,59	€	
2058	 61,76	€	 269,3710013	 16.636,70	€	 6.072.396,19	€	
2059	 63,00	€	 269,3710013	 16.969,44	€	 6.193.844,11	€	









Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2024	 34,60	€	 3200	 110.720,00	€	 40.412.800,00	€	
2025	 35,29	€	 3248	 114.628,42	€	 41.839.371,84	€	
2026	 36,00	€	 3296,72	 118.674,80	€	 43.316.301,67	€	
2027	 36,72	€	 3346,1708	 122.864,02	€	 44.845.367,11	€	
2028	 37,45	€	 3396,363362	 127.201,12	€	 46.428.408,57	€	
2029	 38,20	€	 3447,308812	 131.691,32	€	 48.067.331,40	€	
2030	 38,97	€	 3499,018445	 136.340,02	€	 49.764.108,19	€	
2031	 39,74	€	 3551,503721	 141.152,83	€	 51.520.781,21	€	
2032	 40,54	€	 3604,776277	 146.135,52	€	 53.339.464,79	€	
2033	 41,35	€	 3658,847921	 151.294,10	€	 55.222.347,90	€	
2034	 42,18	€	 3713,73064	 156.634,79	€	 57.171.696,78	€	
2035	 43,02	€	 3769,4366	 162.163,99	€	 59.189.857,68	€	
2036	 43,88	€	 3825,978149	 167.888,38	€	 61.279.259,65	€	
2037	 44,76	€	 3883,367821	 173.814,84	€	 63.442.417,52	€	
2038	 45,65	€	 3941,618338	 179.950,51	€	 65.681.934,86	€	
2039	 46,57	€	 4000,742613	 186.302,76	€	 68.000.507,16	€	
2040	 47,50	€	 4060,753752	 192.879,25	€	 70.400.925,06	€	
2041	 48,45	€	 4121,665059	 199.687,88	€	 72.886.077,71	€	
2042	 49,42	€	 4183,490035	 206.736,87	€	 75.458.956,26	€	
2043	 50,41	€	 4246,242385	 214.034,68	€	 78.122.657,41	€	
2044	 51,41	€	 4309,936021	 221.590,10	€	 80.880.387,22	€	
2045	 52,44	€	 4309,936021	 226.021,90	€	 82.497.994,96	€	
2046	 53,49	€	 4309,936021	 230.542,34	€	 84.147.954,86	€	
2047	 54,56	€	 4309,936021	 235.153,19	€	 85.830.913,96	€	
2048	 55,65	€	 4309,936021	 239.856,25	€	 87.547.532,24	€	
2049	 56,76	€	 4309,936021	 244.653,38	€	 89.298.482,88	€	
2050	 57,90	€	 4309,936021	 249.546,45	€	 91.084.452,54	€	
2051	 59,06	€	 4309,936021	 254.537,37	€	 92.906.141,59	€	
2052	 60,24	€	 4309,936021	 259.628,12	€	 94.764.264,42	€	
2053	 61,44	€	 4309,936021	 264.820,68	€	 96.659.549,71	€	
2054	 62,67	€	 4309,936021	 270.117,10	€	 98.592.740,71	€	
2055	 63,93	€	 4309,936021	 275.519,44	€	 100.564.595,52	€	
2056	 65,21	€	 4309,936021	 281.029,83	€	 102.575.887,43	€	
2057	 66,51	€	 4309,936021	 286.650,43	€	 104.627.405,18	€	
2058	 67,84	€	 4309,936021	 292.383,43	€	 106.719.953,28	€	
2059	 69,20	€	 4309,936021	 298.231,10	€	 108.854.352,35	€	











In the following tables the annual revenues for the freight transport service are reported. 
	
Napoli-Bari	freight	transport	service	
		 Price/km	 Km	 Wagons/year	 Annual	revenues	
2024	 3,80	€	 300	 85000	 96.900.000,00	€	
2025	 3,88	€	 300	 86275	 100.320.570,00	€	
2026	 3,95	€	 300	 87569,125	 103.861.886,12	€	
2027	 4,03	€	 300	 88882,66188	 107.528.210,70	€	
2028	 4,11	€	 300	 90215,9018	 111.323.956,54	€	
2029	 4,20	€	 300	 91569,14033	 115.253.692,20	€	
2030	 4,28	€	 300	 92942,67744	 119.322.147,54	€	
2031	 4,37	€	 300	 94336,8176	 123.534.219,35	€	
2032	 4,45	€	 300	 95751,86986	 127.894.977,29	€	
2033	 4,54	€	 300	 97188,14791	 132.409.669,99	€	
2034	 4,63	€	 300	 98645,97013	 137.083.731,34	€	
2035	 4,72	€	 300	 100125,6597	 141.922.787,06	€	
2036	 4,82	€	 300	 101627,5446	 146.932.661,44	€	
2037	 4,92	€	 300	 103151,9577	 152.119.384,39	€	
2038	 5,01	€	 300	 104699,2371	 157.489.198,66	€	
2039	 5,11	€	 300	 106269,7257	 163.048.567,37	€	
2040	 5,22	€	 300	 107863,7716	 168.804.181,80	€	
2041	 5,32	€	 300	 109481,7281	 174.762.969,41	€	
2042	 5,43	€	 300	 111123,954	 180.932.102,24	€	
2043	 5,54	€	 300	 112790,8134	 187.319.005,44	€	
2044	 5,65	€	 300	 114482,6756	 193.931.366,34	€	
2045	 5,76	€	 300	 114482,6756	 197.809.993,66	€	
2046	 5,87	€	 300	 114482,6756	 201.766.193,54	€	
2047	 5,99	€	 300	 114482,6756	 205.801.517,41	€	
2048	 6,11	€	 300	 114482,6756	 209.917.547,75	€	
2049	 6,23	€	 300	 114482,6756	 214.115.898,71	€	
2050	 6,36	€	 300	 114482,6756	 218.398.216,68	€	
2051	 6,49	€	 300	 114482,6756	 222.766.181,02	€	
2052	 6,62	€	 300	 114482,6756	 227.221.504,64	€	
2053	 6,75	€	 300	 114482,6756	 231.765.934,73	€	
2054	 6,88	€	 300	 114482,6756	 236.401.253,43	€	
2055	 7,02	€	 300	 114482,6756	 241.129.278,49	€	
2056	 7,16	€	 300	 114482,6756	 245.951.864,06	€	
2057	 7,30	€	 300	 114482,6756	 250.870.901,35	€	
2058	 7,45	€	 300	 114482,6756	 255.888.319,37	€	
2059	 7,60	€	 300	 114482,6756	 261.006.085,76	€	





6 Socio-economic analysis 
 
From table 6.1.1 A to table 6.2.3 A the description is the same made from table 5.1.1 A to table 
5.2.3 taking into account that the values in the socio-economic analysis are costant over time 
so there is not inflation and the same values are converted through conversion factors as we 
have said in chapter 6. 
 
















Year	 A	 B	 C	 D	
2016	 491,02	€	 446,84	€	 421,04	€	 465,23	€	
2017	 491,02	€	 446,84	€	 421,04	€	 465,23	€	
2018	 491,02	€	 446,84	€	 421,04	€	 465,23	€	
2019	 491,02	€	 446,84	€	 421,04	€	 465,23	€	
2020	 491,02	€	 446,84	€	 421,04	€	 465,23	€	
2021	 491,02	€	 446,84	€	 421,04	€	 465,23	€	
2022	 491,02	€	 446,84	€	 421,04	€	 465,23	€	























Year	 A	 B	 C	 D	
2020	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2021	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2022	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2023	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2024	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2025	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2026	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2027	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2028	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2029	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2030	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2031	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2032	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2033	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2034	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2035	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2036	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2037	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2038	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2039	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2040	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2041	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2042	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2043	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2044	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2045	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2046	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2047	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2048	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2049	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2050	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2051	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2052	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2053	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2054	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2055	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2056	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2057	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2058	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	
2059	 1,22184	 1,5273	 1,42548	 1,12002	





























































6.2.1 A  
 
In the following tables the annual revenues for the short distance passenger transport service 
are reported. 
The PV of short distance passenger transport service revenues for each solution is computed 
through the sum of PVs of the annual revenues of the routes composing the same solution. 
	
Benevento-Caserta	(solution	A)	
Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2020	 3,10	€	 1900	 5.890,00	€	 1.484.280,00	€	
2021	 3,10	€	 1928,5	 5.978,35	€	 1.506.544,20	€	
2022	 3,10	€	 1957,4275	 6.068,03	€	 1.529.142,36	€	
2023	 3,10	€	 1986,788913	 6.159,05	€	 1.552.079,50	€	
2024	 3,10	€	 2016,590746	 6.251,43	€	 1.575.360,69	€	
2025	 3,10	€	 2046,839607	 6.345,20	€	 1.598.991,10	€	
2026	 3,10	€	 2077,542201	 6.440,38	€	 1.622.975,97	€	
2027	 3,10	€	 2108,705335	 6.536,99	€	 1.647.320,61	€	
2028	 3,10	€	 2140,335915	 6.635,04	€	 1.672.030,42	€	
2029	 3,10	€	 2172,440953	 6.734,57	€	 1.697.110,87	€	
2030	 3,10	€	 2205,027568	 6.835,59	€	 1.722.567,54	€	
2031	 3,10	€	 2238,102981	 6.938,12	€	 1.748.406,05	€	
2032	 3,10	€	 2271,674526	 7.042,19	€	 1.774.632,14	€	
2033	 3,10	€	 2305,749644	 7.147,82	€	 1.801.251,62	€	
2034	 3,10	€	 2340,335888	 7.255,04	€	 1.828.270,40	€	
2035	 3,10	€	 2375,440927	 7.363,87	€	 1.855.694,45	€	
2036	 3,10	€	 2411,072541	 7.474,32	€	 1.883.529,87	€	
2037	 3,10	€	 2447,238629	 7.586,44	€	 1.911.782,82	€	
2038	 3,10	€	 2483,947208	 7.700,24	€	 1.940.459,56	€	
2039	 3,10	€	 2521,206416	 7.815,74	€	 1.969.566,45	€	
2040	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2041	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2042	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2043	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2044	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2045	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2046	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2047	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2048	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2049	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2050	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2051	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2052	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2053	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2054	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2055	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2056	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2057	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2058	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2059	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	







Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2020	 5,10	€	 3400	 17.340,00	€	 4.369.680,00	€	
2021	 5,10	€	 3451	 17.600,10	€	 4.435.225,20	€	
2022	 5,10	€	 3502,765	 17.864,10	€	 4.501.753,58	€	
2023	 5,10	€	 3555,306475	 18.132,06	€	 4.569.279,88	€	
2024	 5,10	€	 3608,636072	 18.404,04	€	 4.637.819,08	€	
2025	 5,10	€	 3662,765613	 18.680,10	€	 4.707.386,37	€	
2026	 5,10	€	 3717,707097	 18.960,31	€	 4.777.997,16	€	
2027	 5,10	€	 3773,472704	 19.244,71	€	 4.849.667,12	€	
2028	 5,10	€	 3830,074794	 19.533,38	€	 4.922.412,13	€	
2029	 5,10	€	 3887,525916	 19.826,38	€	 4.996.248,31	€	
2030	 5,10	€	 3945,838805	 20.123,78	€	 5.071.192,03	€	
2031	 5,10	€	 4005,026387	 20.425,63	€	 5.147.259,91	€	
2032	 5,10	€	 4065,101783	 20.732,02	€	 5.224.468,81	€	
2033	 5,10	€	 4126,07831	 21.043,00	€	 5.302.835,84	€	
2034	 5,10	€	 4187,969484	 21.358,64	€	 5.382.378,38	€	
2035	 5,10	€	 4250,789027	 21.679,02	€	 5.463.114,06	€	
2036	 5,10	€	 4314,550862	 22.004,21	€	 5.545.060,77	€	
2037	 5,10	€	 4379,269125	 22.334,27	€	 5.628.236,68	€	
2038	 5,10	€	 4444,958162	 22.669,29	€	 5.712.660,23	€	
2039	 5,10	€	 4511,632534	 23.009,33	€	 5.798.350,13	€	
2040	 5,10	€	 4579,307022	 23.354,47	€	 5.885.325,39	€	
2041	 5,10	€	 4579,307022	 23.354,47	€	 5.885.325,39	€	
2042	 5,10	€	 4579,307022	 23.354,47	€	 5.885.325,39	€	
2043	 5,10	€	 4579,307022	 23.354,47	€	 5.885.325,39	€	
2044	 5,10	€	 4579,307022	 23.354,47	€	 5.885.325,39	€	
2045	 5,10	€	 4579,307022	 23.354,47	€	 5.885.325,39	€	
2046	 5,10	€	 4579,307022	 23.354,47	€	 5.885.325,39	€	
2047	 5,10	€	 4579,307022	 23.354,47	€	 5.885.325,39	€	
2048	 5,10	€	 4579,307022	 23.354,47	€	 5.885.325,39	€	
2049	 5,10	€	 4579,307022	 23.354,47	€	 5.885.325,39	€	
2050	 5,10	€	 4579,307022	 23.354,47	€	 5.885.325,39	€	
2051	 5,10	€	 4579,307022	 23.354,47	€	 5.885.325,39	€	
2052	 5,10	€	 4579,307022	 23.354,47	€	 5.885.325,39	€	
2053	 5,10	€	 4579,307022	 23.354,47	€	 5.885.325,39	€	
2054	 5,10	€	 4579,307022	 23.354,47	€	 5.885.325,39	€	
2055	 5,10	€	 4579,307022	 23.354,47	€	 5.885.325,39	€	
2056	 5,10	€	 4579,307022	 23.354,47	€	 5.885.325,39	€	
2057	 5,10	€	 4579,307022	 23.354,47	€	 5.885.325,39	€	
2058	 5,10	€	 4579,307022	 23.354,47	€	 5.885.325,39	€	
2059	 5,10	€	 4579,307022	 23.354,47	€	 5.885.325,39	€	






Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2020	 3,10	€	 7000	 21.700,00	€	 5.468.400,00	€	
2021	 3,10	€	 7105	 22.025,50	€	 5.550.426,00	€	
2022	 3,10	€	 7211,575	 22.355,88	€	 5.633.682,39	€	
2023	 3,10	€	 7319,748625	 22.691,22	€	 5.718.187,63	€	
2024	 3,10	€	 7429,544854	 23.031,59	€	 5.803.960,44	€	
2025	 3,10	€	 7540,988027	 23.377,06	€	 5.891.019,85	€	
2026	 3,10	€	 7654,102848	 23.727,72	€	 5.979.385,14	€	
2027	 3,10	€	 7768,91439	 24.083,63	€	 6.069.075,92	€	
2028	 3,10	€	 7885,448106	 24.444,89	€	 6.160.112,06	€	
2029	 3,10	€	 8003,729828	 24.811,56	€	 6.252.513,74	€	
2030	 3,10	€	 8123,785775	 25.183,74	€	 6.346.301,45	€	
2031	 3,10	€	 8245,642562	 25.561,49	€	 6.441.495,97	€	
2032	 3,10	€	 8369,3272	 25.944,91	€	 6.538.118,41	€	
2033	 3,10	€	 8494,867108	 26.334,09	€	 6.636.190,18	€	
2034	 3,10	€	 8622,290115	 26.729,10	€	 6.735.733,04	€	
2035	 3,10	€	 8751,624467	 27.130,04	€	 6.836.769,03	€	
2036	 3,10	€	 8882,898834	 27.536,99	€	 6.939.320,57	€	
2037	 3,10	€	 9016,142316	 27.950,04	€	 7.043.410,38	€	
2038	 3,10	€	 9151,384451	 28.369,29	€	 7.149.061,53	€	
2039	 3,10	€	 9288,655218	 28.794,83	€	 7.256.297,46	€	
2040	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2041	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2042	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2043	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2044	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2045	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2046	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2047	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2048	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2049	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2050	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2051	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2052	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2053	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2054	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2055	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2056	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2057	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2058	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2059	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	





Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2020	 16,36	€	 2800	 45.808,00	€	 11.543.616,00	€	
2021	 16,36	€	 2842	 46.495,12	€	 11.716.770,24	€	
2022	 16,36	€	 2884,63	 47.192,55	€	 11.892.521,79	€	
2023	 16,36	€	 2927,89945	 47.900,44	€	 12.070.909,62	€	
2024	 16,36	€	 2971,817942	 48.618,94	€	 12.251.973,26	€	
2025	 16,36	€	 3016,395211	 49.348,23	€	 12.435.752,86	€	
2026	 16,36	€	 3061,641139	 50.088,45	€	 12.622.289,16	€	
2027	 16,36	€	 3107,565756	 50.839,78	€	 12.811.623,49	€	
2028	 16,36	€	 3154,179242	 51.602,37	€	 13.003.797,85	€	
2029	 16,36	€	 3201,491931	 52.376,41	€	 13.198.854,81	€	
2030	 16,36	€	 3249,51431	 53.162,05	€	 13.396.837,64	€	
2031	 16,36	€	 3298,257025	 53.959,48	€	 13.597.790,20	€	
2032	 16,36	€	 3347,73088	 54.768,88	€	 13.801.757,05	€	
2033	 16,36	€	 3397,946843	 55.590,41	€	 14.008.783,41	€	
2034	 16,36	€	 3448,916046	 56.424,27	€	 14.218.915,16	€	
2035	 16,36	€	 3500,649787	 57.270,63	€	 14.432.198,89	€	
2036	 16,36	€	 3553,159533	 58.129,69	€	 14.648.681,87	€	
2037	 16,36	€	 3606,456926	 59.001,64	€	 14.868.412,10	€	
2038	 16,36	€	 3660,55378	 59.886,66	€	 15.091.438,28	€	
2039	 16,36	€	 3715,462087	 60.784,96	€	 15.317.809,86	€	
2040	 16,36	€	 3771,194018	 61.696,73	€	 15.547.577,00	€	
2041	 16,36	€	 3771,194018	 61.696,73	€	 15.547.577,00	€	
2042	 16,36	€	 3771,194018	 61.696,73	€	 15.547.577,00	€	
2043	 16,36	€	 3771,194018	 61.696,73	€	 15.547.577,00	€	
2044	 16,36	€	 3771,194018	 61.696,73	€	 15.547.577,00	€	
2045	 16,36	€	 3771,194018	 61.696,73	€	 15.547.577,00	€	
2046	 16,36	€	 3771,194018	 61.696,73	€	 15.547.577,00	€	
2047	 16,36	€	 3771,194018	 61.696,73	€	 15.547.577,00	€	
2048	 16,36	€	 3771,194018	 61.696,73	€	 15.547.577,00	€	
2049	 16,36	€	 3771,194018	 61.696,73	€	 15.547.577,00	€	
2050	 16,36	€	 3771,194018	 61.696,73	€	 15.547.577,00	€	
2051	 16,36	€	 3771,194018	 61.696,73	€	 15.547.577,00	€	
2052	 16,36	€	 3771,194018	 61.696,73	€	 15.547.577,00	€	
2053	 16,36	€	 3771,194018	 61.696,73	€	 15.547.577,00	€	
2054	 16,36	€	 3771,194018	 61.696,73	€	 15.547.577,00	€	
2055	 16,36	€	 3771,194018	 61.696,73	€	 15.547.577,00	€	
2056	 16,36	€	 3771,194018	 61.696,73	€	 15.547.577,00	€	
2057	 16,36	€	 3771,194018	 61.696,73	€	 15.547.577,00	€	
2058	 16,36	€	 3771,194018	 61.696,73	€	 15.547.577,00	€	
2059	 16,36	€	 3771,194018	 61.696,73	€	 15.547.577,00	€	





Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2020	 2,50	€	 4350	 10.875,00	€	 2.740.500,00	€	
2021	 2,50	€	 4415,25	 11.038,13	€	 2.781.607,50	€	
2022	 2,50	€	 4481,47875	 11.203,70	€	 2.823.331,61	€	
2023	 2,50	€	 4548,700931	 11.371,75	€	 2.865.681,59	€	
2024	 2,50	€	 4616,931445	 11.542,33	€	 2.908.666,81	€	
2025	 2,50	€	 4686,185417	 11.715,46	€	 2.952.296,81	€	
2026	 2,50	€	 4756,478198	 11.891,20	€	 2.996.581,26	€	
2027	 2,50	€	 4827,825371	 12.069,56	€	 3.041.529,98	€	
2028	 2,50	€	 4900,242752	 12.250,61	€	 3.087.152,93	€	
2029	 2,50	€	 4973,746393	 12.434,37	€	 3.133.460,23	€	
2030	 2,50	€	 5048,352589	 12.620,88	€	 3.180.462,13	€	
2031	 2,50	€	 5124,077878	 12.810,19	€	 3.228.169,06	€	
2032	 2,50	€	 5200,939046	 13.002,35	€	 3.276.591,60	€	
2033	 2,50	€	 5278,953132	 13.197,38	€	 3.325.740,47	€	
2034	 2,50	€	 5358,137429	 13.395,34	€	 3.375.626,58	€	
2035	 2,50	€	 5438,50949	 13.596,27	€	 3.426.260,98	€	
2036	 2,50	€	 5520,087132	 13.800,22	€	 3.477.654,89	€	
2037	 2,50	€	 5602,888439	 14.007,22	€	 3.529.819,72	€	
2038	 2,50	€	 5686,931766	 14.217,33	€	 3.582.767,01	€	
2039	 2,50	€	 5772,235742	 14.430,59	€	 3.636.508,52	€	
2040	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2041	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2042	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2043	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2044	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2045	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2046	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2047	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2048	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2049	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2050	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2051	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2052	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2053	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2054	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2055	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2056	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2057	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2058	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2059	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	





Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2020	 3,10	€	 1900	 5.890,00	€	 1.484.280,00	€	
2021	 3,10	€	 1928,5	 5.978,35	€	 1.506.544,20	€	
2022	 3,10	€	 1957,4275	 6.068,03	€	 1.529.142,36	€	
2023	 3,10	€	 1986,788913	 6.159,05	€	 1.552.079,50	€	
2024	 3,10	€	 2016,590746	 6.251,43	€	 1.575.360,69	€	
2025	 3,10	€	 2046,839607	 6.345,20	€	 1.598.991,10	€	
2026	 3,10	€	 2077,542201	 6.440,38	€	 1.622.975,97	€	
2027	 3,10	€	 2108,705335	 6.536,99	€	 1.647.320,61	€	
2028	 3,10	€	 2140,335915	 6.635,04	€	 1.672.030,42	€	
2029	 3,10	€	 2172,440953	 6.734,57	€	 1.697.110,87	€	
2030	 3,10	€	 2205,027568	 6.835,59	€	 1.722.567,54	€	
2031	 3,10	€	 2238,102981	 6.938,12	€	 1.748.406,05	€	
2032	 3,10	€	 2271,674526	 7.042,19	€	 1.774.632,14	€	
2033	 3,10	€	 2305,749644	 7.147,82	€	 1.801.251,62	€	
2034	 3,10	€	 2340,335888	 7.255,04	€	 1.828.270,40	€	
2035	 3,10	€	 2375,440927	 7.363,87	€	 1.855.694,45	€	
2036	 3,10	€	 2411,072541	 7.474,32	€	 1.883.529,87	€	
2037	 3,10	€	 2447,238629	 7.586,44	€	 1.911.782,82	€	
2038	 3,10	€	 2483,947208	 7.700,24	€	 1.940.459,56	€	
2039	 3,10	€	 2521,206416	 7.815,74	€	 1.969.566,45	€	
2040	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2041	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2042	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2043	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2044	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2045	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2046	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2047	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2048	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2049	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2050	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2051	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2052	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2053	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2054	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2055	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2056	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2057	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2058	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	
2059	 3,10	€	 2559,024512	 7.932,98	€	 1.999.109,95	€	










Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2020	 5,10	€	 2600	 13.260,00	€	 3.341.520,00	€	
2021	 5,10	€	 2639	 13.458,90	€	 3.391.642,80	€	
2022	 5,10	€	 2678,585	 13.660,78	€	 3.442.517,44	€	
2023	 5,10	€	 2718,763775	 13.865,70	€	 3.494.155,20	€	
2024	 5,10	€	 2759,545232	 14.073,68	€	 3.546.567,53	€	
2025	 5,10	€	 2800,93841	 14.284,79	€	 3.599.766,04	€	
2026	 5,10	€	 2842,952486	 14.499,06	€	 3.653.762,54	€	
2027	 5,10	€	 2885,596774	 14.716,54	€	 3.708.568,97	€	
2028	 5,10	€	 2928,880725	 14.937,29	€	 3.764.197,51	€	
2029	 5,10	€	 2972,813936	 15.161,35	€	 3.820.660,47	€	
2030	 5,10	€	 3017,406145	 15.388,77	€	 3.877.970,38	€	
2031	 5,10	€	 3062,667237	 15.619,60	€	 3.936.139,93	€	
2032	 5,10	€	 3108,607246	 15.853,90	€	 3.995.182,03	€	
2033	 5,10	€	 3155,236354	 16.091,71	€	 4.055.109,76	€	
2034	 5,10	€	 3202,5649	 16.333,08	€	 4.115.936,41	€	
2035	 5,10	€	 3250,603373	 16.578,08	€	 4.177.675,46	€	
2036	 5,10	€	 3299,362424	 16.826,75	€	 4.240.340,59	€	
2037	 5,10	€	 3348,85286	 17.079,15	€	 4.303.945,70	€	
2038	 5,10	€	 3399,085653	 17.335,34	€	 4.368.504,88	€	
2039	 5,10	€	 3450,071938	 17.595,37	€	 4.434.032,45	€	
2040	 5,10	€	 3501,823017	 17.859,30	€	 4.500.542,94	€	
2041	 5,10	€	 3501,823017	 17.859,30	€	 4.500.542,94	€	
2042	 5,10	€	 3501,823017	 17.859,30	€	 4.500.542,94	€	
2043	 5,10	€	 3501,823017	 17.859,30	€	 4.500.542,94	€	
2044	 5,10	€	 3501,823017	 17.859,30	€	 4.500.542,94	€	
2045	 5,10	€	 3501,823017	 17.859,30	€	 4.500.542,94	€	
2046	 5,10	€	 3501,823017	 17.859,30	€	 4.500.542,94	€	
2047	 5,10	€	 3501,823017	 17.859,30	€	 4.500.542,94	€	
2048	 5,10	€	 3501,823017	 17.859,30	€	 4.500.542,94	€	
2049	 5,10	€	 3501,823017	 17.859,30	€	 4.500.542,94	€	
2050	 5,10	€	 3501,823017	 17.859,30	€	 4.500.542,94	€	
2051	 5,10	€	 3501,823017	 17.859,30	€	 4.500.542,94	€	
2052	 5,10	€	 3501,823017	 17.859,30	€	 4.500.542,94	€	
2053	 5,10	€	 3501,823017	 17.859,30	€	 4.500.542,94	€	
2054	 5,10	€	 3501,823017	 17.859,30	€	 4.500.542,94	€	
2055	 5,10	€	 3501,823017	 17.859,30	€	 4.500.542,94	€	
2056	 5,10	€	 3501,823017	 17.859,30	€	 4.500.542,94	€	
2057	 5,10	€	 3501,823017	 17.859,30	€	 4.500.542,94	€	
2058	 5,10	€	 3501,823017	 17.859,30	€	 4.500.542,94	€	
2059	 5,10	€	 3501,823017	 17.859,30	€	 4.500.542,94	€	





Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2020	 3,10	€	 7000	 21.700,00	€	 5.468.400,00	€	
2021	 3,10	€	 7105	 22.025,50	€	 5.550.426,00	€	
2022	 3,10	€	 7211,575	 22.355,88	€	 5.633.682,39	€	
2023	 3,10	€	 7319,748625	 22.691,22	€	 5.718.187,63	€	
2024	 3,10	€	 7429,544854	 23.031,59	€	 5.803.960,44	€	
2025	 3,10	€	 7540,988027	 23.377,06	€	 5.891.019,85	€	
2026	 3,10	€	 7654,102848	 23.727,72	€	 5.979.385,14	€	
2027	 3,10	€	 7768,91439	 24.083,63	€	 6.069.075,92	€	
2028	 3,10	€	 7885,448106	 24.444,89	€	 6.160.112,06	€	
2029	 3,10	€	 8003,729828	 24.811,56	€	 6.252.513,74	€	
2030	 3,10	€	 8123,785775	 25.183,74	€	 6.346.301,45	€	
2031	 3,10	€	 8245,642562	 25.561,49	€	 6.441.495,97	€	
2032	 3,10	€	 8369,3272	 25.944,91	€	 6.538.118,41	€	
2033	 3,10	€	 8494,867108	 26.334,09	€	 6.636.190,18	€	
2034	 3,10	€	 8622,290115	 26.729,10	€	 6.735.733,04	€	
2035	 3,10	€	 8751,624467	 27.130,04	€	 6.836.769,03	€	
2036	 3,10	€	 8882,898834	 27.536,99	€	 6.939.320,57	€	
2037	 3,10	€	 9016,142316	 27.950,04	€	 7.043.410,38	€	
2038	 3,10	€	 9151,384451	 28.369,29	€	 7.149.061,53	€	
2039	 3,10	€	 9288,655218	 28.794,83	€	 7.256.297,46	€	
2040	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2041	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2042	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2043	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2044	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2045	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2046	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2047	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2048	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2049	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2050	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2051	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2052	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2053	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2054	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2055	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2056	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2057	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2058	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	
2059	 3,10	€	 9427,985046	 29.226,75	€	 7.365.141,92	€	





Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2020	 6,00	€	 750	 4.500,00	€	 1.134.000,00	€	
2021	 6,00	€	 761,25	 4.567,50	€	 1.151.010,00	€	
2022	 6,00	€	 772,66875	 4.636,01	€	 1.168.275,15	€	
2023	 6,00	€	 784,2587813	 4.705,55	€	 1.185.799,28	€	
2024	 6,00	€	 796,022663	 4.776,14	€	 1.203.586,27	€	
2025	 6,00	€	 807,9630029	 4.847,78	€	 1.221.640,06	€	
2026	 6,00	€	 820,082448	 4.920,49	€	 1.239.964,66	€	
2027	 6,00	€	 832,3836847	 4.994,30	€	 1.258.564,13	€	
2028	 6,00	€	 844,8694399	 5.069,22	€	 1.277.442,59	€	
2029	 6,00	€	 857,5424815	 5.145,25	€	 1.296.604,23	€	
2030	 6,00	€	 870,4056188	 5.222,43	€	 1.316.053,30	€	
2031	 6,00	€	 883,4617031	 5.300,77	€	 1.335.794,10	€	
2032	 6,00	€	 896,7136286	 5.380,28	€	 1.355.831,01	€	
2033	 6,00	€	 910,164333	 5.460,99	€	 1.376.168,47	€	
2034	 6,00	€	 923,816798	 5.542,90	€	 1.396.811,00	€	
2035	 6,00	€	 937,67405	 5.626,04	€	 1.417.763,16	€	
2036	 6,00	€	 951,7391607	 5.710,43	€	 1.439.029,61	€	
2037	 6,00	€	 966,0152482	 5.796,09	€	 1.460.615,06	€	
2038	 6,00	€	 980,5054769	 5.883,03	€	 1.482.524,28	€	
2039	 6,00	€	 995,213059	 5.971,28	€	 1.504.762,15	€	
2040	 6,00	€	 1010,141255	 6.060,85	€	 1.527.333,58	€	
2041	 6,00	€	 1010,141255	 6.060,85	€	 1.527.333,58	€	
2042	 6,00	€	 1010,141255	 6.060,85	€	 1.527.333,58	€	
2043	 6,00	€	 1010,141255	 6.060,85	€	 1.527.333,58	€	
2044	 6,00	€	 1010,141255	 6.060,85	€	 1.527.333,58	€	
2045	 6,00	€	 1010,141255	 6.060,85	€	 1.527.333,58	€	
2046	 6,00	€	 1010,141255	 6.060,85	€	 1.527.333,58	€	
2047	 6,00	€	 1010,141255	 6.060,85	€	 1.527.333,58	€	
2048	 6,00	€	 1010,141255	 6.060,85	€	 1.527.333,58	€	
2049	 6,00	€	 1010,141255	 6.060,85	€	 1.527.333,58	€	
2050	 6,00	€	 1010,141255	 6.060,85	€	 1.527.333,58	€	
2051	 6,00	€	 1010,141255	 6.060,85	€	 1.527.333,58	€	
2052	 6,00	€	 1010,141255	 6.060,85	€	 1.527.333,58	€	
2053	 6,00	€	 1010,141255	 6.060,85	€	 1.527.333,58	€	
2054	 6,00	€	 1010,141255	 6.060,85	€	 1.527.333,58	€	
2055	 6,00	€	 1010,141255	 6.060,85	€	 1.527.333,58	€	
2056	 6,00	€	 1010,141255	 6.060,85	€	 1.527.333,58	€	
2057	 6,00	€	 1010,141255	 6.060,85	€	 1.527.333,58	€	
2058	 6,00	€	 1010,141255	 6.060,85	€	 1.527.333,58	€	
2059	 6,00	€	 1010,141255	 6.060,85	€	 1.527.333,58	€	





Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2020	 2,50	€	 4350	 10.875,00	€	 2.740.500,00	€	
2021	 2,50	€	 4415,25	 11.038,13	€	 2.781.607,50	€	
2022	 2,50	€	 4481,47875	 11.203,70	€	 2.823.331,61	€	
2023	 2,50	€	 4548,700931	 11.371,75	€	 2.865.681,59	€	
2024	 2,50	€	 4616,931445	 11.542,33	€	 2.908.666,81	€	
2025	 2,50	€	 4686,185417	 11.715,46	€	 2.952.296,81	€	
2026	 2,50	€	 4756,478198	 11.891,20	€	 2.996.581,26	€	
2027	 2,50	€	 4827,825371	 12.069,56	€	 3.041.529,98	€	
2028	 2,50	€	 4900,242752	 12.250,61	€	 3.087.152,93	€	
2029	 2,50	€	 4973,746393	 12.434,37	€	 3.133.460,23	€	
2030	 2,50	€	 5048,352589	 12.620,88	€	 3.180.462,13	€	
2031	 2,50	€	 5124,077878	 12.810,19	€	 3.228.169,06	€	
2032	 2,50	€	 5200,939046	 13.002,35	€	 3.276.591,60	€	
2033	 2,50	€	 5278,953132	 13.197,38	€	 3.325.740,47	€	
2034	 2,50	€	 5358,137429	 13.395,34	€	 3.375.626,58	€	
2035	 2,50	€	 5438,50949	 13.596,27	€	 3.426.260,98	€	
2036	 2,50	€	 5520,087132	 13.800,22	€	 3.477.654,89	€	
2037	 2,50	€	 5602,888439	 14.007,22	€	 3.529.819,72	€	
2038	 2,50	€	 5686,931766	 14.217,33	€	 3.582.767,01	€	
2039	 2,50	€	 5772,235742	 14.430,59	€	 3.636.508,52	€	
2040	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2041	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2042	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2043	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2044	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2045	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2046	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2047	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2048	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2049	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2050	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2051	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2052	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2053	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2054	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2055	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2056	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2057	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2058	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	
2059	 2,50	€	 5858,819278	 14.647,05	€	 3.691.056,15	€	








Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2020	 3,10	€	 1700	 5.270,00	€	 1.328.040,00	€	
2021	 3,10	€	 1725,5	 5.349,05	€	 1.347.960,60	€	
2022	 3,10	€	 1751,3825	 5.429,29	€	 1.368.180,01	€	
2023	 3,10	€	 1777,653238	 5.510,73	€	 1.388.702,71	€	
2024	 3,10	€	 1804,318036	 5.593,39	€	 1.409.533,25	€	
2025	 3,10	€	 1831,382807	 5.677,29	€	 1.430.676,25	€	
2026	 3,10	€	 1858,853549	 5.762,45	€	 1.452.136,39	€	
2027	 3,10	€	 1886,736352	 5.848,88	€	 1.473.918,44	€	
2028	 3,10	€	 1915,037397	 5.936,62	€	 1.496.027,21	€	
2029	 3,10	€	 1943,762958	 6.025,67	€	 1.518.467,62	€	
2030	 3,10	€	 1972,919403	 6.116,05	€	 1.541.244,64	€	
2031	 3,10	€	 2002,513194	 6.207,79	€	 1.564.363,31	€	
2032	 3,10	€	 2032,550891	 6.300,91	€	 1.587.828,76	€	
2033	 3,10	€	 2063,039155	 6.395,42	€	 1.611.646,19	€	
2034	 3,10	€	 2093,984742	 6.491,35	€	 1.635.820,88	€	
2035	 3,10	€	 2125,394513	 6.588,72	€	 1.660.358,19	€	
2036	 3,10	€	 2157,275431	 6.687,55	€	 1.685.263,57	€	
2037	 3,10	€	 2189,634562	 6.787,87	€	 1.710.542,52	€	
2038	 3,10	€	 2222,479081	 6.889,69	€	 1.736.200,66	€	
2039	 3,10	€	 2255,816267	 6.993,03	€	 1.762.243,67	€	
2040	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2041	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2042	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2043	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2044	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2045	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2046	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2047	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2048	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2049	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2050	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2051	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2052	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2053	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2054	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2055	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2056	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2057	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2058	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2059	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	












Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2020	 5,10	€	 3100	 15.810,00	€	 3.984.120,00	€	
2021	 5,10	€	 3146,5	 16.047,15	€	 4.043.881,80	€	
2022	 5,10	€	 3193,6975	 16.287,86	€	 4.104.540,03	€	
2023	 5,10	€	 3241,602963	 16.532,18	€	 4.166.108,13	€	
2024	 5,10	€	 3290,227007	 16.780,16	€	 4.228.599,75	€	
2025	 5,10	€	 3339,580412	 17.031,86	€	 4.292.028,75	€	
2026	 5,10	€	 3389,674118	 17.287,34	€	 4.356.409,18	€	
2027	 5,10	€	 3440,51923	 17.546,65	€	 4.421.755,31	€	
2028	 5,10	€	 3492,127018	 17.809,85	€	 4.488.081,64	€	
2029	 5,10	€	 3544,508924	 18.077,00	€	 4.555.402,87	€	
2030	 5,10	€	 3597,676558	 18.348,15	€	 4.623.733,91	€	
2031	 5,10	€	 3651,641706	 18.623,37	€	 4.693.089,92	€	
2032	 5,10	€	 3706,416332	 18.902,72	€	 4.763.486,27	€	
2033	 5,10	€	 3762,012577	 19.186,26	€	 4.834.938,56	€	
2034	 5,10	€	 3818,442765	 19.474,06	€	 4.907.462,64	€	
2035	 5,10	€	 3875,719407	 19.766,17	€	 4.981.074,58	€	
2036	 5,10	€	 3933,855198	 20.062,66	€	 5.055.790,70	€	
2037	 5,10	€	 3992,863026	 20.363,60	€	 5.131.627,56	€	
2038	 5,10	€	 4052,755971	 20.669,06	€	 5.208.601,97	€	
2039	 5,10	€	 4113,547311	 20.979,09	€	 5.286.731,00	€	
2040	 5,10	€	 4175,25052	 21.293,78	€	 5.366.031,97	€	
2041	 5,10	€	 4175,25052	 21.293,78	€	 5.366.031,97	€	
2042	 5,10	€	 4175,25052	 21.293,78	€	 5.366.031,97	€	
2043	 5,10	€	 4175,25052	 21.293,78	€	 5.366.031,97	€	
2044	 5,10	€	 4175,25052	 21.293,78	€	 5.366.031,97	€	
2045	 5,10	€	 4175,25052	 21.293,78	€	 5.366.031,97	€	
2046	 5,10	€	 4175,25052	 21.293,78	€	 5.366.031,97	€	
2047	 5,10	€	 4175,25052	 21.293,78	€	 5.366.031,97	€	
2048	 5,10	€	 4175,25052	 21.293,78	€	 5.366.031,97	€	
2049	 5,10	€	 4175,25052	 21.293,78	€	 5.366.031,97	€	
2050	 5,10	€	 4175,25052	 21.293,78	€	 5.366.031,97	€	
2051	 5,10	€	 4175,25052	 21.293,78	€	 5.366.031,97	€	
2052	 5,10	€	 4175,25052	 21.293,78	€	 5.366.031,97	€	
2053	 5,10	€	 4175,25052	 21.293,78	€	 5.366.031,97	€	
2054	 5,10	€	 4175,25052	 21.293,78	€	 5.366.031,97	€	
2055	 5,10	€	 4175,25052	 21.293,78	€	 5.366.031,97	€	
2056	 5,10	€	 4175,25052	 21.293,78	€	 5.366.031,97	€	
2057	 5,10	€	 4175,25052	 21.293,78	€	 5.366.031,97	€	
2058	 5,10	€	 4175,25052	 21.293,78	€	 5.366.031,97	€	
2059	 5,10	€	 4175,25052	 21.293,78	€	 5.366.031,97	€	








Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2020	 3,10	€	 1700	 5.270,00	€	 1.328.040,00	€	
2021	 3,10	€	 1725,5	 5.349,05	€	 1.347.960,60	€	
2022	 3,10	€	 1751,3825	 5.429,29	€	 1.368.180,01	€	
2023	 3,10	€	 1777,653238	 5.510,73	€	 1.388.702,71	€	
2024	 3,10	€	 1804,318036	 5.593,39	€	 1.409.533,25	€	
2025	 3,10	€	 1831,382807	 5.677,29	€	 1.430.676,25	€	
2026	 3,10	€	 1858,853549	 5.762,45	€	 1.452.136,39	€	
2027	 3,10	€	 1886,736352	 5.848,88	€	 1.473.918,44	€	
2028	 3,10	€	 1915,037397	 5.936,62	€	 1.496.027,21	€	
2029	 3,10	€	 1943,762958	 6.025,67	€	 1.518.467,62	€	
2030	 3,10	€	 1972,919403	 6.116,05	€	 1.541.244,64	€	
2031	 3,10	€	 2002,513194	 6.207,79	€	 1.564.363,31	€	
2032	 3,10	€	 2032,550891	 6.300,91	€	 1.587.828,76	€	
2033	 3,10	€	 2063,039155	 6.395,42	€	 1.611.646,19	€	
2034	 3,10	€	 2093,984742	 6.491,35	€	 1.635.820,88	€	
2035	 3,10	€	 2125,394513	 6.588,72	€	 1.660.358,19	€	
2036	 3,10	€	 2157,275431	 6.687,55	€	 1.685.263,57	€	
2037	 3,10	€	 2189,634562	 6.787,87	€	 1.710.542,52	€	
2038	 3,10	€	 2222,479081	 6.889,69	€	 1.736.200,66	€	
2039	 3,10	€	 2255,816267	 6.993,03	€	 1.762.243,67	€	
2040	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2041	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2042	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2043	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2044	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2045	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2046	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2047	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2048	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2049	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2050	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2051	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2052	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2053	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2054	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2055	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2056	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2057	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2058	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	
2059	 3,10	€	 2289,653511	 7.097,93	€	 1.788.677,32	€	











Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2020	 5,10	€	 2300	 11.730,00	€	 2.955.960,00	€	
2021	 5,10	€	 2334,5	 11.905,95	€	 3.000.299,40	€	
2022	 5,10	€	 2369,5175	 12.084,54	€	 3.045.303,89	€	
2023	 5,10	€	 2405,060263	 12.265,81	€	 3.090.983,45	€	
2024	 5,10	€	 2441,136166	 12.449,79	€	 3.137.348,20	€	
2025	 5,10	€	 2477,753209	 12.636,54	€	 3.184.408,42	€	
2026	 5,10	€	 2514,919507	 12.826,09	€	 3.232.174,55	€	
2027	 5,10	€	 2552,6433	 13.018,48	€	 3.280.657,17	€	
2028	 5,10	€	 2590,932949	 13.213,76	€	 3.329.867,03	€	
2029	 5,10	€	 2629,796943	 13.411,96	€	 3.379.815,03	€	
2030	 5,10	€	 2669,243898	 13.613,14	€	 3.430.512,26	€	
2031	 5,10	€	 2709,282556	 13.817,34	€	 3.481.969,94	€	
2032	 5,10	€	 2749,921794	 14.024,60	€	 3.534.199,49	€	
2033	 5,10	€	 2791,170621	 14.234,97	€	 3.587.212,48	€	
2034	 5,10	€	 2833,038181	 14.448,49	€	 3.641.020,67	€	
2035	 5,10	€	 2875,533753	 14.665,22	€	 3.695.635,98	€	
2036	 5,10	€	 2918,66676	 14.885,20	€	 3.751.070,52	€	
2037	 5,10	€	 2962,446761	 15.108,48	€	 3.807.336,58	€	
2038	 5,10	€	 3006,883462	 15.335,11	€	 3.864.446,63	€	
2039	 5,10	€	 3051,986714	 15.565,13	€	 3.922.413,33	€	
2040	 5,10	€	 3097,766515	 15.798,61	€	 3.981.249,53	€	
2041	 5,10	€	 3097,766515	 15.798,61	€	 3.981.249,53	€	
2042	 5,10	€	 3097,766515	 15.798,61	€	 3.981.249,53	€	
2043	 5,10	€	 3097,766515	 15.798,61	€	 3.981.249,53	€	
2044	 5,10	€	 3097,766515	 15.798,61	€	 3.981.249,53	€	
2045	 5,10	€	 3097,766515	 15.798,61	€	 3.981.249,53	€	
2046	 5,10	€	 3097,766515	 15.798,61	€	 3.981.249,53	€	
2047	 5,10	€	 3097,766515	 15.798,61	€	 3.981.249,53	€	
2048	 5,10	€	 3097,766515	 15.798,61	€	 3.981.249,53	€	
2049	 5,10	€	 3097,766515	 15.798,61	€	 3.981.249,53	€	
2050	 5,10	€	 3097,766515	 15.798,61	€	 3.981.249,53	€	
2051	 5,10	€	 3097,766515	 15.798,61	€	 3.981.249,53	€	
2052	 5,10	€	 3097,766515	 15.798,61	€	 3.981.249,53	€	
2053	 5,10	€	 3097,766515	 15.798,61	€	 3.981.249,53	€	
2054	 5,10	€	 3097,766515	 15.798,61	€	 3.981.249,53	€	
2055	 5,10	€	 3097,766515	 15.798,61	€	 3.981.249,53	€	
2056	 5,10	€	 3097,766515	 15.798,61	€	 3.981.249,53	€	
2057	 5,10	€	 3097,766515	 15.798,61	€	 3.981.249,53	€	
2058	 5,10	€	 3097,766515	 15.798,61	€	 3.981.249,53	€	
2059	 5,10	€	 3097,766515	 15.798,61	€	 3.981.249,53	€	





In the following tables the annual revenues for the long distance passenger transport service are 
reported. 
The PV of long distance passenger transport service revenues is computed through the sum of 
PVs of the annual revenues of the routes. 
	
Roma-Bari	AV	
Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2024	 59,00	€	 6909	 407.631,00	€	 148.785.315,00	€	
2025	 59,00	€	 7012,635	 413.745,47	€	 151.017.094,73	€	
2026	 59,00	€	 7117,824525	 419.951,65	€	 153.282.351,15	€	
2027	 59,00	€	 7224,591893	 426.250,92	€	 155.581.586,41	€	
2028	 59,00	€	 7332,960771	 432.644,69	€	 157.915.310,21	€	
2029	 59,00	€	 7442,955183	 439.134,36	€	 160.284.039,86	€	
2030	 59,00	€	 7554,599511	 445.721,37	€	 162.688.300,46	€	
2031	 59,00	€	 7667,918503	 452.407,19	€	 165.128.624,97	€	
2032	 59,00	€	 7782,937281	 459.193,30	€	 167.605.554,34	€	
2033	 59,00	€	 7899,68134	 466.081,20	€	 170.119.637,66	€	
2034	 59,00	€	 8018,17656	 473.072,42	€	 172.671.432,22	€	
2035	 59,00	€	 8138,449209	 480.168,50	€	 175.261.503,71	€	
2036	 59,00	€	 8260,525947	 487.371,03	€	 177.890.426,26	€	
2037	 59,00	€	 8384,433836	 494.681,60	€	 180.558.782,65	€	
2038	 59,00	€	 8510,200343	 502.101,82	€	 183.267.164,39	€	
2039	 59,00	€	 8637,853349	 509.633,35	€	 186.016.171,86	€	
2040	 59,00	€	 8767,421149	 517.277,85	€	 188.806.414,44	€	
2041	 59,00	€	 8898,932466	 525.037,02	€	 191.638.510,65	€	
2042	 59,00	€	 9032,416453	 532.912,57	€	 194.513.088,31	€	
2043	 59,00	€	 9167,9027	 540.906,26	€	 197.430.784,64	€	
2044	 59,00	€	 9305,42124	 549.019,85	€	 200.392.246,41	€	
2045	 59,00	€	 9305,42124	 549.019,85	€	 200.392.246,41	€	
2046	 59,00	€	 9305,42124	 549.019,85	€	 200.392.246,41	€	
2047	 59,00	€	 9305,42124	 549.019,85	€	 200.392.246,41	€	
2048	 59,00	€	 9305,42124	 549.019,85	€	 200.392.246,41	€	
2049	 59,00	€	 9305,42124	 549.019,85	€	 200.392.246,41	€	
2050	 59,00	€	 9305,42124	 549.019,85	€	 200.392.246,41	€	
2051	 59,00	€	 9305,42124	 549.019,85	€	 200.392.246,41	€	
2052	 59,00	€	 9305,42124	 549.019,85	€	 200.392.246,41	€	
2053	 59,00	€	 9305,42124	 549.019,85	€	 200.392.246,41	€	
2054	 59,00	€	 9305,42124	 549.019,85	€	 200.392.246,41	€	
2055	 59,00	€	 9305,42124	 549.019,85	€	 200.392.246,41	€	
2056	 59,00	€	 9305,42124	 549.019,85	€	 200.392.246,41	€	
2057	 59,00	€	 9305,42124	 549.019,85	€	 200.392.246,41	€	
2058	 59,00	€	 9305,42124	 549.019,85	€	 200.392.246,41	€	
2059	 59,00	€	 9305,42124	 549.019,85	€	 200.392.246,41	€	









Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2024	 159,00	€	 2590	 411.810,00	€	 150.310.650,00	€	
2025	 159,00	€	 2628,85	 417.987,15	€	 152.565.309,75	€	
2026	 159,00	€	 2668,28275	 424.256,96	€	 154.853.789,40	€	
2027	 159,00	€	 2708,306991	 430.620,81	€	 157.176.596,24	€	
2028	 159,00	€	 2748,931596	 437.080,12	€	 159.534.245,18	€	
2029	 159,00	€	 2790,16557	 443.636,33	€	 161.927.258,86	€	
2030	 159,00	€	 2832,018054	 450.290,87	€	 164.356.167,74	€	
2031	 159,00	€	 2874,498324	 457.045,23	€	 166.821.510,26	€	
2032	 159,00	€	 2917,615799	 463.900,91	€	 169.323.832,91	€	
2033	 159,00	€	 2961,380036	 470.859,43	€	 171.863.690,40	€	
2034	 159,00	€	 3005,800737	 477.922,32	€	 174.441.645,76	€	
2035	 159,00	€	 3050,887748	 485.091,15	€	 177.058.270,45	€	
2036	 159,00	€	 3096,651064	 492.367,52	€	 179.714.144,50	€	
2037	 159,00	€	 3143,10083	 499.753,03	€	 182.409.856,67	€	
2038	 159,00	€	 3190,247342	 507.249,33	€	 185.146.004,52	€	
2039	 159,00	€	 3238,101053	 514.858,07	€	 187.923.194,59	€	
2040	 159,00	€	 3286,672568	 522.580,94	€	 190.742.042,51	€	
2041	 159,00	€	 3335,972657	 530.419,65	€	 193.603.173,15	€	
2042	 159,00	€	 3386,012247	 538.375,95	€	 196.507.220,74	€	
2043	 159,00	€	 3436,802431	 546.451,59	€	 199.454.829,05	€	
2044	 159,00	€	 3488,354467	 554.648,36	€	 202.446.651,49	€	
2045	 159,00	€	 3488,354467	 554.648,36	€	 202.446.651,49	€	
2046	 159,00	€	 3488,354467	 554.648,36	€	 202.446.651,49	€	
2047	 159,00	€	 3488,354467	 554.648,36	€	 202.446.651,49	€	
2048	 159,00	€	 3488,354467	 554.648,36	€	 202.446.651,49	€	
2049	 159,00	€	 3488,354467	 554.648,36	€	 202.446.651,49	€	
2050	 159,00	€	 3488,354467	 554.648,36	€	 202.446.651,49	€	
2051	 159,00	€	 3488,354467	 554.648,36	€	 202.446.651,49	€	
2052	 159,00	€	 3488,354467	 554.648,36	€	 202.446.651,49	€	
2053	 159,00	€	 3488,354467	 554.648,36	€	 202.446.651,49	€	
2054	 159,00	€	 3488,354467	 554.648,36	€	 202.446.651,49	€	
2055	 159,00	€	 3488,354467	 554.648,36	€	 202.446.651,49	€	
2056	 159,00	€	 3488,354467	 554.648,36	€	 202.446.651,49	€	
2057	 159,00	€	 3488,354467	 554.648,36	€	 202.446.651,49	€	
2058	 159,00	€	 3488,354467	 554.648,36	€	 202.446.651,49	€	
2059	 159,00	€	 3488,354467	 554.648,36	€	 202.446.651,49	€	









Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2024	 47,10	€	 3750	 176.625,00	€	 64.468.125,00	€	
2025	 47,10	€	 3806,25	 179.274,38	€	 65.435.146,88	€	
2026	 47,10	€	 3863,34375	 181.963,49	€	 66.416.674,08	€	
2027	 47,10	€	 3921,293906	 184.692,94	€	 67.412.924,19	€	
2028	 47,10	€	 3980,113315	 187.463,34	€	 68.424.118,05	€	
2029	 47,10	€	 4039,815015	 190.275,29	€	 69.450.479,82	€	
2030	 47,10	€	 4100,41224	 193.129,42	€	 70.492.237,02	€	
2031	 47,10	€	 4161,918423	 196.026,36	€	 71.549.620,58	€	
2032	 47,10	€	 4224,3472	 198.966,75	€	 72.622.864,88	€	
2033	 47,10	€	 4287,712408	 201.951,25	€	 73.712.207,86	€	
2034	 47,10	€	 4352,028094	 204.980,52	€	 74.817.890,98	€	
2035	 47,10	€	 4417,308515	 208.055,23	€	 75.940.159,34	€	
2036	 47,10	€	 4483,568143	 211.176,06	€	 77.079.261,73	€	
2037	 47,10	€	 4550,821665	 214.343,70	€	 78.235.450,66	€	
2038	 47,10	€	 4619,08399	 217.558,86	€	 79.408.982,42	€	
2039	 47,10	€	 4688,37025	 220.822,24	€	 80.600.117,15	€	
2040	 47,10	€	 4758,695804	 224.134,57	€	 81.809.118,91	€	
2041	 47,10	€	 4830,076241	 227.496,59	€	 83.036.255,69	€	
2042	 47,10	€	 4902,527384	 230.909,04	€	 84.281.799,53	€	
2043	 47,10	€	 4976,065295	 234.372,68	€	 85.546.026,52	€	
2044	 47,10	€	 5050,706275	 237.888,27	€	 86.829.216,92	€	
2045	 47,10	€	 5050,706275	 237.888,27	€	 86.829.216,92	€	
2046	 47,10	€	 5050,706275	 237.888,27	€	 86.829.216,92	€	
2047	 47,10	€	 5050,706275	 237.888,27	€	 86.829.216,92	€	
2048	 47,10	€	 5050,706275	 237.888,27	€	 86.829.216,92	€	
2049	 47,10	€	 5050,706275	 237.888,27	€	 86.829.216,92	€	
2050	 47,10	€	 5050,706275	 237.888,27	€	 86.829.216,92	€	
2051	 47,10	€	 5050,706275	 237.888,27	€	 86.829.216,92	€	
2052	 47,10	€	 5050,706275	 237.888,27	€	 86.829.216,92	€	
2053	 47,10	€	 5050,706275	 237.888,27	€	 86.829.216,92	€	
2054	 47,10	€	 5050,706275	 237.888,27	€	 86.829.216,92	€	
2055	 47,10	€	 5050,706275	 237.888,27	€	 86.829.216,92	€	
2056	 47,10	€	 5050,706275	 237.888,27	€	 86.829.216,92	€	
2057	 47,10	€	 5050,706275	 237.888,27	€	 86.829.216,92	€	
2058	 47,10	€	 5050,706275	 237.888,27	€	 86.829.216,92	€	
2059	 47,10	€	 5050,706275	 237.888,27	€	 86.829.216,92	€	









Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2024	 49,00	€	 2200	 107.800,00	€	 39.347.000,00	€	
2025	 49,00	€	 2233	 109.417,00	€	 39.937.205,00	€	
2026	 49,00	€	 2266,495	 111.058,26	€	 40.536.263,08	€	
2027	 49,00	€	 2300,492425	 112.724,13	€	 41.144.307,02	€	
2028	 49,00	€	 2334,999811	 114.414,99	€	 41.761.471,63	€	
2029	 49,00	€	 2370,024809	 116.131,22	€	 42.387.893,70	€	
2030	 49,00	€	 2405,575181	 117.873,18	€	 43.023.712,11	€	
2031	 49,00	€	 2441,658808	 119.641,28	€	 43.669.067,79	€	
2032	 49,00	€	 2478,283691	 121.435,90	€	 44.324.103,80	€	
2033	 49,00	€	 2515,457946	 123.257,44	€	 44.988.965,36	€	
2034	 49,00	€	 2553,189815	 125.106,30	€	 45.663.799,84	€	
2035	 49,00	€	 2591,487662	 126.982,90	€	 46.348.756,84	€	
2036	 49,00	€	 2630,359977	 128.887,64	€	 47.043.988,19	€	
2037	 49,00	€	 2669,815377	 130.820,95	€	 47.749.648,02	€	
2038	 49,00	€	 2709,862608	 132.783,27	€	 48.465.892,74	€	
2039	 49,00	€	 2750,510547	 134.775,02	€	 49.192.881,13	€	
2040	 49,00	€	 2791,768205	 136.796,64	€	 49.930.774,34	€	
2041	 49,00	€	 2833,644728	 138.848,59	€	 50.679.735,96	€	
2042	 49,00	€	 2876,149399	 140.931,32	€	 51.439.932,00	€	
2043	 49,00	€	 2919,29164	 143.045,29	€	 52.211.530,98	€	
2044	 49,00	€	 2963,081014	 145.190,97	€	 52.994.703,94	€	
2045	 49,00	€	 2963,081014	 145.190,97	€	 52.994.703,94	€	
2046	 49,00	€	 2963,081014	 145.190,97	€	 52.994.703,94	€	
2047	 49,00	€	 2963,081014	 145.190,97	€	 52.994.703,94	€	
2048	 49,00	€	 2963,081014	 145.190,97	€	 52.994.703,94	€	
2049	 49,00	€	 2963,081014	 145.190,97	€	 52.994.703,94	€	
2050	 49,00	€	 2963,081014	 145.190,97	€	 52.994.703,94	€	
2051	 49,00	€	 2963,081014	 145.190,97	€	 52.994.703,94	€	
2052	 49,00	€	 2963,081014	 145.190,97	€	 52.994.703,94	€	
2053	 49,00	€	 2963,081014	 145.190,97	€	 52.994.703,94	€	
2054	 49,00	€	 2963,081014	 145.190,97	€	 52.994.703,94	€	
2055	 49,00	€	 2963,081014	 145.190,97	€	 52.994.703,94	€	
2056	 49,00	€	 2963,081014	 145.190,97	€	 52.994.703,94	€	
2057	 49,00	€	 2963,081014	 145.190,97	€	 52.994.703,94	€	
2058	 49,00	€	 2963,081014	 145.190,97	€	 52.994.703,94	€	
2059	 49,00	€	 2963,081014	 145.190,97	€	 52.994.703,94	€	










Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2024	 31,50	€	 200	 6.300,00	€	 2.299.500,00	€	
2025	 31,50	€	 203	 6.394,50	€	 2.333.992,50	€	
2026	 31,50	€	 206,045	 6.490,42	€	 2.369.002,39	€	
2027	 31,50	€	 209,135675	 6.587,77	€	 2.404.537,42	€	
2028	 31,50	€	 212,2727101	 6.686,59	€	 2.440.605,48	€	
2029	 31,50	€	 215,4568008	 6.786,89	€	 2.477.214,57	€	
2030	 31,50	€	 218,6886528	 6.888,69	€	 2.514.372,79	€	
2031	 31,50	€	 221,9689826	 6.992,02	€	 2.552.088,38	€	
2032	 31,50	€	 225,2985173	 7.096,90	€	 2.590.369,70	€	
2033	 31,50	€	 228,6779951	 7.203,36	€	 2.629.225,25	€	
2034	 31,50	€	 232,108165	 7.311,41	€	 2.668.663,63	€	
2035	 31,50	€	 235,5897875	 7.421,08	€	 2.708.693,58	€	
2036	 31,50	€	 239,1236343	 7.532,39	€	 2.749.323,99	€	
2037	 31,50	€	 242,7104888	 7.645,38	€	 2.790.563,85	€	
2038	 31,50	€	 246,3511461	 7.760,06	€	 2.832.422,30	€	
2039	 31,50	€	 250,0464133	 7.876,46	€	 2.874.908,64	€	
2040	 31,50	€	 253,7971095	 7.994,61	€	 2.918.032,27	€	
2041	 31,50	€	 257,6040662	 8.114,53	€	 2.961.802,75	€	
2042	 31,50	€	 261,4681272	 8.236,25	€	 3.006.229,79	€	
2043	 31,50	€	 265,3901491	 8.359,79	€	 3.051.323,24	€	
2044	 31,50	€	 269,3710013	 8.485,19	€	 3.097.093,09	€	
2045	 31,50	€	 269,3710013	 8.485,19	€	 3.097.093,09	€	
2046	 31,50	€	 269,3710013	 8.485,19	€	 3.097.093,09	€	
2047	 31,50	€	 269,3710013	 8.485,19	€	 3.097.093,09	€	
2048	 31,50	€	 269,3710013	 8.485,19	€	 3.097.093,09	€	
2049	 31,50	€	 269,3710013	 8.485,19	€	 3.097.093,09	€	
2050	 31,50	€	 269,3710013	 8.485,19	€	 3.097.093,09	€	
2051	 31,50	€	 269,3710013	 8.485,19	€	 3.097.093,09	€	
2052	 31,50	€	 269,3710013	 8.485,19	€	 3.097.093,09	€	
2053	 31,50	€	 269,3710013	 8.485,19	€	 3.097.093,09	€	
2054	 31,50	€	 269,3710013	 8.485,19	€	 3.097.093,09	€	
2055	 31,50	€	 269,3710013	 8.485,19	€	 3.097.093,09	€	
2056	 31,50	€	 269,3710013	 8.485,19	€	 3.097.093,09	€	
2057	 31,50	€	 269,3710013	 8.485,19	€	 3.097.093,09	€	
2058	 31,50	€	 269,3710013	 8.485,19	€	 3.097.093,09	€	
2059	 31,50	€	 269,3710013	 8.485,19	€	 3.097.093,09	€	










Year	 Price	 Passengers/day	 Revenues/day	 Revenues/year	
2024	 34,60	€	 3200	 110.720,00	€	 40.412.800,00	€	
2025	 34,60	€	 3248	 112.380,80	€	 41.018.992,00	€	
2026	 34,60	€	 3296,72	 114.066,51	€	 41.634.276,88	€	
2027	 34,60	€	 3346,1708	 115.777,51	€	 42.258.791,03	€	
2028	 34,60	€	 3396,363362	 117.514,17	€	 42.892.672,90	€	
2029	 34,60	€	 3447,308812	 119.276,88	€	 43.536.062,99	€	
2030	 34,60	€	 3499,018445	 121.066,04	€	 44.189.103,94	€	
2031	 34,60	€	 3551,503721	 122.882,03	€	 44.851.940,50	€	
2032	 34,60	€	 3604,776277	 124.725,26	€	 45.524.719,60	€	
2033	 34,60	€	 3658,847921	 126.596,14	€	 46.207.590,40	€	
2034	 34,60	€	 3713,73064	 128.495,08	€	 46.900.704,25	€	
2035	 34,60	€	 3769,4366	 130.422,51	€	 47.604.214,82	€	
2036	 34,60	€	 3825,978149	 132.378,84	€	 48.318.278,04	€	
2037	 34,60	€	 3883,367821	 134.364,53	€	 49.043.052,21	€	
2038	 34,60	€	 3941,618338	 136.379,99	€	 49.778.697,99	€	
2039	 34,60	€	 4000,742613	 138.425,69	€	 50.525.378,46	€	
2040	 34,60	€	 4060,753752	 140.502,08	€	 51.283.259,14	€	
2041	 34,60	€	 4121,665059	 142.609,61	€	 52.052.508,03	€	
2042	 34,60	€	 4183,490035	 144.748,76	€	 52.833.295,65	€	
2043	 34,60	€	 4246,242385	 146.919,99	€	 53.625.795,08	€	
2044	 34,60	€	 4309,936021	 149.123,79	€	 54.430.182,01	€	
2045	 34,60	€	 4309,936021	 149.123,79	€	 54.430.182,01	€	
2046	 34,60	€	 4309,936021	 149.123,79	€	 54.430.182,01	€	
2047	 34,60	€	 4309,936021	 149.123,79	€	 54.430.182,01	€	
2048	 34,60	€	 4309,936021	 149.123,79	€	 54.430.182,01	€	
2049	 34,60	€	 4309,936021	 149.123,79	€	 54.430.182,01	€	
2050	 34,60	€	 4309,936021	 149.123,79	€	 54.430.182,01	€	
2051	 34,60	€	 4309,936021	 149.123,79	€	 54.430.182,01	€	
2052	 34,60	€	 4309,936021	 149.123,79	€	 54.430.182,01	€	
2053	 34,60	€	 4309,936021	 149.123,79	€	 54.430.182,01	€	
2054	 34,60	€	 4309,936021	 149.123,79	€	 54.430.182,01	€	
2055	 34,60	€	 4309,936021	 149.123,79	€	 54.430.182,01	€	
2056	 34,60	€	 4309,936021	 149.123,79	€	 54.430.182,01	€	
2057	 34,60	€	 4309,936021	 149.123,79	€	 54.430.182,01	€	
2058	 34,60	€	 4309,936021	 149.123,79	€	 54.430.182,01	€	
2059	 34,60	€	 4309,936021	 149.123,79	€	 54.430.182,01	€	








In the following tables the annual revenues for the freight transport service are reported. 
	
Napoli-Bari	freight	transport	services	
Year	 Price/km	 Km	 Wagons/year	 Annual	revenues	
2024	 3,8	 300	 85000	 96.900.000,00	€	
2025	 3,8	 300	 86275	 98.353.500,00	€	
2026	 3,8	 300	 87569,125	 99.828.802,50	€	
2027	 3,8	 300	 88882,66188	 101.326.234,54	€	
2028	 3,8	 300	 90215,9018	 102.846.128,06	€	
2029	 3,8	 300	 91569,14033	 104.388.819,98	€	
2030	 3,8	 300	 92942,67744	 105.954.652,28	€	
2031	 3,8	 300	 94336,8176	 107.543.972,06	€	
2032	 3,8	 300	 95751,86986	 109.157.131,64	€	
2033	 3,8	 300	 97188,14791	 110.794.488,62	€	
2034	 3,8	 300	 98645,97013	 112.456.405,94	€	
2035	 3,8	 300	 100125,6597	 114.143.252,03	€	
2036	 3,8	 300	 101627,5446	 115.855.400,81	€	
2037	 3,8	 300	 103151,9577	 117.593.231,83	€	
2038	 3,8	 300	 104699,2371	 119.357.130,30	€	
2039	 3,8	 300	 106269,7257	 121.147.487,26	€	
2040	 3,8	 300	 107863,7716	 122.964.699,57	€	
2041	 3,8	 300	 109481,7281	 124.809.170,06	€	
2042	 3,8	 300	 111123,954	 126.681.307,61	€	
2043	 3,8	 300	 112790,8134	 128.581.527,23	€	
2044	 3,8	 300	 114482,6756	 130.510.250,13	€	
2045	 3,8	 300	 114482,6756	 130.510.250,13	€	
2046	 3,8	 300	 114482,6756	 130.510.250,13	€	
2047	 3,8	 300	 114482,6756	 130.510.250,13	€	
2048	 3,8	 300	 114482,6756	 130.510.250,13	€	
2049	 3,8	 300	 114482,6756	 130.510.250,13	€	
2050	 3,8	 300	 114482,6756	 130.510.250,13	€	
2051	 3,8	 300	 114482,6756	 130.510.250,13	€	
2052	 3,8	 300	 114482,6756	 130.510.250,13	€	
2053	 3,8	 300	 114482,6756	 130.510.250,13	€	
2054	 3,8	 300	 114482,6756	 130.510.250,13	€	
2055	 3,8	 300	 114482,6756	 130.510.250,13	€	
2056	 3,8	 300	 114482,6756	 130.510.250,13	€	
2057	 3,8	 300	 114482,6756	 130.510.250,13	€	
2058	 3,8	 300	 114482,6756	 130.510.250,13	€	
2059	 3,8	 300	 114482,6756	 130.510.250,13	€	















2016	 0,00	€	 0,00	€	 0,00	€	
2017	 0,00	€	 0,00	€	 0,00	€	
2018	 0,00	€	 0,00	€	 0,00	€	
2019	 0,00	€	 0,00	€	 0,00	€	
2020	 0,00	€	 15,80	€	 0,00	€	
2021	 0,00	€	 15,80	€	 0,00	€	
2022	 0,00	€	 15,80	€	 0,00	€	
2023	 0,00	€	 15,80	€	 0,00	€	
2024	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2025	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2026	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2027	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2028	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2029	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2030	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2031	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2032	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2033	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2034	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2035	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2036	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2037	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2038	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2039	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2040	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2041	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2042	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2043	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2044	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2045	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2046	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2047	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2048	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2049	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2050	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2051	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2052	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2053	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2054	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2055	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2056	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2057	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2058	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	
2059	 89,18	€	 232,37	€	 46,31	€	





In this section the values of the comparative static analysis are reported.  
The number of the tables accompanied by the letter A refer to the numbers of the plots in the 
thesis (for example the table 21 A refers to the plot 21 in the thesis). 
All the numbers are expressed in millions of Euros unless otherwise specified. 
	
§ Example 1 (´ = œ%) 
• Hypothesis 1: investment costs sustained entirely by the Private Company 
	
Table	21	A	
P	 0	 50	 100	 150	 200	 250	 297,93	
>á	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
" > 	 15.017,4	 15.898,35	 16.779,3	 17.660,26	 18.541,25	 19.422,16	 20.266,71	
>ù	 224,1	 274,36	 324,62	 374,88	 425,14	 475,4	 523,58	
"ù > 	 8.170,46	 7.289,5	 6.408,55	 5.527,6	 4.646,65	 3.765,7	 2.921,15	
V	
project	




w	S	 w	P	 !∗ß	 >á	 " > 	 >ù	 "ù > 	 V	project	
1	 0	 0	 0	 15.017,4	 224,1	 8.170,46	 23.187,86	
0,9	 0,1	 0	 0	 15.017,4	 224,1	 8.170,46	 23.187,86	
0,8	 0,2	 0	 0	 15.017,4	 224,1	 8.170,46	 23.187,86	
0,7	 0,3	 0	 0	 15.017,4	 224,1	 8.170,46	 23.187,86	
0,6	 0,4	 0	 0	 15.017,4	 224,1	 8.170,46	 23.187,86	
0,5	 0,5	 0	 0	 15.017,4	 224,1	 8.170,46	 23.187,86	
0,4	 0,6	 0	 0	 15.017,4	 224,1	 8.170,46	 23.187,86	
0,3	 0,7	 0	 0	 15.017,4	 224,1	 8.170,46	 23.187,86	
0,2	 0,8	 1.440,71	 0	 40.401,35	 1.672,27	 76,05	 40.477,4	
0,1	 0,9	 3.345,01	 0	 73.953,24	 3.586,43	 20.009,35	 93.962,58	











• Hypothesis 2: investment costs sustained for the 75% by the Private Company and for 
25% by the State	
	
Table	23	A	
P	 0	 100	 200	 300	 353,67	
>á	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
" > 	 14.035,36	 15.797,27	 17.559,17	 19.321,07	 20.266,71	
>ù	 168,08	 268,6	 369,11	 469,63	 523,58	
"ù > 	 9.152,49	 7.390,59	 5.628,69	 3.866,78	 2.921,15	




w	S	 w	P	 !∗ß	 >á	 " > 	 >ù	 "ù > 	 V	project	
1	 0	 0	 0	 14.035,36	 168,08	 9.152,49	 23.187,86	
0,9	 0,1	 0	 0	 14.035,36	 168,08	 9.152,49	 23.187,86	
0,8	 0,2	 0	 0	 14.035,36	 168,08	 9.152,49	 23.187,86	
0,7	 0,3	 0	 0	 14.035,36	 168,08	 9.152,49	 23.187,86	
0,6	 0,4	 0	 0	 14.035,36	 168,08	 9.152,49	 23.187,86	
0,5	 0,5	 0	 0	 14.035,36	 168,08	 9.152,49	 23.187,86	
0,4	 0,6	 0	 0	 14.035,36	 168,08	 9.152,49	 23.187,86	
0,3	 0,7	 0	 0	 14.035,36	 168,08	 9.152,49	 23.187,86	
0,2	 0,8	 1.440,71	 0	 39.419,31	 1.616,25	 84,64	 39.503,96	
0,1	 0,9	 3.345,01	 0	 72.971,2	 3.530,41	 19.696,77	 92.667,97	






















• Hypothesis 3: investment costs sustained for the 50% by the Private Company and for 
50% by the State	
	
Table	25	A	
P	 0	 100	 200	 300	 409,41	
>á	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
" > 	 13.053,33	 14.815,23	 16.577,13	 18.339,04	 20.266,71	
>ù	 112,05	 212,57	 313,09	 413,6	 523,58	














w	S	 w	P	 !∗ß	 >á	 " > 	 >ù	 "ù > 	 V	project	
1	 0	 0	 0	 13.053,33	 112,05	 10.134,53	 23.187,86	
0,9	 0,1	 0	 0	 13.053,33	 112,05	 10.134,53	 23.187,86	
0,8	 0,2	 0	 0	 13.053,33	 112,05	 10.134,53	 23.187,86	
0,7	 0,3	 0	 0	 13.053,33	 112,05	 10.134,53	 23.187,86	
0,6	 0,4	 0	 0	 13.053,33	 112,05	 10.134,53	 23.187,86	
0,5	 0,5	 0	 0	 13.053,33	 112,05	 10.134,53	 23.187,86	
0,4	 0,6	 0	 0	 13.053,33	 112,05	 10.134,53	 23.187,86	
0,3	 0,7	 0	 0	 13.053,33	 112,05	 10.134,53	 23.187,86	
0,2	 0,8	 1.440,71	 0	 38.437,27	 1.560,22	 94,57	 38.531,84	
0,1	 0,9	 3.345,01	 0	 71.989,16	 3.474,38	 19.384,19	 91.373,35	






















• Hypothesis 4: investment costs sustained for the 25% by the Private Company and for 
75% by the State	
	
Table	27	A	
P	 0	 100	 200	 300	 400	 465,15	
>á	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
" > 	 12.071,29	 13.833,19	 15.595,1	 17.357	 19.118,9	 20.266,71	
>ù	 56,03	 156,54	 257,06	 357,58	 458,1	 523,58	


















w	S	 w	P	 !∗ß	 >á	 " > 	 >ù	 "ù > 	 V	project	
1	 0	 0	 0	 12.071,29	 56,03	 11.116,57	 23.187,86	
0,9	 0,1	 0	 0	 12.071,29	 56,03	 11.116,57	 23.187,86	
0,8	 0,2	 0	 0	 12.071,29	 56,03	 11.116,57	 23.187,86	
0,7	 0,3	 0	 0	 12.071,29	 56,03	 11.116,57	 23.187,86	
0,6	 0,4	 0	 0	 12.071,29	 56,03	 11.116,57	 23.187,86	
0,5	 0,5	 0	 0	 12.071,29	 56,03	 11.116,57	 23.187,86	
0,4	 0,6	 0	 0	 12.071,29	 56,03	 11.116,57	 23.187,86	
0,3	 0,7	 0	 0	 12.071,29	 56,03	 11.116,57	 23.187,86	
0,2	 0,8	 1.440,71	 0	 37.455,24	 1.504,2	 106,08	 37.561,32	
0,1	 0,9	 3.345,01	 0	 71.007,12	 3.418,35	 19.071,61	 90.078,74	




















• Hypothesis 5: investment costs sustained entirely by the State 
	
Table	29	A	
P	 0	 100	 200	 300	 400	 500	 520,88	
>á	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
" > 	 11.089,25	 12.851,15	 14.613,06	 16.374,96	 18.136,86	 19.898,77	 20.266,71	
>ù	 0	 100,52	 201,04	 301,55	 402,07	 502,59	 523,58	




















w	S	 w	P	 !∗ß	 >á	 " > 	 >ù	 "ù > 	 V	project	
1	 0	 0	 0	 11.089,25	 0	 12.098,61	 23.187,86	
0,9	 0,1	 0	 0	 11.089,25	 0	 12.098,61	 23.187,86	
0,8	 0,2	 0	 0	 11.089,25	 0	 12.098,61	 23.187,86	
0,7	 0,3	 0	 0	 11.089,25	 0	 12.098,61	 23.187,86	
0,6	 0,4	 0	 0	 11.089,25	 0	 12.098,61	 23.187,86	
0,5	 0,5	 0	 0	 11.089,25	 0	 12.098,61	 23.187,86	
0,4	 0,6	 0	 0	 11.089,25	 0	 12.098,61	 23.187,86	
0,3	 0,7	 0	 0	 11.089,25	 0	 12.098,61	 23.187,86	
0,2	 0,8	 1.440,71	 0	 36.473,2	 1.448,17	 495	 36.968,2	
0,1	 0,9	 3.345,01	 0	 70.025,09	 3.362,33	 52.310,92	 122.336,01	






















§ Example 2 (´ = –%) 
• Hypothesis 1: investment costs sustained entirely by the Private Company 
	
Table	31	A	
P	 0		 50	 100	 150	 200	 249,17	
>á	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
" > 	 8.008,12	 8.730,91	 9.453,69	 10.176,47	 10.899,26	 11.610,09	
>ù	 273,13	 323,39	 373,64	 423,9	 474,15	 523,58	
"ù > 	 5.064,5	 4.341,71	 3.618,93	 2.896,14	 2.173,36	 1.462,53	




w	S	 w	P	 !∗ß	 >á	 " > 	 >ù	 "ù > 	 V	project	
1	 0	 0	 0	 8.008,12	 273,12	 5.064,5	 13.072,62	
0,9	 0,1	 0	 0	 8.008,12	 273,12	 5.064,5	 13.072,62	
0,8	 0,2	 0	 0	 8.008,12	 273,12	 5.064,5	 13.072,62	
0,7	 0,3	 0	 0	 8.008,12	 273,12	 5.064,5	 13.072,62	
0,6	 0,4	 0	 0	 8.008,12	 273,12	 5.064,5	 13.072,62	
0,5	 0,5	 0	 0	 8.008,12	 273,12	 5.064,5	 13.072,62	
0,4	 0,6	 0	 0	 8.008,12	 273,12	 5.064,5	 13.072,62	
0,3	 0,7	 186,05	 0	 10.697,6	 460,13	 2.375,02	 13.072,62	
0,2	 0,8	 1.324,69	 0	 27.157,41	 1.604,6	 4,58	 27.161,99	
0,1	 0,9	 2.463,33	 0	 43.617,22	 2.749,08	 7.679,06	 51.296,28	
















• Hypothesis 2: investment costs sustained for the 75% by the Private Company and for 
25% by the State	
	
Table	33	A	
	 P	 0		 100	 200	 300	 317,11	
>á	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
" > 	 7.026,08	 8.471,65	 9.917,22	 11.362,79	 11.610,09	
>ù	 204,85	 305,36	 405,87	 506,38	 523,58	














w	S	 w	P	 !∗ß	 >á	 " > 	 >ù	 "ù > 	 V	project	
1	 0	 0	 0	 7.026,08	 204,85	 6046,53	 13.072,62	
0,9	 0,1	 0	 0	 7.026,08	 204,85	 6046,53	 13.072,62	
0,8	 0,2	 0	 0	 7.026,08	 204,85	 6046,53	 13.072,62	
0,7	 0,3	 0	 0	 7.026,08	 204,85	 6046,53	 13.072,62	
0,6	 0,4	 0	 0	 7.026,08	 204,85	 6046,53	 13.072,62	
0,5	 0,5	 0	 0	 7.026,08	 204,85	 6046,53	 13.072,62	
0,4	 0,6	 0	 0	 7.026,08	 204,85	 6046,53	 13.072,62	
0,3	 0,7	 186,05	 0	 9.715,56	 391,85	 3357,05	 13.072,62	
0,2	 0,8	 1.324,69	 0	 26.175,37	 1.536,32	 5,73	 26.181,1	
0,1	 0,9	 2.463,33	 0	 42.635,18	 2.680,80	 7.488,33	 50.123,5	



















• Hypothesis 3: investment costs sustained for the 50% by the Private Company and for 
50% by the State	
	
Table	35	A	
P	 0		 100	 200	 300	 385,04	
>á	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
" > 	 6.044,05	 7.489,61	 8.935,18	 10.380,75	 11.610,09	
>ù	 136,56	 237,08	 337,59	 438,10	 523,58	














w	S	 w	P	 !∗ß	 >á	 " > 	 >ù	 "ù > 	 V	project	
1	 0	 0	 0	 6.044,05	 136,56	 7.028,57	 13.072,62	
0,9	 0,1	 0	 0	 6.044,05	 136,56	 7.028,57	 13.072,62	
0,8	 0,2	 0	 0	 6.044,05	 136,56	 7.028,57	 13.072,62	
0,7	 0,3	 0	 0	 6.044,05	 136,56	 7.028,57	 13.072,62	
0,6	 0,4	 0	 0	 6.044,05	 136,56	 7.028,57	 13.072,62	
0,5	 0,5	 0	 0	 6.044,05	 136,56	 7.028,57	 13.072,62	
0,4	 0,6	 0	 0	 6.044,05	 136,56	 7.028,57	 13.072,62	
0,3	 0,7	 186,05	 0	 8.733,52	 323,57	 4.339,09	 13.072,62	
0,2	 0,8	 1.324,69	 0	 25.193,33	 1.468,04	 7,24	 25.200,57	
0,1	 0,9	 2.463,33	 0	 41.653,14	 2.612,52	 7.297,59	 48.950,73	






















• Hypothesis 4: investment costs sustained for the 25% by the Private Company and for 
75% by the State	
	
Table	37	A	
P	 0		 100	 200	 300	 400	 452,98	
>á	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
" > 	 5.062,01	 6.507,58	 7.953,14	 9.398,71	 10.844,28	 11.610,09	
>ù	 68,28	 168,79	 269,31	 369,82	 470,33	 523,58	
















w	S	 w	P	 !∗ß	 >á	 " > 	 >ù	 "ù > 	 V	project	
1	 0	 0	 0	 5.062,01	 68,28	 8.010,61	 13.072,62	
0,9	 0,1	 0	 0	 5.062,01	 68,28	 8.010,61	 13.072,62	
0,8	 0,2	 0	 0	 5.062,01	 68,28	 8.010,61	 13.072,62	
0,7	 0,3	 0	 0	 5.062,01	 68,28	 8.010,61	 13.072,62	
0,6	 0,4	 0	 0	 5.062,01	 68,28	 8.010,61	 13.072,62	
0,5	 0,5	 0	 0	 5.062,01	 68,28	 8.010,61	 13.072,62	
0,4	 0,6	 0	 0	 5.062,01	 68,28	 8.010,61	 13.072,62	
0,3	 0,7	 186,05	 0	 7.751,49	 255,29	 5.321,13	 13.072,62	
0,2	 0,8	 1.324,69	 0	 24.211,29	 1.399,76	 9,25	 24.220,55	
0,1	 0,9	 2.463,33	 0	 40.671,1	 2.544,23	 7.106,86	 47.777,96	

















• Hypothesis 5: investment costs sustained entirely by the State 
	
Table	39	A	
P	 0		 100	 200	 300	 400	 500	 520,91	
>á	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
" > 	 4.079,97	 5.525,54	 6.971,11	 8.416,67	 9.862,24	 11.307,81	 11.610,09	
>ù	 0	 										
100,51	
201,02	 301,54	 402,05	 502,56	 523,58	



















w	S	 w	P	 !∗ß	 >á	 " > 	 >ù	 "ù > 	 V	project	
1	 0	 0	 0	 4.079,97	 0	 8.992,65	 13.072,62	
0,9	 0,1	 0	 0	 4.079,97	 0	 8.992,65	 13.072,62	
0,8	 0,2	 0	 0	 4.079,97	 0	 8.992,65	 13.072,62	
0,7	 0,3	 0	 0	 4.079,97	 0	 8.992,65	 13.072,62	
0,6	 0,4	 0	 0	 4.079,97	 0	 8.992,65	 13.072,62	
0,5	 0,5	 0	 0	 4.079,97	 0	 8.992,65	 13.072,62	
0,4	 0,6	 0	 0	 4.079,97	 0	 8.992,65	 13.072,62	
0,3	 0,7	 186,05	 0	 6.769,45	 187	 6.303,17	 13.072,62	
0,2	 0,8	 1.324,69	 0	 23.229,26	 1.331,48	 64,94	 23.294,2	
0,1	 0,9	 2.463,33	 0	 39.689,07	 2.475,95	 23.375,93	 63.064,99	

























§ Example 3 (™ = ≥“%) 
• Hypothesis 1: investment costs sustained entirely by the Private Company 
	
Table	41	A	
P	 0		 50	 100	 150	 165,97	
>á	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
" > 	 10.517,78	 11.319,87	 12.121,97	 12.924,06	 13.180,31	
>ù	 312,06	 375,78	 439,5	 503,22	 523,58	
"ù > 	 6.441,44	 5.639,35	 4.837,25	 4.035,16	 3.778,9	
V	project	 16.959,22	 16.959,22	 16.959,22	 16.959,22	 16.959,22	
	
Table	42	A	
w	S	 w	P	 !∗ß	 >á	 " > 	 >ù	 "ù > 	 V	project	
1	 0	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 312,06	 6.441,44	 16.959,22	
0,9	 0,1	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 312,06	 6.441,44	 16.959,22	
0,8	 0,2	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 312,06	 6.441,44	 16.959,22	
0,7	 0,3	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 312,06	 6.441,44	 16.959,22	
0,6	 0,4	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 312,06	 6.441,44	 16.959,22	
0,5	 0,5	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 312,06	 6.441,44	 16.959,22	
0,4	 0,6	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 312,06	 6.441,44	 16.959,22	
0,3	 0,7	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 312,06	 6.441,44	 16.959,22	
0,2	 0,8	 212,95	 0	 13.933,95	 583,45	 3128,65	 17.062,6	
0,1	 0,9	 1.437,75	 0	 33.581,97	 2.144,34	 15.476,60	 49.058,57	
















• Hypothesis 2: investment costs sustained for the 75% by the Private Company and for 
25% by the State	
	
Table	43	A	
	 P	 0		 50	 100	 150	 200	 227,19	
>á	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
" > 	 9.535,74	 10.337,83	 11.139,93	 11.942,02	 12.744,12	 13.180,31	
>ù	 234,05	 297,77	 361,49	 425,21	 488,93	 523,58	

















w	S	 w	P	 !∗ß	 >á	 " > 	 >ù	 "ù > 	 V	project	
1	 0	 0	 0	 9.535,74	 234,05	 7.423,48	 16.959,22	
0,9	 0,1	 0	 0	 9.535,74	 234,05	 7.423,48	 16.959,22	
0,8	 0,2	 0	 0	 9.535,74	 234,05	 7.423,48	 16.959,22	
0,7	 0,3	 0	 0	 9.535,74	 234,05	 7.423,48	 16.959,22	
0,6	 0,4	 0	 0	 9.535,74	 234,05	 7.423,48	 16.959,22	
0,5	 0,5	 0	 0	 9.535,74	 234,05	 7.423,48	 16.959,22	
0,4	 0,6	 0	 0	 9.535,74	 234,05	 7.423,48	 16.959,22	
0,3	 0,7	 0	 0	 9.535,74	 234,05	 7.423,48	 16.959,22	
0,2	 0,8	 212,95	 0	 12.951,91	 505,44	 4.007,3	 16.959,22	
0,1	 0,9	 1.437,75	 0	 32.599,93	 2.066,32	 14.913,53	 47.513,46	




















• Hypothesis 3: investment costs sustained for the 50% by the Private Company and for 
50% by the State	
	
Table	45	A	
P	 0		 50	 100	 150	 200	 250	 288,41	
>á	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
" > 	 8.553,7	 9.355,8	 10.157,89	 10.959,99	 11.762,08	 12.564,18	 13.180,31	
>ù	 156,03	 219,75	 283,47	 347,19	 410,91	 474,63	 523,58	



















w	S	 w	P	 !∗ß	 >á	 " > 	 >ù	 "ù > 	 V	project	
1	 0	 0	 0	 8.553,7	 156,03	 8.405,52	 16.959,22	
0,9	 0,1	 0	 0	 8.553,7	 156,03	 8.405,52	 16.959,22	
0,8	 0,2	 0	 0	 8.553,7	 156,03	 8.405,52	 16.959,22	
0,7	 0,3	 0	 0	 8.553,7	 156,03	 8.405,52	 16.959,22	
0,6	 0,4	 0	 0	 8.553,7	 156,03	 8.405,52	 16.959,22	
0,5	 0,5	 0	 0	 8.553,7	 156,03	 8.405,52	 16.959,22	
0,4	 0,6	 0	 0	 8.553,7	 156,03	 8.405,52	 16.959,22	
0,3	 0,7	 0	 0	 8.553,7	 156,03	 8.405,52	 16.959,22	
0,2	 0,8	 212,95	 0	 11.969,88	 427,42	 4.989,34	 16.959,22	
0,1	 0,9	 1.437,75	 0	 31.617,89	 1.988,3	 14.350,46	 45.968,35	





















• Hypothesis 4: investment costs sustained for the 25% by the Private Company and for 
75% by the State	
	
Table	47	A	
P	 0		 100	 200	 300	 349,62	
>á	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
" > 	 7.571,66	 9.175,85	 10.780,04	 12.384,24	 13.180,31	
>ù	 78,02	 205,46	 332,9	 460,34	 523,58	













w	S	 w	P	 !∗ß	 >á	 " > 	 >ù	 "ù > 	 V	project	
1	 0	 0	 0	 7.571,66	 78,02	 9.387,56	 16.959,22	
0,9	 0,1	 0	 0	 7.571,66	 78,02	 9.387,56	 16.959,22	
0,8	 0,2	 0	 0	 7.571,66	 78,02	 9.387,56	 16.959,22	
0,7	 0,3	 0	 0	 7.571,66	 78,02	 9.387,56	 16.959,22	
0,6	 0,4	 0	 0	 7.571,66	 78,02	 9.387,56	 16.959,22	
0,5	 0,5	 0	 0	 7.571,66	 78,02	 9.387,56	 16.959,22	
0,4	 0,6	 0	 0	 7.571,66	 78,02	 9.387,56	 16.959,22	
0,3	 0,7	 0	 0	 7.571,66	 78,02	 9.387,56	 16.959,22	
0,2	 0,8	 212,95	 0	 10.987,84	 349,4	 5.971,38	 16.959,22	
0,1	 0,9	 1.437,75	 0	 30.635,85	 1.910,29	 13.787,39	 44.423,24	





















• Hypothesis 5: investment costs sustained entirely by the State 
	
Table	49	A	
P	 0		 100	 200	 300	 400	 410.84	
>á	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
" > 	 6.589,63	 8.193,82	 9.798,01	 11.402,2	 13.006,39	 13.180,31	
>ù	 0	 127,44	 254,88	 382,32	 509,76	 523,58	
"ù > 	 10.369,59	 8.765,4	 7.161,21	 5.557,02	 3.952,83	 3.778,9	
V	
project	
16.959,22	 16.959,22	 16.959,22	 16.959,22	 16.959,22	 16.959,22	
	
Table	50	A	
w	S	 w	P	 !∗ß	 >á	 " > 	 >ù	 "ù > 	 V	project	
1	 0	 0	 0	 6.589,63	 0	 10.369,59	 16.959,22	
0,9	 0,1	 0	 0	 6.589,63	 0	 10.369,59	 16.959,22	
0,8	 0,2	 0	 0	 6.589,63	 0	 10.369,59	 16.959,22	
0,7	 0,3	 0	 0	 6.589,63	 0	 10.369,59	 16.959,22	
0,6	 0,4	 0	 0	 6.589,63	 0	 10.369,59	 16.959,22	
0,5	 0,5	 0	 0	 6.589,63	 0	 10.369,59	 16.959,22	
0,4	 0,6	 0	 0	 6.589,63	 0	 10.369,59	 16.959,22	
0,3	 0,7	 0	 0	 6.589,63	 0	 10.369,59	 16.959,22	
0,2	 0,8	 212,95	 0	 10.005,8	 271,39	 6.953,42	 16.959,22	
0,1	 0,9	 1.437,75	 0	 29.653,82	 1.832,27	 32.872,33	 62.526,15	


























§ Example 4 (™ = ¥“%) 
• Hypothesis 1: investment costs sustained entirely by the Private Company 
	
Table	51	A	
P	 0		 25	 54,99	
>á	 0	 0	 0	
" > 	 10.517,78	 10.918,82	 11.399,89	
>ù	 427,56	 514,87	 523,58	
"ù > 	 6.441,44	 5.639,35	 5.559,33	
V	project	 16.959,22	 16.959,22	 16.959,22	
	
Table	52A	
w	S	 w	P	 !∗ß	 >á	 " > 	 >ù	 "ù > 	 V	project	
1	 0	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 427,56	 6.441,44	 16.959,22	
0,9	 0,1	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 427,56	 6.441,44	 16.959,22	
0,8	 0,2	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 427,56	 6.441,44	 16.959,22	
0,7	 0,3	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 427,56	 6.441,44	 16.959,22	
0,6	 0,4	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 427,56	 6.441,44	 16.959,22	
0,5	 0,5	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 427,56	 6.441,44	 16.959,22	
0,4	 0,6	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 427,56	 6.441,44	 16.959,22	
0,3	 0,7	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 427,56	 6.441,44	 16.959,22	
0,2	 0,8	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 427,56	 6.441,44	 16.959,22	
0,1	 0,9	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 427,56	 6.441,44	 16.959,22	
















• Hypothesis 2: investment costs sustained for the 75% by the Private Company and for 
25% by the State	
	
Table	53	A	
P	 0		 50	 100	 116,21	
>á	 0	 0	 0	 0	
" > 	 9.535,74	 10.337,83	 11.139,93	 11.399,89	
>ù	 320,67	 407,98	 495,28	 523,58	











w	S	 w	P	 !∗ß	 >á	 " > 	 >ù	 "ù > 	 V	project	
1	 0	 0	 0	 9.535,74	 320,67	 7.423,48	 16.959,22	
0,9	 0,1	 0	 0	 9.535,74	 320,67	 7.423,48	 16.959,22	
0,8	 0,2	 0	 0	 9.535,74	 320,67	 7.423,48	 16.959,22	
0,7	 0,3	 0	 0	 9.535,74	 320,67	 7.423,48	 16.959,22	
0,6	 0,4	 0	 0	 9.535,74	 320,67	 7.423,48	 16.959,22	
0,5	 0,5	 0	 0	 9.535,74	 320,67	 7.423,48	 16.959,22	
0,4	 0,6	 0	 0	 9.535,74	 320,67	 7.423,48	 16.959,22	
0,3	 0,7	 0	 0	 9.535,74	 320,67	 7.423,48	 16.959,22	
0,2	 0,8	 0	 0	 9.535,74	 320,67	 7.423,48	 16.959,22	
0,1	 0,9	 0	 0	 9.535,74	 320,67	 7.423,48	 16.959,22	


















• Hypothesis 3: investment costs sustained for the 50% by the Private Company and for 
50% by the State	
	
Table	55	A	
P	 0		 50	 100	 150	 177,42	
>á	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
" > 	 8.553,7	 9.355,8	 10.157,89	 10.959,99	 11.399,89	
>ù	 213,78	 301,09	 388,39	 475,7	 523,58	
"ù > 	 8.405,52	 7.603,42	 6.801,33	 5.999,23	 5.559,33	
V	project	 16.959,22	
	
16.959,22	 16.959,22	 16.959,22	 16.959,22	
	
Table	56	A	
w	S	 w	P	 !∗ß	 >á	 " > 	 >ù	 "ù > 	 V	project	
1	 0	 0	 0	 8.553,7	 213,78	 8.405,52	 16.959,22	
0,9	 0,1	 0	 0	 8.553,7	 213,78	 8.405,52	 16.959,22	
0,8	 0,2	 0	 0	 8.553,7	 213,78	 8.405,52	 16.959,22	
0,7	 0,3	 0	 0	 8.553,7	 213,78	 8.405,52	 16.959,22	
0,6	 0,4	 0	 0	 8.553,7	 213,78	 8.405,52	 16.959,22	
0,5	 0,5	 0	 0	 8.553,7	 213,78	 8.405,52	 16.959,22	
0,4	 0,6	 0	 0	 8.553,7	 213,78	 8.405,52	 16.959,22	
0,3	 0,7	 0	 0	 8.553,7	 213,78	 8.405,52	 16.959,22	
0,2	 0,8	 0	 0	 8.553,7	 213,78	 8.405,52	 16.959,22	
0,1	 0,9	 0	 0	 8.553,7	 213,78	 8.405,52	 16.959,22	
















• Hypothesis 4: investment costs sustained for the 25% by the Private Company and for 
75% by the State	
	
Table	57	A	
P	 0		 50	 100	 150	 200	 238,64	
>á	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
" > 	 7.571,66	 8.373,76	 9.175,85	 9.977,95	 10.780,04	 11.399,89	
>ù	 106,89	 194,2	 281,5	 368,81	 456,11	 523,58	















w	S	 w	P	 !∗ß	 >á	 " > 	 >ù	 "ù > 	 V	project	
1	 0	 0	 0	 7.571,66	 106,89	 9.387,56	 16.959,22	
0,9	 0,1	 0	 0	 7.571,66	 106,89	 9.387,56	 16.959,22	
0,8	 0,2	 0	 0	 7.571,66	 106,89	 9.387,56	 16.959,22	
0,7	 0,3	 0	 0	 7.571,66	 106,89	 9.387,56	 16.959,22	
0,6	 0,4	 0	 0	 7.571,66	 106,89	 9.387,56	 16.959,22	
0,5	 0,5	 0	 0	 7.571,66	 106,89	 9.387,56	 16.959,22	
0,4	 0,6	 0	 0	 7.571,66	 106,89	 9.387,56	 16.959,22	
0,3	 0,7	 0	 0	 7.571,66	 106,89	 9.387,56	 16.959,22	
0,2	 0,8	 0	 0	 7.571,66	 106,89	 9.387,56	 16.959,22	
0,1	 0,9	 0	 0	 7.571,66	 106,89	 9.387,56	 16.959,22	





















• Hypothesis 5: investment costs sustained entirely by the State 
	
Table	59	A	
P	 0		 50	 100	 150	 200	 250	 299,86	
>á	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
" > 	 6.589,63	 7.391,72	 8.193,82	 8.995,91	 9.798,01	 10.600,1	 11.399,89	
>ù	 0	 87,31	 174,61	 261,92	 349,22	 436,53	 523,58	

















w	S	 w	P	 !∗ß	 >á	 " > 	 >ù	 "ù > 	 V	project	
1	 0	 0	 0	 6.589,63	 0	 10.369,59	 16.959,22	
0,9	 0,1	 0	 0	 6.589,63	 0	 10.369,59	 16.959,22	
0,8	 0,2	 0	 0	 6.589,63	 0	 10.369,59	 16.959,22	
0,7	 0,3	 0	 0	 6.589,63	 0	 10.369,59	 16.959,22	
0,6	 0,4	 0	 0	 6.589,63	 0	 10.369,59	 16.959,22	
0,5	 0,5	 0	 0	 6.589,63	 0	 10.369,59	 16.959,22	
0,4	 0,6	 0	 0	 6.589,63	 0	 10.369,59	 16.959,22	
0,3	 0,7	 0	 0	 6.589,63	 0	 10.369,59	 16.959,22	
0,2	 0,8	 0	 0	 6.589,63	 0	 10.369,59	 16.959,22	
0,1	 0,9	 0	 0	 6.589,63	 0	 10.369,59	 16.959,22	






















§ Example 5 (” = ‘’÷–, ◊	€) 





" > 	 10.517,78	 11.017,66	
>ù	 492,26	 523,58	




w	S	 w	P	 !∗ß	 >á	 " > 	 >ù	 "ù > 	 V	project	
1	 0	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 492,26	 2.513,29	 13.031,07	
0,9	 0,1	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 492,26	 2.513,29	 13.031,07	
0,8	 0,2	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 492,26	 2.513,29	 13.031,07	
0,7	 0,3	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 492,26	 2.513,29	 13.031,07	
0,6	 0,4	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 492,26	 2.513,29	 13.031,07	
0,5	 0,5	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 492,26	 2.513,29	 13.031,07	
0,4	 0,6	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 492,26	 2.513,29	 13.031,07	
0,3	 0,7	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 492,26	 2.513,29	 13.031,07	
0,2	 0,8	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 492,26	 2.513,29	 13.031,07	
0,1	 0,9	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 492,26	 2.513,29	 13.031,07	
















• Hypothesis 2: investment costs sustained for the 75% by the Private Company and for 
25% by the State	
	
Table	63	A	
P	 	0	 100	 153,6	
>á	 0	 0	 0	
" > 	 8.553,7	 10.157,89	 11.017,66	
>ù	 369,19	 469,71	 523,58	






w	S	 w	P	 !∗ß	 >á	 " > 	 >ù	 "ù > 	 V	project	
1	 0	 0	 0	 8.553,7	 369,19	 4.477,37	 13.031,07	
0,9	 0,1	 0	 0	 8.553,7	 369,19	 4.477,37	 13.031,07	
0,8	 0,2	 0	 0	 8.553,7	 369,19	 4.477,37	 13.031,07	
0,7	 0,3	 0	 0	 8.553,7	 369,19	 4.477,37	 13.031,07	
0,6	 0,4	 0	 0	 8.553,7	 369,19	 4.477,37	 13.031,07	
0,5	 0,5	 0	 0	 8.553,7	 369,19	 4.477,37	 13.031,07	
0,4	 0,6	 0	 0	 8.553,7	 369,19	 4.477,37	 13.031,07	
0,3	 0,7	 0	 0	 8.553,7	 369,19	 4.477,37	 13.031,07	
0,2	 0,8	 0	 0	 8.553,7	 369,19	 4.477,37	 13.031,07	
0,1	 0,9	 0	 0	 8.553,7	 369,19	 4.477,37	 13.031,07	






















• Hypothesis 3: investment costs sustained for the 50% by the Private Company and for 
50% by the State	
	
Table	65	A	
P	 0		 100	 200	 276,03	
>á	 0	 0	 0	 0	
" > 	 6.589,63	 8.193,82	 9.798,01	 11.017,66	
>ù	 246,13	 346,64	 447,16	 523,58	
"ù > 	 6.441,44	 4.837,25	 3.233,06	 2.013,41	
V	project	 13.031,07	 13.031,07	 13.031,07	 13.031,07	
	
Table	66	A	
w	S	 w	P	 !∗ß	 >á	 " > 	 >ù	 "ù > 	 V	project	
1	 0	 0	 0	 6.589,63	 246,13	 6.441,44	 13.031,07	
0,9	 0,1	 0	 0	 6.589,63	 246,13	 6.441,44	 13.031,07	
0,8	 0,2	 0	 0	 6.589,63	 246,13	 6.441,44	 13.031,07	
0,7	 0,3	 0	 0	 6.589,63	 246,13	 6.441,44	 13.031,07	
0,6	 0,4	 0	 0	 6.589,63	 246,13	 6.441,44	 13.031,07	
0,5	 0,5	 0	 0	 6.589,63	 246,13	 6.441,44	 13.031,07	
0,4	 0,6	 0	 0	 6.589,63	 246,13	 6.441,44	 13.031,07	
0,3	 0,7	 0	 0	 6.589,63	 246,13	 6.441,44	 13.031,07	
0,2	 0,8	 0	 0	 6.589,63	 246,13	 6.441,44	 13.031,07	
0,1	 0,9	 0	 0	 6.589,63	 246,13	 6.441,44	 13.031,07	























• Hypothesis 4: investment costs sustained for the 25% by the Private Company and for 
75% by the State	
	
Table	67	A	
P	 0		 100	 200	 300	 398,46	
>á	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
" > 	 4.625,55	 6.229,74	 7.833,93	 9.438,12	 11.017,66	
>ù	 123,06	 223,58	 324,09	 424,61	 523,58	













w	S	 w	P	 !∗ß	 >á	 " > 	 >ù	 "ù > 	 V	project	
1	 0	 0	 0	 4.625,55	 123,06	 8.405,52	 13.031,07	
0,9	 0,1	 0	 0	 4.625,55	 123,06	 8.405,52	 13.031,07	
0,8	 0,2	 0	 0	 4.625,55	 123,06	 8.405,52	 13.031,07	
0,7	 0,3	 0	 0	 4.625,55	 123,06	 8.405,52	 13.031,07	
0,6	 0,4	 0	 0	 4.625,55	 123,06	 8.405,52	 13.031,07	
0,5	 0,5	 0	 0	 4.625,55	 123,06	 8.405,52	 13.031,07	
0,4	 0,6	 0	 0	 4.625,55	 123,06	 8.405,52	 13.031,07	
0,3	 0,7	 0	 0	 4.625,55	 123,06	 8.405,52	 13.031,07	
0,2	 0,8	 0	 0	 4.625,55	 123,06	 8.405,52	 13.031,07	
0,1	 0,9	 0	 0	 4.625,55	 123,06	 8.405,52	 13.031,07	





















• Hypothesis 5: investment costs sustained entirely by the State 
	
Table	69	A	
P	 0		 100	 200	 300	 400	 500	 520,9	
>á	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	
" > 	 2.661,48	 4.265,67	 5.869,86	 7.474,05	 9.078,24	 10.682,43	 11.017,66	
>ù	 0	 100,52	 201,03	 301,55	 402,06	 502,58	 523,58	





13.031,07	 13.031,07	 13.031,07	 13.031,07	 13.031,07	 13.031,07	
	
Table	70	A	
w	S	 w	P	 !∗ß	 >á	 " > 	 >ù	 "ù > 	 V	project	
1	 0	 0	 0	 2.661,48	 0	 10.369,59	 13.031,07	
0,9	 0,1	 0	 0	 2.661,48	 0	 10.369,59	 13.031,07	
0,8	 0,2	 0	 0	 2.661,48	 0	 10.369,59	 13.031,07	
0,7	 0,3	 0	 0	 2.661,48	 0	 10.369,59	 13.031,07	
0,6	 0,4	 0	 0	 2.661,48	 0	 10.369,59	 13.031,07	
0,5	 0,5	 0	 0	 2.661,48	 0	 10.369,59	 13.031,07	
0,4	 0,6	 0	 0	 2.661,48	 0	 10.369,59	 13.031,07	
0,3	 0,7	 0	 0	 2.661,48	 0	 10.369,59	 13.031,07	
0,2	 0,8	 0	 0	 2.661,48	 0	 10.369,59	 13.031,07	
0,1	 0,9	 0	 0	 2.661,48	 0	 10.369,59	 13.031,07	

























§ Example 6 (” = ≥≥. ‘’œ, œ÷€) 





" > 	 10.517,78	
>ù	 738,39	




w	S	 w	P	 !∗ß	 >á	 " > 	 >ù	 "ù > 	 V	project	
1	 0	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 738,39	 483,38	 11.001,16	
0,9	 0,1	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 738,39	 483,38	 11.001,16	
0,8	 0,2	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 738,39	 483,38	 11.001,16	
0,7	 0,3	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 738,39	 483,38	 11.001,16	
0,6	 0,4	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 738,39	 483,38	 11.001,16	
0,5	 0,5	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 738,39	 483,38	 11.001,16	
0,4	 0,6	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 738,39	 483,38	 11.001,16	
0,3	 0,7	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 738,39	 483,38	 11.001,16	
0,2	 0,8	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 738,39	 483,38	 11.001,16	
0,1	 0,9	 0	 0	 10.517,78	 738,39	 483,38	 11.001,16	
















• Hypothesis 2: investment costs sustained for the 75% by the Private Company and for 





" > 	 7.571,66	
>ù	 553,79	





w	S	 w	P	 !∗ß	 >á	 " > 	 >ù	 "ù > 	 V	project	
1	 0	 0	 0	 7.571,66	 553,79	 1.595,22	 9.166,88	
0,9	 0,1	 0	 0	 7.571,66	 553,79	 1.595,22	 9.166,88	
0,8	 0,2	 0	 0	 7.571,66	 553,79	 1.595,22	 9.166,88	
0,7	 0,3	 0	 0	 7.571,66	 553,79	 1.595,22	 9.166,88	
0,6	 0,4	 0	 0	 7.571,66	 553,79	 1.595,22	 9.166,88	
0,5	 0,5	 0	 0	 7.571,66	 553,79	 1.595,22	 9.166,88	
0,4	 0,6	 0	 0	 7.571,66	 553,79	 1.595,22	 9.166,88	
0,3	 0,7	 0	 0	 7.571,66	 553,79	 1.595,22	 9.166,88	
0,2	 0,8	 0	 0	 7.571,66	 553,79	 1.595,22	 9.166,88	
0,1	 0,9	 0	 0	 7.571,66	 553,79	 1.595,22	 9.166,88	






















• Hypothesis 3: investment costs sustained for the 50% by the Private Company and for 
50% by the State	
	
Table	75	A	
P	 0		 100	 153,6	
>á	 0	 0	 0	
" > 	 4.625,55	 6.229,74	 7.089,51	
>ù	 369,19	 469,71	 523,58	









w	S	 w	P	 !∗ß	 >á	 " > 	 >ù	 "ù > 	 V	project	
1	 0	 0	 0	 4.625,55	 369,19	 4.477,37	 9.102,92	
0,9	 0,1	 0	 0	 4.625,55	 369,19	 4.477,37	 9.102,92	
0,8	 0,2	 0	 0	 4.625,55	 369,19	 4.477,37	 9.102,92	
0,7	 0,3	 0	 0	 4.625,55	 369,19	 4.477,37	 9.102,92	
0,6	 0,4	 0	 0	 4.625,55	 369,19	 4.477,37	 9.102,92	
0,5	 0,5	 0	 0	 4.625,55	 369,19	 4.477,37	 9.102,92	
0,4	 0,6	 0	 0	 4.625,55	 369,19	 4.477,37	 9.102,92	
0,3	 0,7	 0	 0	 4.625,55	 369,19	 4.477,37	 9.102,92	
0,2	 0,8	 0	 0	 4.625,55	 369,19	 4.477,37	 9.102,92	
0,1	 0,9	 0	 0	 4.625,55	 369,19	 4.477,37	 9.102,92	























• Hypothesis 4: investment costs sustained for the 25% by the Private Company and for 
75% by the State	
	
Table	77	A	
P	 0		 100	 200	 300	 337,25	
>á	 223,25	 0	 0	 0	 0	
" > 	 1.679,44	 3.283,63	 4.887,82	 6.492,01	 7.089,51	
>ù	 184,6	 285,11	 385,63	 486,14	 523,58	













w	S	 w	P	 !∗ß	 >á	 " > 	 >ù	 "ù > 	 V	project	
1	 0	 0	 223,25	 1.679,44	 184,6	 7.423,48	 9.102,92	
0,9	 0,1	 0	 223,25	 1.679,44	 184,6	 7.423,48	 9.102,92	
0,8	 0,2	 0	 223,25	 1.679,44	 184,6	 7.423,48	 9.102,92	
0,7	 0,3	 0	 223,25	 1.679,44	 184,6	 7.423,48	 9.102,92	
0,6	 0,4	 0	 223,25	 1.679,44	 184,6	 7.423,48	 9.102,92	
0,5	 0,5	 0	 223,25	 1.679,44	 184,6	 7.423,48	 9.102,92	
0,4	 0,6	 0	 223,25	 1.679,44	 184,6	 7.423,48	 9.102,92	
0,3	 0,7	 0	 223,25	 1.679,44	 184,6	 7.423,48	 9.102,92	
0,2	 0,8	 0	 223,25	 1.679,44	 184,6	 7.423,48	 9.102,92	
0,1	 0,9	 0	 223,25	 1.679,44	 184,6	 7.423,48	 9.102,92	






















• Hypothesis 5: investment costs sustained entirely by the State 
	
Table	79	A	
P	 0		 100	 200	 300	 400	 500	 520,9	
>á	 971,41	 564,02	 156,64	 0	 0	 0	 0	
" > 	 38,21	 535,15	 1.941,71	 3.545,9	 5.150,09	 6.754,28	 7.089,51	
>ù	 0	 100,52	 201,03	 301,55	 402,06	 502,58	 523,58	
"ù > 	 10.369,59	 8.765,4	 7.161,21	 5.557,02	 3.952,83	 2.348,64	 2.013,41	
V	project	 10.407,8	
	
9.300,55	 9.102,92	 9.102,92	 9.102,92	 9.102,92	 9.102,92	
	
Table	80	A	
w	S	 w	P	 !∗ß	 >á	 " > 	 >ù	 "ù > 	 V	project	
1	 0	 0	 971,41	 38,21	 0	 10.369,59	 10.407,8	
0,9	 0,1	 0	 971,41	 38,21	 0	 10.369,59	 10.407,8	
0,8	 0,2	 0	 971,41	 38,21	 0	 10.369,59	 10.407,8	
0,7	 0,3	 0	 971,41	 38,21	 0	 10.369,59	 10.407,8	
0,6	 0,4	 0	 971,41	 38,21	 0	 10.369,59	 10.407,8	
0,5	 0,5	 0	 971,41	 38,21	 0	 10.369,59	 10.407,8	
0,4	 0,6	 0	 971,41	 38,21	 0	 10.369,59	 10.407,8	
0,3	 0,7	 0	 971,41	 38,21	 0	 10.369,59	 10.407,8	
0,2	 0,8	 0	 971,41	 38,21	 0	 10.369,59	 10.407,8	
0,1	 0,9	 0	 971,41	 38,21	 0	 10.369,59	 10.407,8	
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